

The Story of the Civil War

By John Codman Ropes

and

William Roscoe Livermore

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The Story of the Civil War

A Concise Account of the War in the United States of
America between 1861 and 1865, in Continuation
of the Story by John Codman Ropes

By

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Forms," etc.

With Maps and Plans

Part III

The Campaigns of 1863 to July 10th

Together with the Operations on the Mississippi from April, 1862

Book II.

Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Tullahoma, and Gettysburg

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II	2	X, II	11	XIV	20	XX, I	29
III	3	XI, I	12	XV	21	XX, II	30
IV	4	XI, II	13	XVI, I	22	XXI	31
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CHAPTER VIII

OPERATIONS AROUND VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON.

ON the 30th of April, Grant has about 97,000 officers¹ and men present for duty; of whom 51,000 are operating against Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, 5000 at Helena, 33,000 between Memphis and Corinth, and the rest in western Kentucky and Tennessee. Of 35,000 in Louisiana, Banks thinks he can spare 15,000 to operate against Port Hudson, or to help Grant in his campaign against *Pemberton*. Situation
April 30th.

Pemberton has about 51,000;² 13,000 at Vicksburg, 4000 between the city and Haynes's Bluff, 9000 between Vicksburg and Port Gibson, 5000 at Jackson, 10,000 scattered through the State of Mississippi, and 11,000 at Port Hudson in Louisiana.

Upon the whole, the proportion of strength on land is about as two to one in Grant's favor, but on the water the Federal navy is supreme, and under its protection Grant's supplies can be brought on the Mississippi from Memphis to Young's Point, or up the Yazoo as far as Haynes's Bluff, and from the western bank below Vicksburg to Grand Gulf, or any point in that neighborhood. In this way, his base line is trans-

¹ 38 R., 249. For organization, see pp. 317, 296, 273.

² 38 R., 702, etc. The numbers for the Confederates are approximate only; they are taken from a comparison of all the records; the last report given was for March 31st. See Map, p. 243.

ferred to the heart of his enemy's country. He has a fair knowledge of his enemy's strength, and has nothing to fear for the safety of the men who have crossed. *Pemberton* has failed to oppose their landing, and now can hardly assemble a large enough force to attack them. On the other hand, they have not yet reached the bluffs, and if *Pemberton* can hold them in check until his forces are assembled, he may perhaps detain them until his reinforcements come up from Mobile and Tennessee.


Once in possession of the bluffs, Grant can reasonably expect to hold out until the rest of his troops cross the river. He can take Grand Gulf; and establish a base there, supplying it by wagons over

Comment. the road from Millikens Bend, and by such craft as can from time to time run by the batteries at Vicksburg and come down the Mississippi. He proposes to detach an army corps to Banks at Port Hudson, which cannot then hold out very long. When it falls, the lower Mississippi will be open, Grand Gulf will be supplied from New Orleans, Banks will return Grant's corps with 15,000 men from his own command, and Grant will then advance along the line of the Big Black River and attack either Jackson or Vicksburg. No time must be lost.¹ Grant deems it a matter of vast importance that the highlands shall be reached without resistance.²

Two roads led from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson. The northern followed the left bank of Bayou Pierre, and the southern branched off to the right and entered the road leading from Rodney and Bowen at a point about three miles west of Port Port Gibson. Gibson and about two miles south of the north road. About four miles west of Port Gibson,




¹ 36 R., 48.

² See Map, p. 273.



BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON MAY 1, 1863

SCALE [APPROXIMATE ONLY]



the north and south roads, which were here a mile and a half apart, were connected by a cross-road.

On the 30th of April, *Bowen*, in command at Grand Gulf, sent out about 500 men¹ to occupy those roads.² During the night, *Green's*³ brigade was put in position on the south road and *Tracy's*, which came up by a forced march from Warrenton, on the cross-road.

McClermand's corps, XIII, landed at noon of the 30th,⁴ and after drawing three days' rations to put in their haversacks, at 4 P.M., were started on the south road to Port Gibson. McPherson's corps, XVII, followed as rapidly as they could cross the river. About 1 A.M., of the 1st of May,⁵ the Confederate pickets were driven back. Soon after sunrise, McClermand sent Osterhaus's division to attack the enemy's right; and Carr's and Hovey's, supported by A. J. Smith's, to attack their left.

The ground in this region is very irregular; cut up by deep ravines that have been hollowed out by the

¹ 36 R., 661.

² At Port Gibson:

Federals

³ 36 R., 663.

Corps.	Division.	Brigades.	Present
XIII	Osterhaus A. J. Smith Hovey Carr	Garrard, Sheldon	4,100
		Burbridge, Landram	4,100
		McGinnis, Slack	5,100
		Benton, Stone	4,000
XVII	Logan	J. E. Smith, Stevenson	4,300

Total

21,600

Confederates.

Division.	Brigades.	Present
Stevenson Smith Bowen	Tracy Baldwin Cockrell, Green	
		2,000
		2,000
		2,500

Total

6,500

⁴ 36 R., 48, 142.

⁵ 36 R., 664.

7.3772

streams in the clayey soil, leaving the banks in some places almost vertical. The roads, as far as practicable, follow the ridges, which are generally open, while the ravines are covered with dense thickets, vines, and cane-brakes. In the deepest ravines, the magnolia trees grow to gigantic size; and at this season of the year the aspect of the country is so grand and beautiful that it must have seemed like paradise to the Federal soldiers, who had been cooped up on the muddy banks of the Mississippi during the long and dreary winter.

Battle-field of Port Gibson. *Green's*¹ small brigade was posted on the crest of a hill running diagonally across the southern road near Magnolia Church². **Fight on southern road.** McClernand with Carr's and Hovey's divisions attacked him in front and flank and compelled him to fall back with heavy loss.

¹ 36 R., 672.

² The ground in front of his position was open, and exposed to the fire of his infantry and artillery; but on Green's right a dense thicket extended to within 200 yards of his position, and on his left nearly up to it. Benton's brigade, advancing south of the road, passed through ravines covered with timber, dense canebrake, and tangled thickets (36 R., 623), came upon Green's left flank, and closed up to within a short distance, while Stone's brigade could not advance along the road (36 R., 628), but crossed a deep hollow thickly covered with underbrush, and came to the open ground in front of Green's right. Neither side could advance. After a hard fight, Green's men were so tired that, under the cross fire from Benton and Stone, they could no longer stop the Federal advance.

Hovey's division then came up with McGinnis's brigade advancing in two lines of battle to Benton's support. His right wing was retarded by the thicket, while his left advanced in the open. Slack's brigade then came up on the left of McGinnis and McGinnis's left and Slack's right charged up the road at Green's centre, while Stone fired at his right flank, and Benton at his left. Benton then charged, and at 11 A.M., Green's men, becoming exhausted, and outflanked at both flanks, were compelled to fall back, losing two guns and several prisoners (36 R., 602, 606, 610, 620, 623, 673, 674).

Tracy's brigade was posted across the cross-road about a quarter of a mile from the Bruinsburg road, with his centre on an open ridge which the road follows, his right and left in wooded ravines. Fight on cross-road. *Osterhaus's* men made repeated efforts to advance over the open ground in front; but one regiment after another took shelter in the woods and ravines where, keeping up a fire on *Tracy's* position, they gradually gained ground on both flanks.

Grant came on the field in person at 10 A.M.¹ *McPherson* and *Logan* with *J. E. Smith's* and *Stevenson's* brigades, at 12 M.² Grant sent *Stevenson* to *McClermand*; and *Smith* to *Osterhaus* with orders to move to the left, and flank the enemy out of his position.

Meanwhile, when *Green* fell back, *Baldwin* had come up from Port Gibson, and *Bowen* had placed him on the Rodney road about a mile back of *Green's* position, sent *Green* to the right to reinforce *Tracy's* brigade, and brought *Cockrell* from Grand Gulf with two of his regiments to *Baldwin's* line and sent one to *Tracy's*.³ By means of counter-charges, and by keeping a bold front, *Bowen*, with less than 3000 men, for several hours held in check *McClermand* with 13,000. Fight on Rodney road.

On the other road, *J. E. Smith* formed his brigade in two lines on *Osterhaus's* left, and advanced through the

¹ I Grant, 483.

² 36 R., 643.

³ *Baldwin's* brigade (36 R., 675) took a position across the Rodney road on ground that was broken by wooded ravines. *McClermand* advanced with *Hovey's* division in front, supported by *Carr's*; and after a hard fight, outflanked *Baldwin's* left (36 R., 664), until *Cockrell* came and charged *Hovey's* right. Then, *Burbridge* of *A. J. Smith's* division came up in turn, drove *Cockrell* back, and rolled up *Baldwin's* left, while *Landram* reinforced *Hovey's* centre (36 R., 145). *Stevenson's* brigade of *Logan's* division arrived in time to assist in driving *Baldwin* from the field.

ravine to turn *Tracy's* right. When *Green* came to the relief of *Tracy's* men,¹ fearing that they would be cut off from the road to Port Gibson, he threw in his own brigade and *Cockrell's* regiment on *Tracy's* left, and drove *Osterhaus* back. About 3 P.M., when J. E. Smith appeared, *Green's* right² fell back, and took up a position behind the embankment of the cross-road facing west. About 5 P.M., *Tracy* was killed and *Green*, finding his position outflanked, drew off his men with little loss through a ravine that led to the Port Gibson road.

Another
fight on
cross-road.

Before sunset, all *Bowen's* forces passed in retreat to the left of Port Gibson, and took up a position on the north bank of Bayou Pierre, excepting *Baldwin's* brigade, which, cut off from the direct road, crossed both forks of the Bayou Pierre to rejoin *Bowen*; the bridges of course were destroyed. On the Federal side, *Dennis's* brigade of *Logan's* division came up at the close of the fight;³ *Crocker's* division landed at Bruinsburg on the 1st of May and came up on the morning of the 2d. Grant followed *Bowen* to within a mile or two of Port Gibson. Grant's losses at the battle of Port Gibson were reported as 875,⁴ *Bowen's* as 822.⁵

Bowen re-
treats; Grant
follows.

On the 2d, *Bowen* held⁶ his position on the north bank of Bayou Pierre, where he was joined by *Loring* with part of *Tilghman's* brigade. On the 3d, finding that Grand Gulf could not be held, *Bowen* withdrew the garrison. *Loring* then took command, and crossed⁷ by *Hankinson's* Ferry to the north bank of the Big Black River where he was joined by *Barton*, *Taylor*, and *Reynolds* of *Stevenson's* division, from Vicksburg.⁸

¹ 36 R., 673. ² 36 R., 680, 681. ³ 36 R., 644. ⁴ 36 R., 585. ⁵ 36 R., 667.

⁶ 36 R., 666.

⁷ 38 R., 823.

⁸ 36 R., 656, 657; 38 R., 823.

McPherson pursued the enemy to Hankinson's Ferry. McClelland followed, and halted at Willow Spring, leaving Lawler to guard the line from Bruinsburg.

At Port Gibson, Grant heard of the success of Grierson's raid,¹ and reports led him to believe that *Pemberton's* forces in eastern Mississippi had been scattered to oppose it. At about the same time, he heard² that troops were expected at Jackson from the southern cities with *Beauregard* in command. He then went in person to Grand Gulf, where he met the fleet and heard from Banks, who was on Red River, and who said that he could not arrive at Port Hudson until the 10th of May, and then with only 15,000 men.

Grant hears
from
Banks.

To wait for Banks would give the Confederates time to concentrate. Grant very wisely decides to move on. On the 3d of May,³ McClelland and McPherson, with 28,000 men, hold a strong position on the upland. McArthur of McPherson's corps can come in a few days with 4000, and Sherman with 17,000 more, and Hurlbut can send 10,000 from Memphis if required. Grant is not strong enough, however, to push on directly to Vicksburg without waiting for Sherman; for he would, as he says, be delayed in the broken country by *Pemberton's* army, which would grow stronger day by day from the troops that would come by rail from Jackson. Grant must unite his own army before attacking *Pemberton's*. Then, he can advance fearlessly along the line of Big Black River, and strike the railroad between Vicksburg and Jackson, having the navy for a base both above and below Vicksburg; and for a short campaign, he is not tied down to any line of operations;

Grant's
plans and
prospects.


¹ 1 Grant 488, 490; 36 R., 33. ² 36 R., 49. ³ See Map, XIV.


for he can live off the country as Halleck has repeatedly urged him to do. In his overland campaign in December, he found food and forage enough to support his army for two months, and on his way from Port Gibson to Grand Gulf, he has ascertained that beef and cattle, mutton, poultry, corn, and forage are abundant in this country,¹ so that all that he will have to transport are hard bread, coffee, salt, and ammunition.

If when Grant advances, *Pemberton* comes out to meet him, Grant's superior numbers will probably prevail. If *Pemberton* tries to join his reinforcements, Grant will try to take Vicksburg or to throw his forces between those of his enemy and beat them in detail. If, however, he is overpowered, he can, if prudent, fall back on Grand Gulf, or if his line of retreat in that direction is cut off, he can strike for Haynes's Bluff, or for some point on the long line of the Walnut Hills, which are wholly unprotected by nature against an attack from the rear.²


¹ I Grant, 488, 493, etc.

² Pemberton cannot hold them by a passive defence against an attack by the Federal navy in front and the Federal army in the rear. If he uncovers Vicksburg, Grant will step in. If he shuts himself up there with all his army, Grant will seize upon a point where he can supply his army directly from Memphis by way of the Mississippi and the Yazoo, under protection of the naval force which Porter has left for such purposes. This is all that Grant has been working for, the last six months. His reinforcements can pour down the Mississippi in a steady stream, and when he is strong enough, he can invest Vicksburg, and hold it until the garrison is either exhausted or starved. If Pemberton hopes to save his army and control the navigation of the Mississippi he must either beat Grant in the open field, or at least keep him from the line between Haynes's Bluff and Vicksburg. We shall presently see how Pemberton and Johnston propose to solve the problem that confronts them.






THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR BY FELIX L. LIVERMORE, VOL. 10



BY WILLIAM B. H.



On the 3d of May, Grant ordered Hurlbut at Memphis to send four regiments to Millikens Bend, and on the 5th to send Lauman's division also. While waiting at Hankinson's Ferry¹ for wagons and supplies, and for Sherman's corps to come up and join him, Grant made demonstrations to make the enemy believe that he intended to advance by the Hankinson's and Hall's Ferry roads and attack² Vicksburg at once. On the 5th, McPherson sent out reconnaissances³ for four or five miles, the result⁴ of which appeared to show that the main portion of the enemy's army had retreated across the river at Hankinson's Ferry, and were concentrating at Bovina Station near the Big Black on the Jackson & Vicksburg Railroad. On the 6th, Grant had heard that the enemy⁵ were bringing reinforcements from Bragg at Tullahoma, and wisely suggested to Halleck that Rosecrans should at least make a demonstration of advancing.

From the data published in the Official Record,⁶ it would appear that the number of officers and men⁷

¹ 36 R., 50.

² Grant, 493.

³ 38 R., 274.

⁴ 36 R., 636.

⁵ 36 R., 35.

⁶ 38 R., 249, etc.

⁷ Grant says in his memoirs (1 Grant, 481) that when Sherman came up on the 7th of May, his total force was about 33,000; and adds that the enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haynes's Bluff, and Jackson with a force of nearly 60,000 men. The figures taken from the Record though not absolutely accurate, can probably be relied upon to within ten per cent, and show the error of Grant's later estimate. At the time, Grant (1 Grant, 496) estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about 18,000 men, with smaller forces at Haynes's Bluff and Jackson. In this estimate he was not far astray; his mistake was made at a later date, and not like McClellan's at the time when he was called upon to act. It is much to Grant's credit that he did not base his plans upon his later estimate. If Pemberton's forces had been nearly twice as large as his own, instead of considerably smaller, the result would probably have been very different.

present for duty on the 7th of May in McClernand's corps and two divisions each of Sherman's and McPherson's, then with Grant, would be about 39,500, and the number of the Confederate forces¹ in this region about 32,000, of whom 3600 were in Vicksburg; 2000 at Warrenton; 2000 near Haynes's Bluff; 1000 at Jackson, and 23,400 in the movable army confronting Grant's 39,500.

On the 6th as Sherman was approaching with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, Grant ordered a general advance.²

Grant advances. During the night of the 6th, McPherson drew in his troops north of the Big Black.

All the ferries³ were to be closely guarded until the troops were well advanced. Grant's plan was to hug the Big Black River as closely as possible with McClernand's and Sherman's corps and get them to the railroad at some place between Edwards Depot and Bolton. McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and thence into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, public stores, etc., and then push west to rejoin the main force.

Advancing slowly, and making long halts to gather supplies from the country, and to give time for Blair and McArthur, who were guarding the communications, to rejoin their commands,⁴ McClernand and Sherman

¹ 38 R., 703, etc.

² I Grant, 494.

³ 36 R., 50.

⁴ On the 7th, A. J. Smith (38 R., 279) moved to the Little Sandy; Hovey (37 R., 40) and Carr (36 R., 616) to the Big Sandy; Logan (36 R., 636) and Crocker to Rocky Spring. Steele (36 R., 752) and Tuttle (36 R., 759) crossed to Grand Gulf. Blair, with two brigades, started from Millikens Bend.

On the 8th (36 R., 753, 759), Steele moved to Hankinson's Ferry, Tuttle to Willow Spring (36 R., 753, 759).

On the 9th, Tuttle moved to Rocky Spring, Logan and Crocker to Utica Cross Roads (38 R., 287; 36 R., 636); McPherson's cavalry drove the enemy's cavalry from Utica.

reached Fourteen Mile Creek, seven miles south of the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad, on the 12th. On the same day, two miles west of Raymond, McPherson, as we shall see, encountered *Gregg's* brigade, which had come from Port Hudson, and was advancing to meet him.

After a hard fight, McPherson drove back the enemy, and bivouacked in the outskirts of the town.¹

On this day, McArthur arrived at Grand Gulf with Ransom's and Hall's brigades. Blair,² with two hundred wagons besides his own train started from Grand Gulf and marched to Willow Spring.

On the 12th, Grant has gained the position he wanted.³ He has deployed 28,000 men over a front of eight or nine miles, within seven miles of the railroad from Vicksburg to Jackson; his left flank is well protected by the Big Black River and his right flank is made more than secure by McPherson's fight at Raymond. He knows

Grant controls the situation.

On the 10th, Osterhaus (37 R., 12) and Hovey moved to Five Mile Creek, A. J. Smith (38 R., 283) and Steele (36 R., 753) to Big Sandy; Logan and Crocker to Weeks (36 R., 636). Ransom's brigade of McArthur's division started (37 R., 297) from Grand Gulf.

On the 11th, A. J. Smith moved to Cayuga (38 R., 292), Logan and Crocker to Roach. Blair arrived at Grand Gulf (36 R., 753); Steele and Tuttle moved to Auburn. Blair (37 R., 255) with two brigades arrived at Grand Gulf.

On the 12th, McClernand (38 R., 296; 36 R., 50) with Hovey, Carr, and Osterhaus advanced to Fourteen Mile Creek by the Auburn and Edwards Station road; A. J. Smith (36 R., 146) to Baldwin's Ferry on the Big Black, and to Montgomery Bridge on Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman (36 R., 753) with Steele and Tuttle (36 R., 753) to Dillon's on this creek. Hovey (37 R., 41) encamped on both sides of the creek. After some skirmishing all the crossings were secured. McPherson with Logan and Crocker moved out on the road to Raymond (36 R., 637). Two miles west of this town, he met Gregg with his brigade from Port Hudson.

¹ 36 R., 716, 717.

² 37 R., 255.

³ See Map XIV at end.

that *Pemberton's* advance is at Edwards Station, and he believes that his main force, which he estimates at 18,000, is near the railroad crossing at Big Black Bridge. Grant's troops are well placed within supporting distance and between two large fractions of his enemy's forces.¹

On the 12th, Grant ordered² McClernand and Sherman to advance by parallel roads to Edwards Depot and to a point on the railroad between Edwards Station and Bolton. At about sunset, however, he heard that *Pemberton's* reinforcements had been met and defeated at Raymond, and had fallen back on Jackson; that others were arriving there daily; and that *Joe Johnston* was hourly expected to take command in person. It would hardly be prudent to send McPherson alone to Jackson with 11,000 men.

Grant thought he could make better use of the advantage that he had gained.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond . . . [he says³], I decided at once to turn the whole column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.⁴ . . . But by moving against Jackson, I cut my

* If McClernand and Sherman push on, they can gain the railroad and destroy it. If then, *Pemberton* falls back behind the Big Black, his reinforcements will have to make a wide circuit to join him. If he moves north to Brownsville, he can probably join his reinforcements at Livingston, or possibly at Clinton, but in that case he will uncover Vicksburg.

¹ 36 R., 50.

³ 1 Grant, 499.

⁴ "Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. A force was also collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore

own communication. So I finally decided to have none—to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears of my communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.

In the past five or six days Grant had only advanced at the average rate of about five miles a day.¹ Wagon trains had come up with rations on the 8th;² the troops had also found by experience that they could live off the country;³ on the 9th, the command at the front had on an average about three days' rations; Grant thought they could be made to last seven, and so notified his corps commanders.⁴ On the 11th, another train came up⁵. Grant countermanded the order to move on Edwards Depot, and gave orders to push right on to Jackson with Sherman's corps of 11,000 on one road, and McPherson's of 11,000 on another; and tried so to dispose of McClernand's 17,000 that he could reinforce one or the other if required, and meanwhile hold *Pemberton* in check, guard his rear, and protect Blair, who with 6000 men was coming from Willow Spring with 200 wagons loaded with rations, etc.

A popular account of this campaign might lead one to suppose that Grant cast aside all rules and principles,

determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction, and then turn on Pemberton."

We have already seen that Grant's earlier estimate of his enemy's forces was much nearer the truth than his later one. Pemberton had only about 32,000 men in all the region on Grant's left, and only about 23,400 in the movable army confronting Grant's 39,500.

¹ The distance from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg by the road is about forty miles; to Jackson, about seventy-five miles. Twelve days had elapsed since McClernand's corps landed at Bruinsburg, and now the most advanced division of Grant's army was but sixty miles from that point.

² 38 R., 284.

³ 38 R., 285.

⁴ 38 R., 285, 297.

⁵ 38 R., 297.

plunged with his army poorly provided with subsistence into the heart of the enemy's country, where he was

Comment. surrounded by superior forces, subjected his men to unusual privations for several weeks, and by sheer force of his originality and his rapid marches shattered these forces in a manner unknown to military science.

On the other hand, Grant had not been overtaxing nor endangering his army; but moving prudently and deliberately, even at the risk of losing his opportunity to strike his enemy's forces in detail, by leaving so long in their possession the only railroad that connected them.

On the 1st of May, when *Pemberton*, at Jackson, had finally realized that Grant had landed in force, he telegraphed¹ to the War Department² and to *Johnston* for reinforcements. The enemy's movement, he said, "threatened Jackson, and would, if successful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson from the east." The War Department ordered reinforcements³ from *Bragg*⁴ in Tennessee, from *Beauregard*⁴ in South Carolina, and from *Buckner* in Alabama. *Pemberton* called in all his available troops from Grenada,⁵ Columbus, Meridian,⁶ Jackson,⁷ and Port Hudson.⁸

On the 1st, *Johnston* telegraphed from Tullahoma⁹: "If Grant's army lands on this side of the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force."¹⁰ And on the 2d: "If Grant crosses, unite your troops to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it."

Reinforce-
ments for
Pemberton.

Instruc-
tions to
Pemberton.

¹ 38 R., 807.

² 36 R., 214.

³ 38 R., 807.

⁴ May 1st.

⁵ 38 R., 817; 36 R., 259. May 2d.

⁶ May 2d.

⁷ May 1st.

⁸ 38 R., 810. May 1st.

⁹ 38 R., 808.

¹⁰ 38 R., 815; 36 R., 329.

Johnston's advice was sound. *Pemberton* failed, first, in not meeting Grant when he landed; and second, in not meeting him in greater force before he reached the upland. On the 1st of May, however, *Pemberton* cannot assemble as strong a force as Grant; and, not being as good a commander, cannot hope to beat him until reinforcements arrive from other departments, which are obliged to pass through Jackson on their route. If *Pemberton* concentrates his troops to cover that point he may save his army, but will probably lose Vicksburg. Unless strong reinforcements are coming quickly, or unless the Confederate government proposes to abandon the defence of all other regions for that of the Mississippi, *Pemberton* had better evacuate Vicksburg at once and destroy what he cannot take away. On the 7th of May, however, he received a telegram from President Davis¹ saying: "Want of transportation of supplies must compel the enemy to seek a junction with their fleet after a few days' absence from it. To hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with Trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever it is in my power to do."

One course alone appears now to be open to *Pemberton*. By skilful movements he can perhaps hold the line of the Big Black River, keep Grant from crossing, and possibly take advantage of some mistake to beat him. He must hold the railroad to Jackson as long as he can without uncovering the Big Black.²

¹ 36 R., 327.

² If he loses the railroad, he must wait until reinforcements can find their way around Grant's army to join him. If *Pemberton* had a large force of cavalry to keep him informed of Grant's movements, his problem would not be so difficult. His cavalry is scattered in guarding the frontier against raids. He has asked for more, but it has not come.

We have seen that, on the 3d of May, all of *Stevenson's* and *Bowen's* divisions, *Baldwin's* brigade of *Smith's*, and part of *Tilghman's* of *Loring's* division were assembled on the right bank of the Big Black River at Hankinson's Ferry. The other two brigades of *Smith's* division were at Vicksburg. *Hébert's* of *Forney's* division was on the Walnut Hills, and *Moore's* at Warrenton.

Pemberton
falls back.

*Pemberton*¹ did not try to hold Hankinson's Ferry, but occupied the line of the Warrenton and Hall's Ferry road, and several positions on the Baldwin's Ferry road and thence to Bovina and Edwards Depot. On the 5th, he² moved his headquarters from Jackson to Vicksburg. On the 7th, receiving³ the message from President Davis, he ordered⁴ *Gardner*, who was coming from Port Hudson with *Maxey* and 5000 troops, to return with 2000 and hold it to the last. On the 10th, *Gregg*, who had started earlier from Port Hudson, arrived⁵ at Jackson.

On the 11th, *Pemberton*, thinking⁶ from the demonstrations at Baldwin's Ferry that Grant's movements were probably directed against Edwards Depot, sent *Gregg* to Raymond to support the cavalry scouting between that point and Edwards Depot, with orders⁷ to fall back on Jackson if the enemy advanced on him too strongly; but if they should approach Big Black Bridge, to be ready to attack them in rear or flank. He thought⁸

Engagement
at Raymond.

The chances of success are now decidedly in Grant's favor. Johnston (3 B. & L., 482) says that the Confederate reinforcements actually sent to Pemberton late in May could have been sent as well early in April and that this would have put Pemberton on at least equal terms with his antagonist.

¹ 36 R., 259. ² 38 R., 833. ³ 36 R., 259; 38 R., 842. ⁴ 38 R., 845.

⁵ 38 R., 851. ⁶ 38 R., 854; 36 R., 260. ⁷ 38 R., 856. ⁸ 36 R., 324.

that Raymond was a good point for the reinforcements to assemble for such a purpose.¹ *Walker's* brigade,² which arrived at Jackson soon after from South Carolina, was ordered to Raymond to support *Gregg* or to cover his retreat. *Gregg* with about 2600 men met *Logan* of *McPherson's* corps with 6000; and, as we saw, was driven back. *McPherson's* loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 442 men;³ *Gregg's*, 514.⁴

On the 12th, when the skirmishing at Fourteen Mile Creek proved that *Grant* was advancing in force in that direction,⁵ *Pemberton* moved to the left; *Bowen's* division,⁶ to *Edwards Depot*, *Loring's* two brigades⁷ to *Big Black Bridge*, and *Stevenson's*⁸ to *Lanier's* and *Bovina*. He kept three brigades on the old line from *Warrenton* to the *Big Black*, and brought up *Vaughn* from *Smith's* division to *Mt. Alban*.

Pemberton
moves to
Edwards
Depot.

He moved his headquarters to *Bovina*; and telegraphed to *Johnston*⁹ that the enemy were moving their heavy force toward *Edwards Depot* and that he would do all he could to meet them. That, he said, would be the battle-field if he could carry forward sufficient force, and leave troops to secure the safety of *Vicksburg*. He again urgently asked for cavalry, said that he was largely outnumbered, and obliged to hold back a large force on the *Big Black* lest the enemy cross and take *Vicksburg*; and to keep a considerable force on either flank of *Vicksburg* out of supporting distance. On the

¹ In this he showed little judgment. It was well to send a strong enough force to support the cavalry in its reconnaissance; but it was unsafe to try to organize an attack on *Grant's* army from this quarter.

² 38 R., 856, 858; 36 R., 324, 325.

³ 36 R., 706.

⁴ 36 R., 739.

⁵ 36 R., 260.

⁶ 38 R., 863.

⁷ 38 R., 861.

⁸ 38 R., 865.

⁹ 38 R., 89.

13th, *Pemberton* took up a strong position about a mile south of Edwards Depot.¹

On the 13th, Steele and Tuttle of Sherman's corps moved to Mississippi Springs;² Logan and Crocker of McPherson's corps to Clinton,³ destroying the railroad and telegraph as far as possible. To deceive the enemy as to the point of

Grant moves
on Jackson.

¹ 36 R., 261; 37 R., 74. On the 4th (38 R., 829; 36 R., 656, 657) Loring went to Mt. Alban. Bowen one mile (38 R., 827) east of Bovina. Featherston (38 R., 829) arrived at Edwards Depot. Taylor and Baldwin went with Loring (38 R., 829, 830) and were posted near Hall's Ferry. Stevenson, Barton, Lee (38 R., 829, 830), and Reynolds on the Warrenton and Hall's Ferry road. Buford arrived at Jackson (38 R., 828). Gardner was ordered to come from Port Hudson with 5000 men (38 R., 828) including Maxey's brigade.

On the 5th, Tilghman, Featherston, and Buford, all of Loring's division, assembled at Edwards Depot (38 R., 836). Bowen went (38 R., 834) to Big Black Bridge. Pemberton moved his headquarters from Jackson to (38 R., 838) Vicksburg.

On the 6th, Loring went to Lanier's (38 R., 840), guarding roads to Baldwin's Ferry. Bowen moved to south and east side (38 R., 834) of Big Black Bridge, and sent a regiment to Edwards Depot.

On the 10th, Loring moved to Whittaker's (38 R., 843). Gregg arrived at Jackson (38 R., 851).


On the 11th, Loring fell back to Lanier's (38 R., 852). Gregg advanced to Raymond (36 R., 736). Waul's legion arrived at Vicksburg (38 R., 850, 852, 865).



On the 12th, engagement at Raymond. (36 R., 736) 1200 of Walker's (38 R., 860, 864) brigade arrived at Jackson; advanced to meet Gregg. Gregg fell back (38 R., 859) three or four miles east of Raymond. Loring with Buford and (38 R., 861) Featherston to Big Black Bridge. Tilghman remained at Baldwin's Ferry (38 R., 863). Bowen advanced to Edwards Depot (38 R., 863). Vaughn to Mt. Alban (38 R., 862). Stevenson moved (38 R., 857, 866) two of his brigades to Bovina, and two to Laniers, leaving Moore (38 R., 865) at Warrenton, Waul at K. Gibson, Baldwin at Hall's Ferry road nine miles from Warrenton.

On the 13th, Stevenson's other two brigades came up to Bovina (38 R., 874); all to Big Black Bridge. Vaughn advanced to Big Black Bridge. Featherston and Buford advanced to Edwards Depot (38 R., 874). Maxey arrived at Brookhaven (38 R., 871). Forney concentrated his forces within the defences of Vicksburg (38 R., 872).

² 36 R., 753, 759.

³ 36 R., 638, 646.





attack while gaining ground to the east, McClelland's corps was moved by the road north of Fourteen Mile Creek towards Raymond,¹ Hovey advanced a mile on the road toward Edwards Depot, and formed in line of battle across the road, while Osterhaus and Carr, filing by the right flank to the rear under cover of Hovey's line, crossed Baker's Creek on the road to Raymond, and halted; Hovey followed. A. J. Smith, after destroying Montgomery Bridge, went back to Old Auburn to meet Blair and guard the trains.

On the 14th² the rain fell in torrents, making the roads very muddy.³ McPherson and Sherman advanced on Jackson, arriving by different roads at the same hour; Osterhaus, to Raymond, where he was halted;⁴ Carr, to Forest Hill Church;⁵ Hovey, to within four miles of Clinton⁶.

On the 9th of May,⁷ *Johnston*, at Tullahoma, received orders to proceed immediately to Mississippi and take command of the army, and to have 3000 good troops follow him.

*Johnston
arrives at
Jackson.*

Johnston had been sick for five or six weeks; but started at once and arrived⁸ at Jackson on the night of the 13th, having received *Pemberton's* dispatch of the 12th, found *Gregg* and

¹ 36 R., 146.

² 36 R., 50. See Map XIV at end.

³ 36 R., 638.

⁴ 36 R., 147; 37 R., 12.

⁵ 36 R., 616.

⁶ If, while Sherman and McPherson were advancing on Jackson, Pemberton should throw all his force against the fractions that Grant had left behind, he would have a fair chance to rout or capture some of them; but it would be a dangerous game for Pemberton to play. His troops were not as well practised in long marches as Stonewall Jackson's, and he himself had never given proof of his skill in such manoeuvres. Grant was willing to take this risk with the chance of catching Pemberton in the act, turning back upon him, and driving him into the Big Black River.

⁷ 36 R., 220; B. & L., 478.

⁸ 36 R., 239.

Walker there with 6000 men, and learned that *Maxey* was expected the next day from Port Hudson and probably *Gist* from South Carolina with their brigades, making in all about 11,000. He telegraphed to the Secretary of War: "I arrived this evening, finding the enemy in force between this place and General *Pemberton*, cutting off the communication. I am too late."¹

At 8.40 P.M. he sent to *Pemberton* a dispatch saying:

I have lately arrived and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us, with four divisions, at Clinton. It is im-

Corresponds with *Pemberton*. portant to re-establish communications, that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come up on his rear at once. To beat such a detachment, would be of immense value. The troops here could cooperate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all important.²

From *Pemberton's* dispatch, *Johnston* naturally inferred that the main body of Grant's army was south of Edwards Depot; and his instructions were quite in accord with his plan to beat the enemy in detail and to unite his own forces. *Pemberton* received this message between 9 and 10 A.M. of the 14th on his way from Bovina to the army at Edwards Depot;³ and immediately replied:

I leave at once with whole available force, about 16,000, from Edwards Depot.⁴ . . . In directing this move I do

¹ 2 Davis, *Rise and Fall*, 404.

² 38 R., 870.

³ 36 R., 261.

⁴ "Leaving Vaughn's brigade (about 1500), at Big Black Bridge. Tilghman's brigade (1500), now at Baldwin's Ferry, I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column; he will be, however, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will be left necessarily unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mill to Warrenton, numbering 7500 effective men. The men have been marching several days, are much fatigued, and I fear will straggle very much."

not think you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with your order.

Pemberton having heard¹ that the detachment to which *Johnston* referred was numerically greater than his whole available force in the field, and that the enemy² had at least an equal force to the south, on his right flank, and that another division was at or near Dillon's, and thinking that the movement indicated by *Johnston* would be extremely hazardous, called a council of war of all the general officers present and asked their opinions. A majority were in favor of the movement indicated by *Johnston*; but the two who were senior in rank preferred a movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the enemy's supplies from the Mississippi River, while *Pemberton* himself was opposed to any advance which would separate him from his base at Vicksburg. He was, however, unwilling to retreat in opposition to the universal judgment of his generals, and thought the only possibility of success to be in the plan of cutting the enemy's communications.

He might indeed have fallen back on the instructions implied in President Davis's dispatch about saving Vicksburg and Port Hudson; otherwise it is hard to see how he could decline to obey *Johnston's* order. If *Pemberton* moved directly on Clinton as ordered, his success in reaching it, or escaping to the north and east and joining *Johnston*, would depend mainly upon the manner in which McClernand's troops were handled. The advantage was decidedly with Grant.

Comment.

¹ 36 R., 261.

² 36 R., 261.

Pemberton's plan was, not to attack. He wrote to *Johnston* on the 14th:

I shall¹ move as early to-morrow morning as practicable with a column of 17,000 men to Dillon's, situated on the main road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and one half miles below Raymond and nine and one half miles from Edwards Depot. The object is to cut the enemy's communications and force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. At this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond. I wish very much I could join my reinforcements.

To move to Dillon, and wait until Grant should attack him would leave Grant free to move wherever he chose. *Pemberton* met with the usual fate of those who try to reconcile contrary advice by adopting a middle course.

On the 14th, *Johnston*² sent his train north on the Canton road with everything it could carry, and then followed himself, covering his retreat with about 5000 men on the road from Clinton and about 500 on that from Raymond. By these precautions McPherson's advance was delayed until 3 P.M., and Sherman's until 2 P.M. In this engagement the losses on the Federal side were 300, on the Confederate side 200.³

Johnston encamped about six miles north of Jackson, on the Canton road. He sent a dispatch⁴ to *Pemberton* saying that troops mentioned in his note of the 13th had compelled him to evacuate Jackson, and that he had taken a road at right angles with that on which the enemy approached;

Johnston
evacuates
Jackson.

Writes to
Pemberton.

¹ 36 R., 262.

³ 36 R., 751, 786, 787.


² 36 R., 240, 785.

⁴ 38 R., 877.

On the morning of the 14th
to the bridge of the river
has a full grip on the river
Takes distributed and
to allow the glassing of
R. Black Port. The river
late. Jackson had just
fallen to the river. From
had long force between the
Benton of Johnson and
was determined not to allow
to anti.


Benton could not meet
Johnson at Jackson after the
were held at Champion Hill.
He sustained severe losses.

CONFED'S | P.M. + + + + +



FEDERALS 2 P.M. □
 CONFED'S 2 " ■
 FEDERALS 3 P.M. - - -
 CONFED'S 3 " + + + + +
 FEDERALS 4 " - - -

DRAWN FOR "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR" BY COL. W.R. LIVERMORE - VOL. III



also that he had telegraphed to *Gist*, who was coming from the east, to assemble the approaching troops forty or fifty miles from Jackson; and to *Maxey*, to return to his wagons at Brookhaven;¹ and that he had advised him to join *Gist*. He asked *Pemberton* whether Grant could supply himself from the Mississippi.

Can you not cut him off from it, and, above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him? . . . I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.²

On the 15th, *Johnston* marched ten miles farther, to Calhoun Station. In the morning, he received *Pemberton's* letter of 5.40 P.M. of the 14th,³ giving the first information he had received of *Pemberton's* position,⁴ to which he replied:

Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me, that we may move to that point with about 6000.⁵

On the 16th, as *Johnston* had no definite knowledge of *Pemberton's* route, or of *Gist's* position, he did not move.

Although *Pemberton*⁶ received *Johnston's* first letter on the morning of the 14th, he made no move until 1 P.M. on the 15th. Then he started in the direction of Raymond; but on account of heavy rains, the water in Baker's Creek was too deep for him to cross at the ford on the direct road. After waiting several hours for it

¹ 36 R., 270, 240, 329, 263, 221. ² 36 R., 877.

³ 36 R., 263.

⁵ 38 R., 882.

³ 36 R., 240.

⁶ 36 R., 261, 262.

to fall, he finally turned up the creek and crossed at the Clinton road, which he followed for a short distance, and then turned off on a cross-road, called "the country road," to the Raymond road, on which he had started. Marching until after midnight, the head of *Loring's* division reached Mrs. Ellison's house, where the road to Dillon's turns off, and the rear of *Stevenson's* division, the point where the country road leaves the Clinton road. *Bowen's* division was in the centre of the column.

When *Johnston*¹ wrote his first dispatch to *Pemberton*, to insure its safe delivery, he sent it by three different messengers, one of whom betrayed *Johnston's* dispatch betrayed. him, and handed his copy to McPherson. Grant received it in the evening of the 14th, and assumed that *Pemberton* would, as directed, march out towards Jackson from the direction of Vicksburg.

As *Johnston* had gone north, Grant thought that his design was evidently to cross the Big Black, pass down the peninsula² between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers, and beat him in the race for Vicksburg. Accordingly, leaving Sherman at Jackson to destroy the railroads and everything that would be useful to the enemy, he made arrangements for McPherson and McClernand to strike *Pemberton* before he could unite with *Johnston*.³

¹ 1 Grant, 508; 36 R., 51.

² 1 Grant, 508.

³ On the night of the 15th, Logan's division of McPherson's corps bivouacked at Bolton, and Crocker between Bolton and Clinton. Hovey, Osterhaus, and Carr, of McClernand's corps, each at (36 R., 148) the intersection of the Raymond and Bolton road with a road to Edwards Depot. A. J. Smith, a little north of Raymond, and Blair of Sherman's corps between Raymond and A. J. Smith.

At 6.30 A.M., on the 16th, *Pemberton* heard that his pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road some distance in his front, and at the same time received *Johnston's* dispatch of the 15th directing him to move to Clinton. *Pemberton* did not feel authorized to disobey these instructions. Thinking, however, that he could not move directly toward Clinton without meeting the enemy in superior numbers, he therefore¹ proposed to return toward Edwards Depot, take the Brownsville road, and then move toward Clinton by a route north of the railroad. He wrote to *Johnston* notifying him of his plan, and then ordered his column to countermarch.

Pemberton
orders a
counter-
march.

If *Pemberton* had obeyed the order literally, and marched rapidly along the country road to the direct road to Clinton, leaving one or two brigades to delay the enemy, he would have had a fair chance of reaching *Johnston*, and at the same time, of inflicting a heavy blow upon Grant.

Comment.

At this time, the enemy drove in *Pemberton's* cavalry pickets, and at 7.30 A.M., fired with artillery on his column on the Raymond road. Presently, the demonstrations became more serious, and he proceeded to form line of battle facing east on the country road, *Loring* on the right, *Bowen* in the centre, and *Stevenson* on the left. *Stevenson* was ordered to make the necessary arrangements for the protection of the trains, which were then on the Clinton road and just crossing Baker's

Forms line
to meet
Grant.

¹ 36 R., 263.

Creek.* Soon afterwards, *Loring's* division was thrown back to another ridge, to cover the approach from the southeast along the military road. The attack began by a heavy artillery duel on the Raymond road, between 9 and 10 A.M.

As soon as *Stevenson*² received the order about the trains,³ he started *Reynolds* back with them on the road leading from Edwards Depot to Brownsville. At 7.30, *S. D. Lee*, moving to the left, took *Reynolds's* place at the cross-roads.⁴ At about 9 A.M., finding that the enemy were massing troops to turn the left flank of the Confederate army, and getting between it and Edwards Depot, *Lee* moved by the left flank to check them, marching north about half a mile to the summit

* Approximate number of officers and enlisted men present for duty at battle of Champion's Hill.


FEDERAL ARMY 29,600								
Divisions		Brigades Present		Divisions		Brigades Present		
XIII. MCCLERNAND, 15,300				XV. SHERMAN, 4300				
Osterhaus	Garrard	1500	Blair	G. A. Smith	2200			
	Lindsey	1500		T. K. Smith	2100			
A. J. Smith	Burbridge	2100	XVII. MCPHERSON, 10,000					
	Landram	2000						
Hovey	McGinnis	2400						
	Slack	2100						
Carr	Benton	2100	Logan	J. E. Smith	2300			
	Lawler	1600		Leggett	1900			
				J. D. Stev'n	1800			
			Crocker	Sanborn	1200			
				Holmes	1200			
Cav., 500				Boomer	1600			
CONFEDERATE ARMY, 21,800								
C. L. Steven- son 10,200	Barton	2600	Loring	Buford	2600			
	S. D. Lee	2300	7,000	Tilghman	2300			
	Cumming	2700		Featherston	2100			
	Reynolds	2600	Bowen	Cockrell	2300			
			4,100	Green	1800			

² 37 R., 108.³ 37 R., 94.⁴ 37 R., 101.

CHAMPION'S HILL


POSITIONS OF TROOPS AT 11 A.M.

FEDERALS
CONFEDERATES



POSITIONS AT 12.30 AND 1 P.M.

12.30 P.M. { FEDERALS
CONFED'S



of Champion's Hill, and then nearly due west¹ along its crest until the enemy's fire was so hot that he had to halt and face it. *Cumming* followed *Lee*, and placed part of his brigade on the new line facing north, part on the old line facing east, and part near the cross-roads to preserve the connection with *Barton's* brigade, which formed the right of *Stevenson's* division. Early in the day, *Barton* sent a regiment and a section of artillery to the bridge at Baker's Creek.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 15th,² Grant went to Clinton. He then ordered *McClermand* to move his command early the next morning toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the enemy if he encountered him; but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident that he was able to defeat him; and also, to order Blair to move with him.

McClermand
advances
against
Pemberton.

Early in the morning of the 16th, Grant³ sent a dispatch to Sherman to come up at once, and join the main force near Bolton. *McClermand*⁴ started early. At 5 A.M., A. J. Smith, followed by Blair, advanced by the Raymond road; and at 6 A.M., Osterhaus, followed by Carr, on the middle road, and Hovey by the Clinton road. *McClermand* went with Osterhaus and Carr.

At 7.30 A.M.,⁵ A. J. Smith met the enemy's skirmishers, who fell back before him; soon after, he encountered the fire of the enemy's artillery, to which he replied, while Burbridge, followed by Landram, advanced along the Raymond road, and at about 11

¹ 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 37.

² 36 R., 51.

³ Having obtained valuable information about *Pemberton's* numbers, positions, and plans, from two employees of the railroad, Northern men, who had passed through *Pemberton's* army the night before.

⁴ 36 R., 148.

⁵ 36 R., 149.

A.M., took a position on a crest¹ along the country road about 600 yards from *Loring's*² line. A. K. Smith, of Blair's division followed, and G. A. Smith brought up the rear.

At about 7.30 A.M.,³ Osterhaus, hearing the report of artillery on his left, pushed forward through a broad field to a point where the road entered⁴ a very broken section of timbered land. There encountering the enemy's skirmishers, he advanced Garrard slowly into the woods, driving the enemy before him and posted Lindsey on an open and commanding ridge near the point where the road entered. Carr halted half his division a mile behind Lindsey.

At 9.45, McClernand wrote⁵ to Grant explaining his position, and asking whether he should bring on an engagement, adding: "General Hovey thinks the enemy has passed a large force toward Raymond, and to our rear, but an aide from General Smith knows nothing of it." At 10.15⁶ Grant wrote:

From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey, and can support him at any point. Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair and Ransom, do so; and direct them to come up to your support by the most expeditious route.

McPherson,⁷ with Logan's division, followed Hovey on the Clinton road, and ordered Crocker to come forward with his division as rapidly as possible.⁸ Grant joined this column. At 10 A.M.,⁹ Hovey arrived near Champion's

McPherson
follows.

¹ 37 R., 31, 32. ² 36 R., 595. ³ 36 R., 149. ⁴ 37 R., 13.

⁵ 38 R., 316. ⁶ 38 R., 317. ⁷ 36 R., 639. ⁸ 36 R., 52. ⁹ 37 R., 41.

Hill, and finding the enemy in position along the crest, deployed his division.¹ McPherson brought up Logan's division and placed it on Hovey's right.²

At about 10.30,³ Hovey advanced up the hill, which is about seventy feet high, and by 11 A.M., Logan also was hotly engaged, and the battle was joined all along the line.

Battle
joined.

The strength of the opposing forces at this hour is about as follows: On the Clinton road, about 10,500 Federals are opposed to 4100 Confederates; on the Middle road, 6700 to 3500; on the Raymond road, 8400 to 11,100. On the Clinton and Middle roads, then, the Federals have the advantage in numbers.

Grant's plan is to crowd *Pemberton*, and cut him off, or drive him into Baker's Creek before he can cross; but his columns are separated by a broad tract of broken and wooded country, and Grant himself is not in position to co-ordinate their movements.

Comment.

At 11 A.M., *Pemberton*, on his march to meet *Johnston*, has been attacked on his flank by a heavy force probably greater than his own. Unable as he thinks to continue on his march without losing heavily, he has formed line to hold the enemy in check. He cannot expect to hold out indefinitely in the position in which this surprise has found him. Against a frontal attack, it is very strong; for the ground in his front is generally clear, and swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery, and his troops are partially sheltered from hostile fire; but neither flank rests on any obstacle,

¹ With McGinnis on the right and Slack on the left.

² Leggett on McGinnis's right, Smith on Leggett's right, and Stevenson in reserve.


³ S. D. Lee in 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 40.

and there is nothing to prevent a superior enemy from outflanking him. His object is to cross Baker's Creek with as little loss as possible; and he need only retard the enemy long enough for this purpose, holding them in check with part of his troops while the others cross. If, however, in the eagerness of the pursuit, the enemy expose themselves to a counter-stroke, *Pemberton* can strike. His position is well adapted to such a manœuvre; for his troops can move rapidly from one flank to the other, by the country road, and the fields behind it, while Grant's left wing is separated from his right by a dense thicket. The salient in *Pemberton's* line at Champion's Hill, where *Lee* turned off to the left, is of course a weak point; for the troops on each face will suffer from the fire directed against the other, as well as from the direct fire in their front; the shape of the ground also is such that the enemy can approach unseen¹ to within seventy-five yards of the summit.

At about 10.30, McGinnis advanced against the point and the left face² of this salient, and, supported by the enfilade fire of McPherson's artillery³ charged and took a battery, drove *Hovey* carries *Champion's Hill*. *Cumming* down the slope to the Edwards Depot road,⁴ and then halted for a while to reorganize.

The whole line [says McGinnis] moved forward, with bayonets fixed, slowly, cautiously, and in excellent order, and when within about seventy-five yards of the battery every gun was opened upon us, and every man went to the ground. As soon as the volley of grape and canister had passed over us, the order was given to charge, when the whole line moved forward as one man, and so sud-


¹ 37 R., 105. ² 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 44. ³ 36 R., 640. ⁴ 37 R., 105.




CHAMPION'S HILL

POSITIONS AT 1.30 AND 2 P.M.


POSITIONS { FEDERALS --- 2 P.M.
CONFED'S + + + + +



POSITIONS AT 2.30 P.M.



POSITIONS AT 3 P.M.



POSITIONS AT 3.30 P.M.



den and apparently unexpected to the rebels was the movement, that, after a desperate conflict of five minutes in which bayonets and butts of muskets were freely used, the battery of four guns was in our possession, and a whole brigade in support was fleeing before us, and a large number of them taken prisoners.¹

Slack advanced on McGinnis's left, over broken ground obstructed by vines and underbrush.²

When *Cumming* fell back, the right of *Lee's* line was enfiladed and fell back to a second ridge.³ Logan followed. Sanborn's brigade⁴ of Crocker's division arrived upon the field about the time when the engagement had become general.⁵ McPherson
outflanks
C. L. Stevenson.

At about 12 M.,⁶ when the Confederate General *C. L. Stevenson* saw the force that was moving against his position, he moved *Barton* with his brigade at double-quick from the right of his line on the country road by the rear to his extreme left, and *Pemberton* directed *Bowen*⁷ and *Loring* to close up their divisions to the left. C. L. Stevenson
sends
Barton to
his left.

At about 12.30 P.M., *Lee*,⁸ finding that the enemy

¹ 36 R., 49.

² Only Slack's skirmishers on his right reached the salient in time to bring a fire on Cumming's line. The rest of the brigade were delayed by the fire of Lee's skirmishers, and, perhaps, by the sound of the fight with Osterhaus on his left. When the fight was joined (36 R., 647; 37 R., 102) Lee advanced against a battery on Leggett's line on McGinnis's right, but was repulsed.

³ On Leggett's right, Smith, leaving two of his regiments confronting Lee's left, moved on with the other three to turn Lee's flank. J. D. Stevenson, in reserve, moved up (36 R., 647) on Smith's right.

⁴ 36 R., 730.

⁵ 36 R., 640. Two regiments were sent to Hovey, one to J. E. Smith, and one to Leggett.

⁶ 37 R., 94.

⁷ 36 R., 264.

⁸ 37 R., 102.

were advancing on his left, drew back all his line to the ridge on which his right had halted.

At 1 P.M., *C. L. Stevenson's* line had been forced back half a mile; his right was at the cross-roads, his left, at the bridge, and his centre a quarter of a mile in front of the Edwards' Depot road between these two points. As he was, then, with about 7600 men, confronting McPherson and Hovey with 14,500, he reported that he could not hold out unless reinforced; and *Pemberton* ordered up *Cockrell's* and *Green's* brigades of *Bowen's* division in succession, about 4100 in all.¹

On the Federal right J. D. Stevenson, finding to his surprise that he had completely outflanked the enemy, and gained their line of retreat, turned, and
Barton
surrounded. came up on *Barton's* left flank and rear,² while J. E. Smith was attacking him in front, and one of Sanborn's regiments, on his right. *Barton*, nearly surrounded, retreated with a loss of a battery and a large part of his brigade. J. D. Stevenson then turned to the right, captured the two guns at the bridge over Baker's Creek,³ and drove off *Barton's* regiment in support.

Meanwhile, *Cockrell* coming along the country road, at quick and double-quick time, formed⁴ on the left of
Bowen
comes to *Cumming's* two regiments that were supporting a battery at the cross-roads. At 1.30,
C. L. Steven- Slack drove back these regiments.⁵ *Green*
son's then came up on *Cockrell's* right, outflanking
support. Slack; *Cockrell*, *Green*, and what was left of *Cumming*, then advanced, driving back Slack and

¹ 36 R., 264.² 37 R., 100.³ 56 R., 721.⁴ 37 R., 110.

⁵ Captured the battery (37 R., 55), and turned *Cockrell's* right flank; but *Cockrell*, drawing back his right and advancing his left, charged Slack's line, and regained the battery.

McGinnis, and at 2.30, nearly reached the crest which *Lee* and *Cumming* had occupied in the morning.¹

McGinnis, fearing that his brigade would be overwhelmed, sent for assistance. At about 2 P.M.,² Hovey called for reinforcements, and Grant ordered Boomer's brigade and two regiments of Sanborn's of Crocker's division to his support,³ and ordered Smith's and Stevenson's brigades of Logan's division to the left; for there was danger that Grant's army might be cut in two. McGinnis's men rallied, but all were obliged to yield to *Cockrell*, who pushed on to the brow of the hill first occupied by *Lee* and *Cumming*, and crowded Boomer's left down the hill toward Champion's house,⁴ while on *Cockrell's* right, *Green* was driving Slack through the thicket in the same direction. At 2.30, Logan had turned *Pemberton's* left; but *Bowen* had nearly pierced Grant's centre.

Bowen
drives
Hovey back.

Grant then sent for Holmes of Crocker's division, whose two regiments, coming up behind Boomer, brought *Cockrell* to a stand at a point where the road from Clinton bends toward the west before turning sharply to the south to cross the ridge, exposing his men to flank fire from sixteen pieces of reserve artillery which Hovey had massed in an open field near by. Hovey says:⁵

Confederate
left driven
back.

The irregularity of our line of battle had previously prevented me from using artillery in enfilading the enemy's line, but as our forces were compelled to fall slowly back, the lines became marked and distinct, and about 2.30

¹ Lee had held his second line against Leggett, who was advancing on McGinnis's right, and as *Cockrell* gained the ridge, Lee's right wing charged Leggett's line (37 R., 102), but was driven back with heavy loss. See Map, p. 301.

² 37 R., 44, 49.

³ 36 R., 53; 36 R., 709, 718.

⁴ 37 R., 66.

⁵ 37 R., 44.

P.M., I could easily perceive, by the sound of firearms through the woods, the position of the respective armies. . . . Through the rebel ranks these batteries hurled an incessant shower of shot and shell, entirely enfilading the rebel columns. The fire was terrific for several minutes and the cheers from our men on the brow of the hill told of the success. The enemy gave back, and our forces . . . drove them again over the ground which had been hotly contested for the third time during the day. . . . It was, after the conflict, literally the hill of death.

Cut up by this fire, *Cockrell* gave way before Holmes's advance. Meanwhile, on *Cockrell's* right, *Green* had driven Slack through the thicket until his advance also was stopped by Holmes. Both *Cockrell* and *Green* had spent most of their ammunition, and the ordnance train had been ordered to their rear, and to add to their confusion,¹ Osterhaus of McClernand's corps now appeared in line of battle coming out of the woods on *Green's* right flank. *Cockrell* and *Green* were ordered to retreat to Baker's Creek. When *Cockrell* fell back,² one of Holmes's regiments followed him over the hill, recaptured the Confederate guns at the angle, and came down upon *Lee's* right flank, while the others followed *Green* to the cross-roads. By 4 P.M., all the Confederate left fell back.

Meanwhile, on the Middle and Raymond roads, McClernand had been slowly advancing. When he first heard that Hovey was heavily engaged,³ he sent word to A. J. Smith on the Raymond road to move forward by that road, and to Blair to move G. A. Smith's brigade to the right, to connect with Osterhaus, and T. K. Smith's forward in supporting distance of A. J. Smith.

McClernand
advances
slowly.

¹ 37 R., 116.

² 37 R., 102.

³ 37 R., 255, Map, p. 293.

At 12.35 P.M., Grant wrote to McClernand¹:

As soon as your command is all in hand, throw forward skirmishers, and feel the enemy, and attack him in force if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and McPherson, and will see that they fully cooperate.

It was a long time before this dispatch reached McClernand,² who then, at once³ ordered A. J. Smith and Osterhaus to "attack the enemy and press for victory," Blair to support Smith,⁴ and Carr, Osterhaus.

A. J. Smith could not advance; for he was still confronted on the Raymond road by *Loring*, whose forces outnumbered his own, and were well posted for defence. G. A. Smith of Blair's division appears to have had only a skirmish line and some artillery in front of him after about 1.20, when *Green* left to support *Cumming*; but he moved very slowly.

Osterhaus⁵ had deployed Garrard's brigade, and pushed forward to the edge of the woods near the cross-roads, where he saw *Green* and *Cockrell* advancing between his own men and Hovey's,⁶ making "a most desperate attempt," he says, "to prevent the junction of the divisions." If, in fact, at 1 o'clock, *Pemberton* had brought two of *Loring's* brigades in support of *Bowen's* attack at the cross-roads, he might, perhaps, have cut Grant's army in two.

If, on the other hand, Osterhaus had followed McClernand's order to "attack the enemy and press for victory," McClernand could have cut *Pemberton's* army in two, and Grant would then have routed it.

Osterhaus, however, "thinking it prudent to strengthen [his] line," brought up two of *Lindsey's* regiments to reinforce Garrard, and sent *Lindsey* with the rest

¹ 38 R., 318.

⁴ 38 R., 318.

² 36 R., 52.

⁵ 37 R., 14.

³ 36 R., 184.

⁶ 37 R., 15.

of his brigade to the edge of the timber to the left.¹ McClernand moved Carr's division up to the ground where Lindsey had been posted,² and then Lawler of this division advanced³ to Lindsey's support, and Benton⁴ moved along the road and joined Garrard.

At 8 A.M.,⁵ *Pemberton* had sent his engineer to throw a bridge across Baker's Creek⁶ at the ford on the Raymond road. At 2 P.M., it was completed; Buford the water had fallen and the ford also was comesto C.L. Stevenson's support. practicable. At about this time,⁷ *Pember-*

ton, satisfied that his left was in danger, and that "there was no important force" in front of his right, had sent several staff officers in rapid succession to *Loring*, ordering him to move two of his brigades to the left as rapidly as possible, leaving the other on the Raymond road to cover the bridge and ford over Baker's Creek. *Loring* replied that the enemy was strong in his front, and trying to flank him. *Pemberton* repeated the order, but it was not until 3 P.M. that either brigade started.⁸ Then, moving at double-quick through corn and rye fields, *Buford* met *Pemberton* near the cross-roads, and was ordered to hold the road in the rear of *Lee's* brigade. Across this road,⁹ the men were hastening in wild disorder and in consternation before the fire of the enemy. Two of *Buford's* regiments¹⁰ were detached to support a battery and keep McClernand in check.

To drive them back, Osterhaus ordered Lindsey¹¹ to move forward, and take the woods near the cross-roads, where the enemy appeared to be rallying. He reached the skirt of the woods but was driven back by

¹ 37 R., 15. ² 37 R., 134. ³ 36 R., 151. ⁴ 37 R., 15. ⁵ 36 R., 265.

⁶ 37 R., 70. ⁷ 36 R., 264. ⁸ 37 R., 83. ⁹ The Edwards' Depot road.

¹⁰ 37 R., 88, 89, 117.

¹¹ 37 R., 15, 25.

the fire of the artillery, and that of *Buford's* two regiments; while *Green's* men,¹ falling back from Champion's Hill, before Holmes, came rushing to the rear panic-stricken, and made good their retreat. One of *Buford's* regiments remained to guard the battery, while the other, 300 or 400 men, advanced with bayonets fixed, and as Lindsey fell back, appeared on Garrard's left flank; Osterhaus thought that the enemy's right was drifting upon him; and this, he says,² "stopped for some time the advance of our troops," about 3000 men.

McClernand
"stopped
for a time."

Osterhaus had seen "large numbers of infantry and artillery massed on a commanding elevation³ apparently in expectation of General [A. J.] Smith's attack." He then says, apparently referring to *Buford*, "The direction of the enemy's retreat was such that he fell (rather unexpectedly to both parties) on the left of the First [Garrard's] Brigade."

McClernand, who saw the effect of this presumed flank attack, then brought up Lawler's brigade of Carr's division,⁴ about 1800 men, who, McClernand says, here cast the trembling balance in our favor. Himself narrowly escaping the effect of a shell, his men joined Lindsey's; and both dashed forward, shooting down the enemy's battery horses, driving away his gunners, and capturing two pieces of cannon.

Grant says⁵:

The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest to discover his numbers.

¹ 37 R., 88, 117.

² 37 R., 135, 15.

³ 37 R., 15.

⁴ 36 R., 151; 37 R., 15, 135.

⁵ 36 R., 53.

At about 3.45, *Buford* took a commanding position¹ about a quarter of a mile south of the Edwards' Depot road. *Lee* and *Green* rallied² in his rear. *Cumming's* men fled to the lower bridge over Baker's Creek. *Loring*, at last, left *Tilghman* confronting A. J. Smith, and went with *Featherston* to the rear, through woods, and over very rough ground, to a country road and came up on *Buford's* left at about 4 P.M.³ From information he then obtained, *Loring* was satisfied that by an attack upon Grant's right, he could cut him off from the bridge; but while *Loring* was forming his line for the attack, he received orders to retreat and bring up the rear. Had he come up earlier, there would have been a fair chance to turn Grant's right. *Pemberton* bitterly complains⁴ of his delay.

When *Lee* and *Cockrell* fell back⁵ Grant went down from Champion's Hill to the cross-roads,⁶ where he met the skirmishers of Carr's and Osterhaus's divisions, and sent word to Osterhaus that the enemy was in full retreat, and to Carr to pursue with all speed to Big Black River⁷ and across if he could, and to Osterhaus to follow, which they did.⁸ A. J. Smith's division pressed *Tilghman* hard on the Raymond road.⁹

Cockrell's and *Green's* brigades marched directly

¹ 37 R., 84. ² 37 R., 102. ³ 37 R., 76. ⁴ 36 R., 265.

⁵ J. D. Stevenson on the Federal right returned to his old position, on the Edwards' Depot road.

⁶ 1 Grant, 518.

⁷ 36 R., 53.

⁸ J. D. Stevenson's brigade with a battery crossed the upper bridge (36 R., 640, 718); Carr's division pushed along the Edwards' Depot road; Lindsey's brigade turned off towards the new bridge and ford.

⁹ 36 R., 151; 37 R., 32, 77, 80.

to the lower bridge and crossed. *Cumming's* men found their way across in disorder. *Lee* reached the ford at 6 P.M.¹ *Barton* had been driven across the upper bridge before 3 P.M. *Pemberton*² directed *Bowen* to take position with his division on the west bank of Baker's Creek, and to hold the crossing until *Loring's* division had effected the passage; and then went in person to the intrenchments at Big Black bridge to make arrangements for holding them during the passage of the river. While *Bowen*³ was waiting for *Loring*, *C. L. Stevenson* came up; the enemy who had crossed at the upper bridge turned upon them, and they then marched in the dark across the plantations to Edwards' Depot,⁴ sending word to *Loring* that he must do his best to save his division. Meanwhile *Tilghman* had been killed, but his brigade kept up the fight against A. J. Smith until dusk, when the order came to retreat. *A. E. Reynolds*, who succeeded him, being closely pressed, moved off by the flank through the fields to deceive the enemy as to his route, and joined *Buford* and *Featherston* in their retreat. *Loring* was nearly surrounded, and saw no chance of escape except by moving with his division down the creek to the south, in hopes of crossing the Big Black below. He marched over plantation roads⁵ which were so bad that he had to abandon his wagons and artillery. Unable to cross, he

C. L. Stevenson
and Bowen cross
Baker's
Creek.

Loring goes
back to
Jackson.

¹ 37 R., 106, 100.

² 36 R., 265.

³ 37 R., 117.

⁴ *Buford* and *Featherston*, bringing up the rear of the column, were hotly pressed. On the march, *Loring* received a message from *Bowen* saying that the enemy had crossed the upper bridge and outflanked him, and that he had been compelled to fall back.

⁵ 37 R., 78.

then turned back to the east, and on the 19th, reached Jackson and reported to *Johnston*.¹ Grant

Casualties continued the pursuit until after dark.²

at Cham- The casualties in the battle of Cham-
pion's Hill. pion's Hill were reported as follows³:

FEDERALS.		CONFEDERATES.	
McPherson's Corps	Logan's Div.	407 Stevenson's Div.	3204
	Crocker's "	671 Bowen's "	758
McClermand's "	Hovey's "	1202 Loring's "	120
	Osterhaus's "		130
	Carr's "		3
	A. J. Smith's "		25
Sherman's "	Blair's "		0
		2438	4082

As Grant says, the battle was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClermand's corps, and Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps. So, on the other side, by *Bowen's* and *Stevenson's* divisions.

Pemberton's defeat appears to have been partly due to his own bad management, and partly to *Loring's* failure to obey his orders. By skilful man-

Comment. œuvres, he could probably have covered his retreat across Baker's Creek or the Big Black River, and rejoined *Johnston* without serious loss. If he had been an abler tactician, he could perhaps have thrown

¹ On the night of the 16th-17th, C. L. Stevenson bivouacked at Bovina, Bowen at Big Black bridge (37 R., 97, 112, 119). A. W. Reynolds, with *Pemberton's* train, on the Brownsville road (37 R., 108), escaped through the woods to Bridgeport, and crossed the Big Black at night.

² 36 R., 53. Carr reached Edwards Depot at 8 P.M., Osterhaus followed; both bivouacked there (37 R., 16); McPherson on the road behind them (36 R., 648, 709, 718, 724, 731); Hovey, A. J. Smith, and Blair on the battle-field (36 R., 53, 151; 37 R., 32, 256). Ransom of McArthur's division arrived (37 R., 297) at the battle-field of Champion's Hill just at the close of the fighting.

³ 36 R., 320; 37 R., 744, 82, 86, 93.

the greater part of his force on McPherson and Hovey, and driven them back before McClernand would have come to them. He appears however to have had no definite conception of his problem¹; and *Loring*, realizing his weakness, failed to obey his orders at a critical stage of the battle. We have seen that when he was ordered to move two of his brigades to the left as rapidly as possible, it was a long time before he complied by sending one. If, as *Pemberton* ought to have supposed, McClernand should advance vigorously, *Pemberton's* army would be cut in two unless the gap were closed.

Knowing as we do how cautiously McClernand was then moving, it seems probable that if one of *Loring's* brigades had been left to hold A. J. Smith in check while the other two moved to the left, and if *Pemberton* had sent them after *Bowen*, Grant's army would have been cut in two; or, if he had sent them against Grant's right flank, as *Loring* afterwards proposed, that flank would have been rolled up, and perhaps routed.

Pemberton says:

Had the movement in support of the left been promptly made when first ordered, it is not improbable that I might have maintained my position, and it is possible that the enemy might have been driven back, though his vastly superior and constantly increasing numbers would have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night to save my communications with Vicksburg.²

By the time *Buford* came, *Stevenson* and *Bowen* had been routed. *Loring* arrived in time to check the pursuit long enough for the other divisions to escape; but not for his own to follow.

¹ 36 R., 263.

² 36 R., 265.

Grant says, in his *Memoirs*¹:

Had McClelland come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force.

When *Pemberton* reached the line of intrenchments at Big Black bridge, which were held by *Vaughn's* brigade of *M. L. Smith's* division, he gave instructions for *Loring*,² when he should arrive, to cross and occupy the west bank, and for *Vaughn* and *Bowen* to hold the trenches. In addition to the railroad bridge, which was floored for the passage of artillery, *Pemberton* made another, by mooring a steamer fore and aft across the river. On the morning of the 17th,³ *Vaughn* occupied the trenches immediately north of the railroad, *Cockrell* of *Bowen's* division those immediately south, and *Green* those farther north between *Vaughn* and the river. There were, in all, about 4700 men and eighteen pieces of artillery.

Early in the morning,⁴ McClelland with Carr's and Osterhaus's divisions came up from Edwards' Depot. Lawler's brigade of Carr's division formed on the right near the river, Benton's in the woods just to the right of the railroad, and Osterhaus's division on the left of the railroad, excepting two regiments sent to support Lawler on the right. After half an hour or more, A. J. Smith's division came up and extended McClelland's left. The artillery and skirmishers opened fire all along the line.⁵

The trenches afforded cover to the defenders from

¹ 1 Grant, 519.

³ 37 R., 113, 119.

² 36 R., 266. See Map p. 273.

⁴ 36 R., 152.

⁵ 36 R., 267.

infantry fire, and were protected in front by a bayou filled with water, fallen timber, and brush; the front, however, was not defended by cross fire of artillery; the parapet was only about three feet high; and the ground in the rear, for about 600 yards, was open and wholly unprotected from hostile fire. There were no supports or reserves of any consequence¹ on whom the defenders could fall back if overpowered or who could with their fire cover the retreat of the defenders.² *Loring's* division had not arrived. The position of the defenders of the trenches was not an enviable one. If the line should break at any point, the defence would collapse and only the first to reach the bridge could escape.

Weakness of
Confederate
position.

Lawler,³ on *McClelland's* right, was ordered to move forward slowly and cautiously, and develop the enemy's position. The banks of the river and the woods and brush that bordered it afforded cover by which his troops approached to within a few hundred yards of the Confederate line. Late in the forenoon, after exchanging fire with the enemy for several hours, Lawler in his shirt-sleeves⁴ made a dash with loud cheers from the woods near the river with all his brigade and with *Garrard's* two regiments from the woods⁵ north of the railroad,⁶ against the trenches held by *Green's* brigade and the left of *Vaughn's*. *Green's* men held their line for a while; but *Vaughn's* fled before the enemy and reached the bayou; and then the others followed. "One portion of the line being broken," says *Pemberton*,⁷ "it very soon became a matter of *sauve qui peut*."

Engage-
ment at Big
Black bridge.

¹ 36 R., 268.

² 3 B. & L., 488.

³ 37 R., 136.

⁴ 1 Grant, 526.

⁵ 37 R., 22.

⁶ O. R. Atlas, Pl. 37, 7.

⁷ 36 R., 267.

Some crossed on the bridges, and with their fire held the enemy at a distance; others swam, a few were drowned, about 1500¹ were captured. The bridges,² saturated with turpentine, were burned.³

After the battle of Big Black bridge, says *Pemberton*,⁴

it became painfully apparent to me that the *morale* of my army was not such as to justify an attempt to hold the line of the Big Black River. Not only was it weakened by the absence of General Loring's division, but also by the large number of stragglers, who, having abandoned their commands, were already making their way into Vicksburg. The enemy, by flank movements on my left by Bridgeport and on my right by Baldwin's and other ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost simultaneously with myself, or, perhaps, interpose a heavy force between me and that city. Under the circumstances nothing remained but to retire the army within the defences of Vicksburg, and to endeavor as speedily as possible to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops. . . . One of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black⁵ was the necessity of abandoning our defences on the Yazoo at Snyder's Mill [near Haynes's Bluff]. That position and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.

Forney's and *M. L. Smith's* divisions guarded the approaches to the city. After the retreat these troops were drawn in. The troops who had been engaged in the recent battles were bivouacked in rear of the

¹ 36 R., 152. Federal losses 279. 37 R., 130. ² 3 B. & L., 488.

³ 37 R., 97, 350. After the trenches had been carried, Lee came up from Bovina, and posted his brigade on the heights of the west bank, to cover the retreat across the river, and remained there until relieved by Baldwin's brigade (37 R., 400).

⁴ 36 R., 268.

⁵ 36 R., 270.

intrenchments; the heavy artillery guarded the batteries on the river front.

On the entire line about 102 pieces of artillery, principally field, were placed in position at suitable points. To man the entire line *Pemberton* was able to bring into the trenches about 18,500 muskets.

Colonel Prime, Grant's chief engineer officer, thus describes the ground¹:

At the beginning of the siege the enemy's defences were essentially the same as at its close, making the place an intrenched camp four miles long and two miles wide, the line of defence not following its windings, being seven miles long and well adapted to the ground. Perhaps the best idea of the ground around Vicksburg . . . may be obtained by supposing that originally a plateau, having from 200 to 300 feet elevation . . . has gradually been washed away, . . . leaving an intricate network of ravines and ridges, the latter everywhere sharp. . . . The soil when cut vertically will remain so for years. For this reason the sides of the smaller ravines were often so steep that their ascent was difficult to a footman unless he aided himself with his hands. The sides of the ravines were usually wooded, but near the enemy's line the trees had been felled, forming in many places entanglements which under fire were absolutely impassable. . . .

Defences of
Vicksburg.

The enemy's line of defence . . . was generally on a dividing ridge . . . was well located for seeing the ravines in its front, and consisted of small works on commanding points, necessarily irregular, from the shape of the ridges on which they were situated; in only one case closed at the gorge; placed at distances varying from 75 to 500 yards from each other, and connected by lines of simple trench or rifle-pits.

¹ 37 R., 169. See Map XII., at end.

Vicksburg was, then, rather an intrenched camp than a fortified place, owing much of its strength to the difficult ground, obstructed by fallen trees in its front, which rendered rapidity of movement and *ensemble* in an assault impossible.

The roads which entered the city from the east followed along the spurs or transverse ridges running out from the main ridge. They were, of course, covered by the enfilade and cross fire of all the musketry and artillery that could be directed upon them; and the earthworks where they crossed were made exceptionally strong. Elsewhere, the line could only be approached by crossing the obstructions, and climbing the steep banks of the ravines under fire from the trenches in front and from the advanced works on the flanks.

By the morning of the 18th,¹ Sherman crossed the Big Black at Bridgeport by the only ponton train with the expedition, and before night reached

Vicksburg
partially
invested.

the Walnut Hills, sending a regiment of cavalry to seize Haynes's Bluff, and turn it over with its guns to the navy in the Yazoo.²

The feelings of Sherman's men, in looking down from the ground they had fought for for the last five months, and seeing the friendly fleet and the supply boats loaded with provisions, have been compared with those of Xenophon's men when they first sighted the Euxine Sea.

McClernand and McPherson built floating bridges during the night of the 17th and crossed at Big Black bridge on the 18th. By the morning of the 19th, Grant had invested Vicksburg as far as practicable

¹ 36 R., 54

² 36 R., 755.

with the forces at his disposal. Sherman's right rested on the river above the city, and on his left, McPherson and then McClelland covered the approaches from the east. If *Pemberton* should try to escape to the south, he would be caught in the pocket between the Big Black and the Mississippi.

During the day, there was continuous skirmishing, and Grant was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. "Relying," he says,¹ "upon the demoralization of the enemy, in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at 2 P.M., on this day."² The Fifteenth Army Corps [Sherman's], from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous assault."

Sherman approached from the northeast along the Graveyard road. At 11 A.M.,³ Blair's artillery and infantry commenced firing, and at 2 P.M., the signal was given for the assault. Blair's division⁴ advanced against the Stockade Redan,⁵ under a heavy fire over almost impassable

Assault of
May 19th.

¹ 36 R., 54.

² The opposing forces were approximately as follows (38 R., 370, 293; 36 R., 328; 37 R., 159-165):

Federals, 47,900				Confederates, 20,000			
XIII.	Engineers	200	XV.	Steele	5700	Stevenson	7500
	Pioneers	200		Blair	5800	Forney	5000
	Osterhaus	3500		Tuttle	4700	M. L. Smith	4400
	A. J. Smith	3600	XVII.	Cavalry	600	Bowen	3000
	Hovey	3600		Logan	6000		
	Carr	3700		McArthur	5000		
	Cavalry	500		Quinby	4500		
	Pioneers	300					

³ 37 R., 262, 267.

⁴ 36 R., 756.

⁵ 37 R., 262.

ground, many pushing themselves up under the parapets of the enemy's works, while others, becoming entangled in the brush and fallen timber, took such shelter as the ridges, stumps, and logs afforded. Ewing and G. A. Smith advanced on the right, and T. K. Smith on both sides of the Graveyard road. The left of G. A. Smith's line,¹ the battalion of the 13th U. S. Infantry, and the 116th Illinois, pushed up close to the Stockade Redan and to the stockade west of it² and planted the colors there. After a loss in the battalion of 70 out of 250, some got into the ditch on the north face of the redan. T. K. Smith³ halted his left wing to take breath at a ridge about 150 yards from the enemy's works, where they were partially sheltered from fire, and sent forward skirmishers to pick off the enemy's gunners, while his right wing pushed on, some men getting into the ditch near the salient. Tuttle's division in support was held in the road.

Ewing advanced against the lunette northwest of the stockade. The centre and left of his line approached⁴ close to the enemy's intrenchments, "and the colors of its regiments waved near them until evening." At dark, Blair's men were ordered to fall back, which gave no little surprise to T. K. Smith, as he "had won by severe loss the best position to fortify in our whole front," and had made arrangements to plant batteries upon the hill he occupied.

McClelland's and McPherson's army corps⁵ "succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions covered from the fire of the enemy." The Federal

¹ V. N. M. P., 10.

² 37 R., 264.

³ 37 R., 268.

⁴ V. N. M. P. 9; 37 R., 281.

⁵ 36 R., 54.

loss in this assault was 942. The Confederate loss was not reported but was very slight.

Meanwhile on the afternoon of May 16th *Johnston*, then at Calhoun, received *Pemberton's* first reply to the order to attack Sherman; and in the evening, *Pemberton's* dispatch dated the same morning,¹ in which he notified him² of his countermarch and plans. *Johnston* says in his *Narrative* (p. 187): I should have joined Lieutenant-General *Pemberton's* 'movable army,' and taken command of it, if at any time after my arrival in Jackson, I had been strong enough to attempt such a ride." Had *Johnston* been on the field on the morning of the 16th, Grant's army, spread out as it was, would have been in some danger. On the 17th, *Johnston* marched in the direction indicated in *Pemberton's* note.

Johnston
and *Pem-*
berton.

In the afternoon, a letter from *Pemberton* was brought to *Johnston* dated Bovina, May 17th, reporting the battle of Champion's Hill, and saying that he feared he would be compelled to fall back from Big Black bridge, and that if so, his position at Snyder's Mill would be untenable. "I have about sixty days' provisions at Vicksburg and Snyder's. I respectfully await your instructions." *Johnston* replied:

If Haynes's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast.³

¹ 36 R., 291.

² *Johnston's Narrative*, 180.

³ 36 R., 241.

On the 18th *Pemberton* wrote that he had fallen back and ordered Haynes's Bluff to be abandoned. On the 19th, *Johnston* received a reply to his order to evacuate Vicksburg at Vernon, where he had gone with his troops to join *Pemberton*. The reply said that it was the unanimous opinion expressed by *Pemberton's* officers in a council of war, that it was impossible to withdraw the army from its position with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy.¹ *Johnston* wrote: "I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you. Hold out."

He then determined to re-establish his lines between Jackson and Canton. He at once ordered *Gardner* to evacuate Port Hudson. *Gist*, from South Carolina, joined him on the 20th, *Ector* and *McNair* of *McCown's* division from Tennessee on the 20th and 21st, *Loring* on the 20th, and *Maxey* on the 23d.

The 20th and 21st were spent by the Federals in perfecting communications with their supplies. "Most

Grant per- of the troops," says Grant, "had been
fects his marching and fighting battles for twenty
communica- days on an average of about five days' rations
tions. drawn from the commissary department.

Though they had not suffered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other rations was beginning to be felt." Grant says in his Reports: "The country was abundantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef, and mutton"; in his *Memoirs*²: "Many of the soldiers had lived so much on chicken, ducks, and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get

¹ 36 R., 242.

² 1 Grant, 591.

bacon, almost took away their appetite." Soldiers can, for a few days at least, endure such privations as this.

On the 21st,¹ Grant determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault.

There were many reasons [he says] to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reinforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I then had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege. The possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State. . . . I would have saved the Government sending large reinforcements much needed elsewhere; and finally the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works.

Grant orders
another
assault.

The order said²:

A simultaneous attack will be made to-morrow at 10 A.M. by all the army corps of this army. . . . At an early hour in the morning, a vigorous attack will be commenced by the artillery and skirmishers. The infantry, with the exception of reserves and skirmishers, will be placed in column of platoons, or by the flank, . . . ready to move forward. . . . Promptly at the hour designated all will start at quick time, with bayonets fixed, and march immediately upon the enemy without firing a gun until the outer works are carried. If prosecuted with vigor, it is confidently believed that this course will

¹ 36 R., 54.

² 38 R., 333.

carry Vicksburg in a very short time, and with much less loss than would be sustained by delay.

As Sherman's repulse on the 19th might have been due to a concentration of the enemy at the point of attack, Grant proposed on the 22d to attack simultaneously all along the line. Accordingly, Sherman directed one attack, as before, along the Graveyard road against the Stockade Redan; and one against a projecting point about half a mile to the west.¹ McPherson directed one through a ravine against the curtain south of the Stockade Redan, one against the redan north of the Jackson road, one against a strong work just south of this road, and one across a ravine still more to the south.² McClernand directed one against the lunette on the Baldwin's Ferry road,² and one against

¹ On Sherman's right, Steele (36 R., 757) progressed very slowly under heavy fire. Along the Graveyard road some of Ewing's (37 R., 282) men reached the ditch of the Stockade Redan, and planted their colors on the exterior slope of the parapet, the rest took shelter behind the crest which T. K. Smith had held on the 19th. G. A. Smith (37 R., 258) moved to the left through a ravine where he met Ransom (37 R., 297) on McPherson's front, and both charged up against the parapet; but met a staggering fire, and fell back under cover of the hillside. J. E. Smith's (36 R., 709) men advanced down the Jackson road to within about 100 yards of the works, then one regiment filed off, and found shelter on the right in a deep ravine, and another on their left under cover of a ridge in front of the works. Some of Stevenson's men (36 R., 719) advanced to the edge of the ditch and some planted their colors there but were withdrawn. Sanborn and Boomer advanced to the crest of the ridge in their front but found the enemy's fire too severe.

² On McClernand's front Benton (V. N. M. P., 20) took a position in front of both faces of the lunette on the Baldwin's Ferry road, and the curtain south of it. Burbridge (37 R., 33) came up on his right, and carried a field-piece up to within 30 feet of the works, where it did some execution. The men, not being able to scale the walls, tried to dig them down.

the Railroad Redoubt,¹ and one still farther south.²

Suddenly about half-past ten o'clock A.M. [says Gen. S. D. Lee³], as if by magic, every gun and rifle stopped firing

¹ 37 R., 140; V. N. M. P., 22. Lawler's brigade of Carr's division, with one regiment of Landram's, was formed for the assault, in two columns, in a ravine 100 yards in front of the Railroad Redoubt, where they were sheltered from fire. The 22d Iowa, of Lawler's brigade, supported by the 21st, advanced against the redoubt. As soon as they reached the crest of the hill, "a terrible fire from the enemy in front and on both flanks swept the ground and did fearful execution"; their advance was checked, but some 50 brave men from both regiments (37 R., 244) leaped into the ditch and planted the colors of the 22d Iowa high up in a breach in the salient, which had been made by the Federal artillery. Sergeants Griffith and Messenger and some 15 or 20 other enlisted men of that regiment entered through the breach, enfiladed the adjoining faces, captured a lieutenant and about 12 enlisted men, and killed the rest of the defenders, or drove them out of the redoubt, which proved to be only an outwork, open in the rear, and wholly exposed to fire from the main line of defence. Others of the 21st and 22d sheltered themselves in the gullies washed in the sides of the hill and fired on the enemy.

Then the Confederates fired (3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 62) from the main line, killing most of those who had (37 R., 243, 244) entered, and driving the rest into the ditch. A company of the 30th Ala. of S. D. Lee's brigade tried to (3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 62) regain the redoubt; but every man was shot down by fire from the Federals in the gullies outside. Sergeant Griffith (36 R., 180) led his prisoners to the rear. Meanwhile, the 11th Wis., and portions of the 21st and 22d Iowa of Lawler's brigade, with the 97th Ill. of Landram's, branching off to the left to assault the rifle-pits on that side, crossed the brow of the hill which had sheltered them; but found in their front a deep ravine filled with abatis swept by the concentrated fire of the enemy. They could not advance, but halted and held their ground.

In the meantime, Landram's brigade moved up. As it came to the ravine, one regiment crossed the hill to the left to assist those who had crossed before; one remained as a reserve. The 77th Ill. advanced to the redoubt, and planted its colors beside those of the 22d Iowa.

² Farther south, Osterhaus formed his division in three columns covered by skirmishers, and advanced to the top of a ridge about 120 yards from the works, where they were exposed to heavy fire especially from the square redoubt on their left, but could go no farther; Hovey, in support, was therefore not seriously engaged.

³ 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 60.

along General Grant's exterior line. The firing of Admiral Porter's fleet, however, was apparently increased. The silence was almost appalling, at the sudden cessation of the firing of so many field-guns (about 180), and the cracking of so many thousands of sharpshooters' rifles. But the silence was only for a short time. Suddenly, there seemed to spring almost from the bowels of the earth, dense masses of Federal troops, in numerous columns of attack, and with loud cheers and huzzahs, they rushed forward, at a run, with bayonets fixed, not firing a shot, headed for every salient or advanced position along the Confederate lines. They (the Federals), had not far to make the rush, as they had been under cover from 100 yards to 300 yards from the lines to be attacked. Their advance over the rough ground, which compelled them to open out, was a grand and awful sight, and most gallantly did those veterans move forward, feeling the flush of their numerous victories, and confident that everything must go down before them.

As they came within easy range (almost as soon as they started), the Confederate troops, not exceeding 9938 men, along the $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of assault, deliberately rose and stood in their trenches, pouring volley after volley into the advancing enemy; at the same time, the troops in reserve (already included) advanced to the rear of the trenches, and fired over the heads of those in the trenches. Every field-gun and howitzer (33 in number) belched forth continuously and incessantly double-shotted discharges of grape and canister. No troops in the world could stand such a fire, and it took but a little time to see that the general assault was repulsed. The troops stubbornly fell back as well as they could under shelter, and opened with artillery and infantry again on the Confederate lines. The ground everywhere in front was covered with Union dead and wounded.

But even the terrible scene and slaughter described could not stop all of the valiant Federals. Some of them

made lodgments in the ditches of the redans, at some points on the Graveyard, Jackson, and Baldwin's Ferry roads, and also in the ditch of the fort on the R. R. cut. They even, at this latter fort, entered the work, through the breach or slope which had been made in the southeast angle, by the artillery, before the assault; captured a few prisoners (13), and killed or drove the small garrison out and to the work 80 to 100 yards in the rear.

The troops who entered the Railroad Redoubt were Sergeants Griffith and Messenger and 15 or 20 other enlisted men of Lawler's brigade of Carr's division. McClernand, seeing, as he says,¹ "flags of my corps planted upon the enemy's works, and officers and men of my command enter them and rebel captives brought out of them," thinking, perhaps, that he had pierced the enemy's lines, reported to Grant² that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, asked that reinforcements should be sent to him, and that diversions should be made in his favor by the other corps.

Assault of
afternoon,
May 22d.

It was, however, no practical advantage to gain the outwork as long as the enemy held the main line, and Grant doubted the importance of McClernand's success; but, as McClernand reported³ that he had part possession of two forts, Grant complied with his request and gave orders⁴ for Quinby's division to report to him,⁵ and for the assaults to be renewed all along the line.⁶ The result was the same as that of the former charges.

The attempt to carry Vicksburg by assault was a complete failure.⁷ The Federal loss was 3199, of which 1275 fell upon McClernand's corps, 858 upon Sherman's, and 1066

Failure of
assaults.

¹ 36 R., 176.

² 36 R., 172.

³ 36 R., 172.

⁴ 1 Grant, 531.

⁵ 36 R., 56.

⁶ 36 R., 55, 757.

⁷ While Steele's division was still hotly engaged on the extreme right,

upon McPherson's.² That of the Confederates was not reported separately from the other losses during the siege, but was very much less than that of the Federals.

To add to the horror of the repulse, for three days the

Sherman sent Mower's brigade of Tuttle's division to the assault on the Graveyard road, covered by the fire of Blair's division and of the artillery. (36 R., 757) The ground over which Steele's division passed was more open than elsewhere (V. N. M. P., 12); but Thayer's brigade followed by Wood's approached close to the Confederate line. "Mower carried his brigade up bravely and well," says Sherman, "but again arose a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault, with exactly a similar result." J. E. Smith (36 R., 710) of Logan's division sent forward another regiment, which, unable to stand the heavy fire, filed off to the left, and found shelter behind the second. At about 3 P.M. (V. N. M. P., 21), Sanborn of Quinby's division advanced through a ravine in front of the enemy's works, raked by their musketry and artillery, to a point (36 R., 732; 37 R., 62) a few yards in rear of Burbridge's brigade, and then formed his line to relieve Burbridge, some of whose men retired.

At about 5 P.M. (37 R., 389) the Colonel of the 2d Texas, commanding the lunette on the Baldwin's Ferry road, seeing Sanborn's brigade approach through the ravine, thought that they were trying to turn his left flank, which was not protected by intrenchments, and called for support. Two regiments came up from the reserve (V. N. M. P., 22), made a sally through the open space, and came down on Sanborn's right flank; but after half an hour's sharp fighting, fell back into the lunette (37 R., 316). Boomer's (37 R., 67) brigade was formed in two lines about 400 yards (V. N. M. P., 21) from the curtain north of the Railroad Redoubt, and at 5 P.M. advanced slowly under fire from front and flank. Boomer was killed; and Putnam, who succeeded to the command, hearing that Boomer's last words were to let rifle-pits alone, applied for orders, and was told to remain where he was until dark; then he withdrew.

At about 5.30, the Confederates made up a new (37 R., 344, 351, 357, 358; 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 62) assaulting party of about forty men from Waul's Legion and the 30th Ala., recaptured the Railroad Redoubt, rolled hand grenades over the parapet, and forced an officer and about twenty-eight enlisted men to come out of the ditch and surrender. Detachments of the 21st and 22d Iowa remained in position on the slope in front of the redoubt until after dark, when all Federal troops were withdrawn from positions near the parapets.

² 37 R., 166.

Federal dead left on the field lay in the scorching sun without burial, and the wounded without aid. Grant did not follow the usual custom for the defeated party, and ask for a truce to remove them; the stench was fearful¹; so that, on the 25th, for the health of the garrison and for the relief of the sufferers, *Pemberton*² felt justified in making the first application, which was promptly granted.³ Then the officers and men, who had been fighting fiercely, met and conversed like old friends while the dead were buried, and the wounded who had survived the formalities were cared for.

Exposure of
Federal
wounded.

In Grant's *Memoirs*⁴ he says he has always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made, adding: "I might say the same of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg."⁵

Grant's
comments
reviewed.

The opinions of military men are divided about the propriety of making this assault. The reasons which Grant gives weighed heavily both with the offi-

¹ 3 Miss. Hist. Soc., 63.

² 38 R., 914, 918.

³ 1 Badeau, *Military History of U. S. Grant*, 328, 329.

⁴ 2 Grant, 276.

⁵ "There was more justification," says Grant, "for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. . . . The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. . . . There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in the trenches, drinking surface water, filtered through rich vegetation under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault."

cers and men of his command, flushed with victory and eager to end the campaign by a desperate stroke. So it always has been and perhaps always will be where there appears to be any hope of success. *Pemberton's* army had been routed in a pitched battle, and then his rear-guard, left in a hopeless position, had turned and fled. There was no better way, however, to restore the spirits of the whole Confederate army than to attack it in the trenches of Vicksburg, supported by the fresh troops that *Pemberton* had left behind. It was hardly worth while for Grant to sacrifice so many of his men, to encourage the survivors to dig. It was perhaps advisable to make the attempt on the 19th; but the chance of success on the 22d, was very slight, and the renewal of the assault at McClernand's suggestion was utterly unwarranted by the situation. Grant was naturally indignant when he learned all. The result of the diversion made for McClernand, Grant says,¹ "resulted in the increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent. without advancing our position or giving us other advantages."

In war, as elsewhere, men must learn by experience, and if Grant had profited by the result of these assaults to abstain from like experiments a year later, his error, if it was an error, would have been only such as might have been made by the best of commanders.

Grant's campaign prudently conducted. as his masterpiece. It certainly paved the way to his future advancement. His imprudence at Shiloh, and his repeated failures to reach Vicksburg by other routes were forgotten in admiration of his conduct of this campaign.

¹ 36 R., 56.

In all the operations on the Mississippi, an essential part was taken, of course, by the navy. Porter had so disposed of his ships that Grant could have a base at Grand Gulf below Vicksburg, from which his supplies could reach him by river and by the western shore, and from which he could communicate with Banks, below, and another at Haynes's Bluff, where his supplies and reinforcements could come directly from the North.

After landing half of his army, Grant pushed boldly on, and gained the upland. He then learned that Banks could not come to his support, and that he did not need him. He had wisely left Sherman behind to make a diversion, and he wisely waited for him to come up before advancing. He then moved slowly so that the last detachments that he had left behind could join him; until, finding his army between that of *Pemberton* on one side and his reinforcements on the other, he seized upon Jackson, their rallying point and depot for supplies; and then learning through a spy of *Pemberton's* approach, turned upon him, routed his army at Champion's Hill, and his rear-guard at Big Black Bridge, and opened communications with the navy at Haynes's Bluff, the object for which he had been working for the past six months.

This campaign was all the more brilliant from a military standpoint from the fact that the risk was so slight. Any one may take great risks. The thousands who fail will be forgotten, and the one who succeeds may receive undue praise. Grant and his army took little unnecessary risk in the expedition around Vicksburg, and are entitled to great credit for their success. Although Sherman and McPherson did not at first approve of the plan, they showed great zeal in its execution.

But, while the army deserved and received great credit for this campaign, the navy should not be forgotten, and no one appreciated the value of its hearty cooperation better than Grant.

It will be remembered that on the 2d of May, when Grant had landed, and driven *Bowen* from Port Gibson, *Pemberton* applied for reinforcements. On the 9th, *Ector's* and *McNair's* brigades, about 3000 men, and *Jackson's* cavalry, 3300,¹ and on the 27th, *Breckenridge's* division, about 7700 men, were sent to him. Meanwhile, 3000 prisoners taken at Arkansas Post had been returned, and sent to *Bragg*, whose numbers were otherwise increased by *Clayton's* and *Churchill's* brigades.²

On the 6th, Grant telegraphed to Halleck,³ suggesting that Rosecrans should at least make a demonstration of advancing. On the 18th of May, Halleck telegraphed to Rosecrans, and to Burnside, who was in Ohio, that he had just received dispatches⁴ saying that *Joe Johnston* with a considerable force had left Tennessee to reinforce Vicksburg. "The best way to counteract this is to concentrate your forces, and advance against the enemy in Tennessee, moving, if possible, in such a manner as to threaten East Tennessee."

Rosecrans was not inclined to advance until all his preparations were completed. On the 21st, he replied that if he had 6000 cavalry in addition to the mounting of the 2000 now waiting horses, he would attack Bragg in three days. "As it is, all my corps commanders and chief of cavalry are opposed to an advance, which, they think, hazards more than the probable gains."⁵


¹ 35 R., 873, 846-849, 853, 854; 38 R., 945, 952.


² 36 R., 35.

⁴ 35 R., 337.

³ 35 R., 873.

⁵ 35 R., 351.





LOUISIANA

UNDATION

20 30 40 50

SCALE OF MILES.

COPY OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOL. III, BY COL. W. R. LIVERMORE

Halleck replied: "I have only to repeat what I have so often stated, that there is no more cavalry to send you."

In Louisiana, the capture¹ of Butte à la Rose opened for Banks a safe route to Opelousas and to the Red River. These waters were wholly inaccessible to the enemy, and made perfectly safe lines of communication.

Grant and
Banks.

On the 2d of May, Banks established communication with Farragut at the mouth of Red River, by the gunboat "Arizona." On the 5th, he moved on to Alexandria, where he arrived on the 9th, and met Porter, who had just come from Vicksburg.

On the 10th of April, Banks had received² an oral message from Grant, and at Opelousas on the 21st, his two dispatches dated March 23d,³ saying that he could spare a reinforcement of 20,000 men, and on the 5th of May, that dated April 14th, proposing to send one army corps to Bayou Sara by the 25th, and asking that after the reduction of Port Hudson, Banks should send all the troops he could spare to Vicksburg. To both of the plans Banks consented⁴ and told Halleck that he could supply them from New Orleans if they would bring their own water transportation,⁵ and that this force would insure the capture of Port Hudson; but he afterwards learned from Grant's dispatch of May 10th, which he received at Alexandria on the 12th, that Grant had crossed the Mississippi, and could not retrace his steps nor send the troops, but requested

¹ 41 R., 10.

² 21 R., 303.

³ 21 R., 298.

⁴ 21 R., 314. In reply to that of April 14th, he wrote, thinking that Grant meant the 25th of May, instead of April: "By the 25th, probably, by the 1st, certainly, I will be there."

⁵ 21 R., 299, 300.

Banks to join him at Vicksburg. There were three courses open to Banks: to pursue the enemy to Shreveport; to join Grant at Vicksburg; or to invest Port Hudson. Banks wisely decided upon the last.

His troops left Alexandria on the 14th and 15th of May, and reached Port Hudson on the 24th. Banks

went in person on a river steamboat¹ to New Orleans.² Placing Emory in command of the defences there, he sent T. W. Sherman to join Augur at Port Hudson. On the

21st, Augur from Baton Rouge arrived there just in time to prevent the escape of the garrison. On the 22d, Sherman came up and went into position on Augur's left, and Banks arrived with Grover, who was placed on Augur's right, completing the investment on the land side. The investment was completed by the ships and gunboats of the navy. *Gardner*, the Confederate commander, had a garrison of about 4600 men³ and was about to leave, under *Johnston's* order of the 19th. Banks had with him about 20,000 (estimated).⁴

Banks says, "Nothing but the assault would have satisfied the troops of the presence or strength of the enemy and his works."⁵ For this assault

Assault of
May 27th.

the troops were disposed as follows: On the right, Weitzel was temporarily in command of a division under Dwight composed of the brigades of Thomas and Van Zandt, of Paine's division, of the brigades of Fearing and Gooding, and of two negro regiments about to receive their baptism of fire. On Weitzel's left was Grover's division, composed of the brigades of Kimball and Birge; then Augur's division,

¹ Irwin, 153.

² Irwin, 159.

³ 42 R., 10. Map XIII., at end.

⁴ The figures in Record are wrong.

⁵ 41 R., 13, 404, 405.

of those of Dudley and Chapin; and Sherman's of those of Nickerson and Dow. The orders said:

Generals Augur and Sherman will open fire with their artillery¹ upon the enemy's works at daybreak. . . . They will place their troops in position to take instant advantage of any favorable opportunity, and will, if possible, force the enemy's works, at the earliest possible moment. General Weitzel will, according to verbal directions already given him, take advantage of the attacks on other parts of the line to endeavor to force his way into the enemy's works on our right. General Grover will hold himself in readiness to reinforce either the right or left, if necessary, or to force his way into the enemy's works. Generals Augur, Sherman, Grover, and Weitzel will constantly keep up their connection with the commands next them, so as to afford mutual aid and avoid mistakes. . . . All the operations herein directed must commence at the earliest hour practicable. Port Hudson must be taken to-morrow.

Farragut was ready to open fire when notified.

The orders explained precisely what was most to be desired; but did not explain clearly what should be done if no favorable opportunity occurred to Augur or Sherman to "force the enemy's works." The ground over which Weitzel and Grover were to advance was obstructed by ravines with steep banks, gigantic magnolias, and dense thickets; so that no artificial defences were prepared until Banks approached. Then a few detached works were built; and on the night of the 26th,² the defenders prepared temporary breast-works by rolling up logs and piling up rails. Throughout the Confederate line³ trees had been felled for several hundred yards in front of the works, forming an abatis for their protection.

¹ 41 R., 508.

² 41 R., 163.

³ 8 M. H. S. M., 39.

At 5 A.M. of the 27th, Weitzel, young, buoyant, and combative,¹ advanced through the woods, driving back the enemy's skirmishers; and by noon succeeded by "a gigantic bushwhack" in driving the enemy inside the parapet, and silencing for a while some of their artillery.²

To support these attacks, two of Grover's regiments then made their way through an almost impassable ravine to a point near Weitzel's left where they climbed a steep bluff to within thirty yards of the works, but were obliged to take shelter behind the crest. Grover then sent the rest of his division against a point still farther to the left, but to no purpose.

Dwight then sent the colored troops on the Federal right against the extreme left of the enemy's position. The leading regiment crossed Foster's Creek, and under heavy front and flank fire of musketry and artillery advanced to within two hundred yards of the works,³ and then fell back with the loss of twenty-four killed and seventy-nine wounded out of about seven hundred. General (then Captain) Palfrey says,⁴ "The day should be one of the famous dates in the progress of their race."

In three or four hours, Grover's men relaxed their efforts, and then Weitzel's, and there was a lull.⁵ They had heard nothing on their left. The ground in front of Augur was level, but terribly obstructed with felled trees, and exposed for 1200 yards to the fire of the enemy's artillery. Banks was with Augur⁶ waiting for the sound of Sherman's musketry as the

¹ 41 R., 132.

² Thomas occupied a ridge 200 yards from the works, Van Zandt 400, and Paine 500.

³ Irwin, 173.

⁴ 8 M. H. S. M., 41.

⁵ 8 M. H. S. M., 40.

⁶ Irwin, 176.

signal to advance. As the orders required each to keep up his connection with the other so as to afford mutual aid and avoid mistakes, and as Banks was with Augur, Sherman was probably waiting for him.

At about noon, Banks,¹ "greatly disturbed by the check on his right," says Irwin, "and still more by the silence on his left," rode down to Sherman's headquarters. "Hot words passed, the nature of which has not been recorded."² Sherman³ then formed each brigade in columns of regiments in line, and rode with his whole staff in the interval between them.⁴ The troops lost heavily in passing high fences and in the abatis in front of the works, until, after an hour or two, the survivors were compelled to seek shelter. Sherman lost his leg, and was carried from the field. As soon as Banks heard the rattle of Sherman's musketry, he ordered Augur to advance. Chapin's brigade on his left attacked in column of regiments, but could not pass the abatis. Dudley's brigade on the right, held back in reserve, was to follow; but when Banks heard of the failure of Sherman's attack, he lost all hope. The total loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 1995.⁵ The Confederate loss was about 350 men.⁶

This assault was a repetition of the second assault on Vicksburg a few days before. The ground over which Weitzel advanced was perhaps more rugged and more obstructed than that in front of Vicksburg, but the defences were not as carefully prepared. That over which Augur and Sherman advanced was more open and regular and afforded little or no shelter to the men as they advanced. The

¹ Irwin, 176.

⁴ 41 R., 124, 125.

² Irwin, 177.

⁵ 41 R., 47.

³ 41 R., 509.

⁶ Irwin, 182; 41 R., 147.

motives which prompted an assault were in some respects stronger here than at Vicksburg, for Grant's safety appeared to be involved. Banks was not a soldier; but he was advised to make the assault by officers of the army and navy upon whose judgment he properly relied. Its prospect of success was based upon the supposed weakness of the garrison; and the assaults were to be made upon all points at once. Banks should therefore have made his orders clear and definite. From his failure to do so, he lost his only chance of success; the defenders had ample time to move along the good roads they had provided and meet the several assaults in succession. "Worse than all if possible," says Irwin, "the confidence that but a few hours before had run so high was rudely shaken. It was long indeed before the men felt the same faith in themselves, and it is but the plain truth to say that their reliance on the department commander never quite returned."

Upon the whole, this campaign was well conducted. Banks's instruction required him to move up the Mississippi River, and effect a junction with the column coming down, and then, as he was senior to Grant by date of his commission, to take command of the united armies. This was a strong incentive to vigorous action, and Banks was not without ambition. Port Hudson was in the way to an advance up the Mississippi. When Banks arrived, the garrison was nearly as strong as any force that he could bring against it, and he could not besiege it without so reducing the garrison of New Orleans as to endanger its recapture. Accordingly he tried to open a route by land and water west of the Mississippi, and in this he was successful. Hearing that Grant was to send a large force to aid him in

taking Port Hudson, he waited leisurely for a fortnight at Opelousas to reorganize the country. If Banks had known that Grant was to move on to Vicksburg instead of sending troops to Louisiana, he should at least have threatened Port Hudson, so that troops would not be sent from its garrison to reinforce *Pemberton*. But this he did not learn until the 10th of May. Then, as the garrison had been greatly reduced, he could besiege it with a good prospect of success; but he could not move up the Mississippi to join Grant; for if he did, the garrison of Port Hudson could and probably would join with the Confederate troops in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Alabama to recapture New Orleans.

But Halleck thought that he could, from his desk in Washington, coordinate the movements of these two armies hundreds of miles apart; and at the same time, he directed them to cooperate. Halleck. When Grant cut loose from his communications, he must have felt a sense of security in knowing that he could receive no orders from Halleck until the campaign was decided.

On the 11th of May Halleck telegraphed to him¹:

If possible the forces of yourself and General Banks should be united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces. The same thing has been urged upon General Banks.

It came too late to be obeyed.

On the 19th of May, Halleck, learning from the newspapers² that Banks was in possession of Alexandria, and Grant, of Jackson, wrote to Banks:

This may be well enough so far, but these operations

¹ 36 R., 36.

² 41 R., 494.

are too eccentric to be pursued. I must again urge that you cooperate with General Grant east of the Mississippi. Your forces must be united at the earliest possible moment. Otherwise the enemy will concentrate on Grant and crush him.¹

And on the 23d of May²:

If these eccentric movements with the main forces of the enemy on the east side of the Mississippi do not lead to serious disaster, it will be because the enemy does not take full advantage of his opportunity. I assure you that the Government is exceedingly disappointed that you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction.

And on the 3d of June to the same effect. Banks was before Port Hudson when this dispatch was received.³

In spite of Halleck's feeble attempts to bring these two armies together, each finally sat down before the
Comment. fortress that was in its path, in no danger

of attack by superior forces from without. Each army had yielded to the impulse of youthful vigor and patriotism which prompted it to take the fortification by assault. Both now realized that, to open up the Mississippi, they must sit for weeks in the broiling sun of an unhealthy climate, until the garrison of one of the fortresses should be worn out by fatigue or starvation, or until the hostile lines should be penetrated by the slow but certain process of a siege. It was pleasant, however, to know that, by perseverance and hard work, the chances were that, if properly supported, they would at last gain the object for which they had so long been working and fighting.

¹ 41 R., 494.

³ See also 41 R., 534, and 41 R., 545.

² 41 R., 500.



CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS IN JUNE, 1863, ETC.

THE military operations of June, 1863, and the next few days marked the turning point of the war. Hooker's repulse would not be a fatal blow to the North unless it should be followed by an advance of the Confederate army. The investment of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson would mean little or nothing unless these fortresses should fall. The problem of crushing the rebellion then took a definite form. Richmond could not at once be captured; no approach had been made to Chattanooga; but the Mississippi could be opened if the Federal Government would send troops enough to Grant's support. To fail to do this, would be to lose the work of the western army and navy for the past six months.

On the 1st of June, on the banks of the Rappahannock, the Army of the Potomac was reduced by loss in battle, and by expiration of the terms of service, from 150,000 men to 104,600 men¹; whereas the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia had been raised by troops then coming in from Southeast Virginia and North Carolina to 73,000.² Elsewhere in the Northeast were 71,000 Federals³ and 4500 Confederates.² Hooker could spare

Situation,
June, 1863.

Situation
in the
Northeast.

¹ 40 R., 574. Map XV., at end.

² 40 R., 846.

³ 40 R., 589, 592.

no troops to send to Grant. Even if a competent commander were put in his place, it would not be safe to reduce the force that was guarding Washington and the Northeast for the prospect of recovering the extreme Southwest; for this would mean losing the head in the efforts to save the members.

In Southeastern Virginia were about 32,400 Federals¹ and 19,000 Confederates.² Some troops might be sent to the Army of the Potomac; but none could be spared for Grant. In North Carolina were 15,700 Federals³ and 15,000 Confederates.² In South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 15,700 Federals⁴ and 18,300 Confederates.⁵ No Federal troops could be spared from the Atlantic coast. Along the Gulf coast and in Southern Mississippi and in Louisiana were 24,000 Federals⁶ under Banks, 4400 Confederates⁷ at Mobile, 8000 or 9000⁸ under *Taylor* in Louisiana, and 5500⁹ under *Gardner* at Port Hudson.

Banks could not abandon Louisiana to *Gardner* and *Taylor* for the sake of helping Grant. In Texas were 8000 Confederate troops,¹⁰ in New Mexico 2300 Federals.¹¹ Around Vicksburg, Grant had 50,500¹²; at Helena, Arkansas, 4300; and in Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi 36,500. Opposed to him, *Pemberton*¹³ had 20,100 at Vicksburg, *Johnston*¹⁴ had 28,000 near Canton, and 6000¹⁵ were left in other parts of the State. If

¹ 26 R., 733.² 26 R., 1086.³ 26 R., 736.⁴ 20 R., 461.⁵ 20 R., 934, 936, 944, 945.⁶ 41 R., 527, 490, estimated.⁷ 42 R., 28.⁸ 42 R., 42.⁹ 42 R., 10, 82; allowing 400 for losses and including 1300 cavalry.¹⁰ 21 R., 1034; 42 R., 98.¹¹ 42 R., 612.¹² 38 R., 370, 371.¹³ 38 R., 923.¹⁴ 38 R., 925, 917, 936, 945, 947.¹⁵ 38 R., 929, 939, 965, 917, 934.

Johnston's force should be heavily increased, *Pemberton* might be released, and Grant's army thrown back upon the fleet. In Arkansas,¹ *Holmes* had 14,000 white troops and 4400 *Indians*, guarding the State against the Federals in Missouri, Kansas, and Indian Territory. In this region and that adjoining, *Schofield*² had 31,000 men.

Schofield says³:

With my views of the military situation, whether confined to my own department or extended to embrace the entire country, there was but one course to pursue, namely, to send all available force to assist in the capture of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi to the Gulf. After that I could easily operate from points on the Mississippi as a base, capture Little Rock and the line of the Arkansas, and then make that river the base of future operations.

Missouri
and
Northwest.

This course he had urged before, and he says, "I was glad to do it when the responsibility rested upon me." On the 3d of June,⁴ in response to Halleck's request, *Schofield* sent Herron with 4000 men to Grant at Vicksburg. In the Northwest, *Pope* had 6200 men.⁵

In Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, etc.: in the Army of the Cumberland, *Rosecrans* had 87,800⁶; in the Department of the Ohio, *Burnside* had 38,000.⁷

These were opposed to *Bragg*⁸ in Tennessee with 50,700,⁹ *Buckner* in East Tennessee with 16,300, and *Jones*¹⁰ in West Virginia with 6400. *Burnside* was preparing to invade East Tennessee as soon as that part of his old corps then

Ohio,
Kentucky,
Tennessee.

¹ 33 R., 832, 851.

² *Forty-six Years in the Army*, 69.

³ 33 R., 90, 301.

⁴ 35 R., 846; 34 R., 585.

⁵ 35 R., 378.

⁶ 35 R., 855.

⁷ 33 R., 299, 300.

⁸ 33 R., 306, 308.

⁹ 35 R., 379.

¹⁰ 40 R., 844, 846.

in Southeastern Virginia could join him. Rosecrans proposed to make a forward movement at the same time. On the 3d of June, in reply to Halleck's inquiry as to how many troops he could send to Grant, Burnside replied,¹ "Rosecrans is now relying upon my advance into Tennessee, and I am all ready. If I do not go there, some 8000 or 10,000 might be spared for Grant." Halleck directed him to send 8000, adding, "I think there is no fear of an advance upon Kentucky at present," and on the same day, Parke was sent with about 7400² present for duty. On the same day, Halleck telegraphed to Rosecrans,³ "Accounts received here indicate that *Johnston* is being heavily reinforced from *Bragg's* army. If you cannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you."

We saw that *Bragg* had sent about 11,000 men to Mississippi, and that *Beauregard* had sent 8100 from South Carolina. A naval attack had been made upon Charleston in the spring, which we will consider hereafter, and the Federals were threatening a combined attack by land and sea. The shattered remnants of Confederate armies west of the Mississippi were making feeble attempts to relieve the beleaguered garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, or to open a way for them to escape; but the Federal fleets were in the way. Mobile and Charleston, the only ports left to the Confederates east of the Mississippi, were in imminent danger of attack by the Gulf and the sea. Neither *Lee* nor *Bragg* could spare troops for *Johnston*.

On the 15th of May, *Beauregard* suggested to *Johnston*⁴ a plan to submit to the War Department for a "brilliant" summer campaign.

¹ 35 R., 384.² 38 R., 452.³ 35 R., 383.⁴ 35 R., 836.

Certainly [he says], the surest way to relieve the State of Mississippi and the valley of the Mississippi from the presence of the enemy's army is suddenly and boldly to take the offensive in Tennessee and Kentucky; for which purpose all available forces from other commands, held strictly on the defensive, should be concentrated under you. The forces now in Tennessee being thus reinforced by 25,000 or 30,000 men at the most favorable strategic point for the offensive, Rosecrans could be suddenly attacked, and would be either totally destroyed or the remnant of his forces would be speedily driven beyond the Ohio. A force of at least 10,000 men in Tennessee and 20,000 in Kentucky would doubtless then be raised, and, with about 20,000 of the reinforcements received from Vicksburg and elsewhere, could be left to hold these two States. The rest of the army, say about 60,000 or 70,000 men, should cross the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers to Columbus or Fort Pillow, so as to command the Mississippi River and thus cut off Grant's communication with the north.

Early in May,¹ when *Longstreet* was passing through Richmond on his way to rejoin *Lee*, he suggested to Seddon a plan similar to that of *Beauregard*:

that the commands moving on converging lines [he says] could have rapid transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on Rosecrans before he could have help, break up his army, and march for Cincinnati and the Ohio River; that Grant's was the only army that could be drawn to meet this move, and that the move must therefore relieve Vicksburg. It was manifest before the war was accepted that the only way to equalize the contest was by skilful use of our interior lines. . . . But foreign intervention was the ruling idea with the President, and he preferred that as the easiest solution of all problems.

¹ Longstreet, 327 ff.

After reporting to *Lee*,¹ *Longstreet* offered to him the same suggestion. He thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity called them to that service. He suggested that *Johnston* should be sent to reinforce *Bragg*, and that his division be sent to join *Johnston*.

He reflected over the matter one or two days [says *Longstreet*²], and then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result.

What might have been the result of *Beauregard's* plan, which is in accord with the general principles

of strategy, is a problem of great interest.

Comment. The result would depend, of course, upon the manner in which the armies were handled as the reinforcements came up to both armies. *Rosecrans* was well prepared for such an attack. The cities of central Tennessee were well fortified, and stocked with provisions, and Federal troops could be brought by rail from every direction to reinforce *Rosecrans* and *Burnside*; other factors which enter into this problem can be estimated from the experience and result of the campaign which *Lee* actually conducted in the East.

After the battle of Chancellorsville, it was evident that *Hooker* could not command the Army of the Poto-

mac; but it was not easy to find a successor who would satisfy all parties. Lincoln's problem was not merely to lead the North in




a war against the South; but, essentially, to unite the small majority of Northerners who had elected him with the large minority who had opposed him, and were yet unwilling to see the nation destroyed.

Lee could not wait indefinitely for Lincoln to decide.




¹ *Longstreet*, 331. Map IV., at end of Book I.

² *Ibid.*

MODERATE



DRAWN FOR "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR," BY COL. W. L. LIVERMORE, VOL. 3



If he remained long on the defensive, the chances of war would one day compel him to retreat. All the resources of the country around the Rappahannock had been exhausted. Everything had to be brought by rail from a distance. By taking the offensive, he could feed off the enemy's country; he thought that by invading Maryland and Pennsylvania,¹ he could prevent Lincoln from sending troops to Grant and so alarm him for the safety of Washington that he would not allow Hooker to take Richmond but would recall his army from the Rappahannock. Lee meanwhile would supply his brave, battered, and barefoot troops with food and clothing, by his superior skill take Hooker's army at a disadvantage and destroy it, and, perhaps, push on to Baltimore or Philadelphia, levy contributions, and take possession of the land. He could not, of course, hope to hold it; but he thought that after such a display of power, the foreign powers might recognize the Southern Confederacy and raise the blockade, and that the peace party at the North might declare the war a failure.

The movement began on the 3d of June.² *Longstreet's* corps then left Fredericksburg and the Rapidan for Culpeper where *Stuart's* cavalry was already assembled. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by *Ewell's* corps, leaving *Hill's* to occupy the lines at Fredericksburg. By the 8th, *Longstreet*³ and *Ewell* reached Culpeper.

On the 5th, Hooker wrote to the President that he⁴ thought from information he had received, that the enemy were planning a movement similar to that of *Lee's* last year.

Hooker and
Lincoln.

¹ 45 R., 868; 44 R., 302, 305.

³ 44 R., 305. Map IV., end of Book I.

² 44 R., 305.

⁴ 43 R., 30.

He must either have it in mind to cross the Upper Potomac, or to throw his army between mine and Washington. . . . In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed toward the Potomac, via Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so? In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of His Excellency the President the necessity of having one commander for all of the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army. . . . I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it, as I feel the necessity for concert as well as vigorous action. It is necessary for me to say this much that my motives may not be misunderstood.

He would be glad to be relieved of the responsibility of another Chancellorsville. To this Lincoln replied, June 5th¹:

Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it, that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox

¹ 43 R., 31.

jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him or act on the defence, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.

Halleck wrote, approving the President's views, and adding:

Would it not be more advantageous to fight his movable column first, instead of first attacking his intrenchments, with your own forces separated by the Rappahannock? . . . Neither this capital¹ nor Harper's Ferry could long hold out against a large force. They must depend for their security very much upon the cooperation of your army. It would, therefore, seem perilous to permit Lee's main force to move upon the Potomac while your army is attacking an intrenched position on the other side of the Rappahannock. Of course your movements must depend in a great measure upon those made by Lee. . . . General Heintzelman and General Dix are instructed to telegraph directly to you all the movements which they may ascertain or make. Directions have also been given to forward military information which may be received from General Schenck's command. Any movements you may suggest of troops in these commands will be ordered, if deemed practicable. . . . The foregoing views are approved by the President.

It is hardly worth while to speculate as to what Hooker could do. For a competent commander it would be safe either "to pitch into his rear" or to "fight his movable column first." In moving around Hooker's right, *Lee* divided

Comment.

¹ 43 R., 32.

his forces just as Hooker had divided his a month before, but *Lee* had not, as Hooker had, the numerical strength to justify it. With a good commander the Army of the Potomac would stand in no danger of being caught half over the fence by the force that *Lee* had left behind at Fredericksburg. By crossing as Hooker had crossed a month before, he could capture or drive it back, and turn upon *Lee* long before *Lee* could take Washington. On the other hand, by attacking "the movable column first," he could engage it with superior numbers, and be safe from any possible counterstroke. If *Lee* had had any respect for his adversary, he would have kept the fractions of his army within supporting distance.

On the 5th,¹ Hooker directed Sedgwick to throw two bridges across the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing, and on the 6th, to make a reconnaissance and ascertain the position and strength of the enemy. Sedgwick reported them in full force. Hooker also moved²

Battle of
Brandy
Station.

Sykes's corps to the river bank between Banks and United States Fords. As he thought that the accumulation of Confederate cavalry about Culpeper might "mean mischief" he determined if practicable to "break it up in its incipency."³ Accordingly he directed Pleasonton, who had superseded Stoneman in command of the cavalry corps, supported by two brigades of infantry,⁴ to cross the Rappahannock, at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, and march directly on Culpeper.⁵

For this [the order said], you will divide your cavalry

¹ C. W., 1865, 152-3.

² I C. W., 1865, 156.

³ 43 R., 33.

⁴ Ames and Russell, about 1500 men (43 R., 151, 163, 164).

⁵ 45 R., 27.

force as you think proper, . . . to disperse and destroy the rebel force assembled in the vicinity of Culpeper, and to destroy his trains and supplies of all description to the utmost of your ability.¹

On the 8th of June, *Stuart's* brigades were² posted from three to five miles southwest of the Rappahannock, for about five miles above and below Beverly Ford, with pickets along the river, especially at Beverly and Kelly's Fords.

Pleasanton's right wing, Buford's division, Whiting's reserve brigade, and Ames's infantry brigade, all under Buford, were to cross at 3 A.M. at Beverly Ford. With his own division, Buford soon encountered *Jones's* brigade at St. James's Church on the direct road to Brandy Station and Culpeper; and fought on horseback and on foot. *W. H. F. Lee* then formed on *Jones's* left and *Hampton* on his right. Pleasanton's left wing, Duffié's and Gregg's divisions and Russell's infantry brigade, all under Gregg, crossed at 5 or 6 A.M. at Kelly's Ford and advanced by three routes. Hearing from Pleasanton that he had met the cavalry force of the enemy, Gregg pushed on with his own division for Brandy Station and toward the firing; and directed Duffié's division and Russell's brigade upon the same point. When the head of Gregg's division arrived near Brandy Station, finding that Fleetwood Hill near by was occupied by the enemy, Gregg directed Wynd-

¹ "Shortly after crossing the two fords, the routes you will be likely to take intersect, and the major-general commanding suggests that you keep your infantry force together, as in that condition it will afford you a moving *point d'appui* to rally on at all times, which no cavalry can be able to shake. It is believed that the enemy has no infantry. Should you find this to be the case, by keeping the troops well in hand you will be able to make head in any direction."

² McClellan's *Stuart*, 257 ff.; 44 R., 679 ff.

ham's brigade to charge. *Stuart* at St. James's Church, hearing that the enemy was in his rear, brought up three of *Jones's* regiments, and after repeated charges and countercharges, and some fighting on foot, drove Wyndham back. Gregg, seeing this, then sent Kilpatrick's brigade against *Stuart's* new line, drove it away, and occupied the hill; but meanwhile, *Stuart* had brought up *Hampton's* brigade, which had been facing Buford at St. James's Church; and after a succession of charges on both sides, Gregg, finding himself outnumbered, and seeing nothing of Duffié, withdrew his division to a point one mile south of Brandy Station, and recalled him.

Meanwhile^{*} at St. James's Church, *W. H. F. Lee's* brigade extended beyond Buford's right, and threatened to cut him off. Buford then ordered up the reserve brigade on the right of his own division, and brought up Ames's infantry to support his line. As these changes had not been completed when *Hampton* turned on Gregg, Buford did not at once pursue. *W. H. F. Lee's* right flank was now exposed; and *Stuart* withdrew all his troops and formed a second line at Fleetwood Hill. Buford advanced, and extended his right until he had outflanked *Stuart's* left, which he attacked. Meanwhile Duffié and Gregg came up on Buford's left; and *Mumford* from Oak Shade, with three of *Fitz Lee's* regiments, came up on *Stuart's* left, outflanking Buford. Pleasonton says² that he learned that the enemy had double his force of cavalry, and that a train of cars had been run up to Brandy Station with infantry; "And having crippled the enemy by desperate fighting so that he could not follow me, I returned with my command to the north side of the

^{*} McClellan's *Stuart*, 272 ff.

² 43 R., 903.

Rappahannock." His total loss was 866,¹ *Stuart's* loss was 485.²

This disparity was not due to the inferior skill or courage of the Federal troops; but mainly to Pleasonton's effort to concentrate his forces upon a point which proved to be occupied by the enemy, who met each fraction in turn, and drove it back or held it in check until the Federal infantry came to its support. Comment.

But if Pleasonton and Hooker were unfortunate in their combinations, the Federal cavalry covered itself with glory in the eyes of both friend and foe. *Stuart's* adjutant-general³ says of this battle, that it *made* the Federal *cavalry*.

Up to this time [he says] confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and in their commanders which enabled them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battles of June, July, and October.

Pleasonton claims to have gained valuable information about the enemy's movements from this fight; but it appears from Hooker's testimony before the Congressional Committee that it was not very definite.⁴

On the 10th, Hooker wrote again to the President that from certain movements he thought it not improbable that the enemy⁵ were preparing for a raid into Maryland, and asked: Hooker and
Lincoln.

If it should be found to be the case, will it not promote the true interest of the cause for me to march to Richmond at once?

¹ 43 R., 170.

² 44 R., 719.

³ McClellan's *Stuart*, 294.

⁴ 1 C. W., 1865, 158 ff.

⁵ 43 R., 34.

To which Lincoln replied:¹

If left to me, I would not go south of Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines, while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.²


Lincoln was wrong in his estimate of time for taking Richmond provided *Lee* continued his invasion. There were no troops who could delay him long after he arrived; and Dix would be there to help him; nor would it be hard to supply his army. The fall of Richmond would be a great blow to the Confederacy; on the other hand, although Washington was safe,³ it was hardly worth while to permit *Lee* to "swap queens," as he expressed it, by exchanging Richmond for Baltimore or Philadelphia.⁴ Lincoln was quite right in saying "*Lee's* army, and not Richmond is your sure objective point." Hooker had a fine opportunity to strike it in detail without vio-

¹ 43 R., 35.


² And Halleck added: "The President has just referred to me your telegram and his reply of yesterday, with directions to say to you whether or not I agree with him. I do so fully."

³ *Report on the Defences of Washington*, by Bvt. Maj.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, Washington, Govt. Printing Office, p. 32, etc.



⁴ It is quite possible too that the Confederate government would recall Lee to the defence of Richmond, and that Hill could retard Hooker's advance while Lee moved his troops from Culpeper by rail (Fitz Lee's *Lee*, 262), but this would mean the loss of the line of the Rappahannock.



DRAWN FOR "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR" BY COL. W. A. LIVERMORE VOL. III.



JUNE 15 W. J. WILSON DEL.



lating his orders about Washington and Harper's Ferry.

On the 8th of June, *Lee* had written to Seddon, the Secretary of War, proposing to take the aggressive¹; to which he replied on the 10th²: Lee and Seddon.

I concur entirely in your views of the importance of aggressive movements by your army. Indeed, in my present judgment, such action is indispensable to our safety and independence, and all attendant sacrifices and risks must be incurred. I steadily urge and sustain this view; at the same time, I am most anxious to assure your communications and supplies, and it is in this view I press upon your own consideration some of the dangers to which our destitution of a covering force to this city and the railroad may expose us. I have not hesitated, in co-operating with your plans, to leave this city almost defenceless.

On the 10th *Lee* wrote to Davis³:

We should not conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting. The decrease of the aggregate of this army, as disclosed by the returns, affords an illustration of this fact. Its effective strength varies from time to time, but the falling off in its aggregate shows that its ranks are growing weaker and that its losses are not supplied by recruits, etc.

*Ewell*⁴ left Culpeper Court-House on the 10th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he detached *Rodes's* division to Berryville with instructions, after dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac. *Jenkins*⁵ with his Ewell and Milroy.

¹ 45 R., 868. ² 45 R., 882. ³ 45 R., 881. ⁴ 44 R., 305. ⁵ 44 R., 306.

brigade of cavalry was ordered to cover *Ewell's* advance; at the same time, *Imboden* with his command was ordered to make a demonstration in the direction of Romney; as they had long been operating in the Valley and in West Virginia, their presence there created no suspicion.

The defence of all this region was intrusted to Schenck at Baltimore. About 5500 men¹ were stationed at Winchester, and 1500 at Berryville, both under Milroy; 1300 at Martinsburg, and 5300 at Harper's Ferry under Kelley. Halleck had repeatedly told Schenck² to maintain only a small force at Winchester as an outpost which should not be exposed to an attack in force, and to employ the remainder of Milroy's troops for the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, etc. Milroy, however, had convinced Schenck that it was better to hold the Valley, to protect the loyal inhabitants and to make use of its resources for the Federal army, rather than to abandon all to the enemy. He was fortifying Winchester as a stronghold; and much may be said in favor of his scheme, had it been consistent with the general plan of operations. Under the circumstances, however, it was unpardonable for Schenck to keep him there. On the 8th of June, Halleck again recommended Schenck³ to mass his troops, but he was too late.⁴

With the divisions of *Early* and *Johnson*,⁵ about 17,000 men, *Ewell* advanced directly upon Winchester,

¹ 40 R., 590; 44 R., 192.

² 44 R., 186.

³ 44 R., 181.

⁴ "We shall not know," he said, "the direction and intention of this raid until it is actually in motion." And on the 11th: "The Winchester troops, excepting enough to serve as an outpost, should be withdrawn to Harper's Ferry." On the 12th Schenck ordered Milroy to prepare to withdraw but to await further orders. Of course they never came.

⁵ 40 R., 845, 846.

driving Milroy into his works around the town.¹ On the same day, the troops at Berryville fell back before *Rodes*, retreating to Winchester. On the 14th, *Early's* division carried some of the outworks; and Milroy took refuge in the main works just outside of the town, where he could have held out indefinitely if properly prepared. Finding that he had but one day's rations and no ammunition for his artillery, he moved out at 1 A.M. of the 15th, and a few miles north of the town met *Johnson*, who was placed there to intercept him. *Early* soon came up in his rear. After a hard fight and a loss of half of his command, Milroy escaped to Harper's Ferry.² *Rodes* marched from Berryville to Martinsburg where he arrived on the 14th. The garrison escaped without much loss. These operations cleared the Valley of the Federal troops. On the 17th, Tyler, who was placed in command at Harper's Ferry, transferred the troops to the fortifications at Maryland Heights on the northern bank of the Potomac,³ where in a few days about 7000 men were assembled.⁴

On the 13th, Hooker telegraphed to Halleck⁵:

All my sources of information confirm the statement that Longstreet's and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper and Sperryville, toward the Valley. The instructions of the President, approved by yourself, and your original letter of instructions, compel me, in view of this movement of the enemy, to transfer the operations of this army from the line of the Aquia to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Accordingly, directions have been given for the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Corps to rendezvous at Manassas Junction with the cavalry. The Second,

Hooker
moves from
the Rappa-
hannock.

¹ 44 R., 306, 439, 440.

⁴ 43 R., 488.

² 44 R., 306.

⁵ 43 R., 38.

³ 44 R., 20.

Sixth, and Twelfth, with the Reserve Artillery, after covering the withdrawal of government property from depots, have been directed to march to Dumfries and from thence to be governed by the movements of the enemy, the object being to bring the two wings together as far in advance of that line as the movements of the enemy will justify.

Lincoln replied on the 14th¹:

So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the Plank Road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?

Hooker replied:

Will the President allow me to inquire if it is his opinion that Winchester is surrounded by the rebel forces? . . . I do not feel like making a move for an enemy until I am satisfied as to his whereabouts. To proceed to Winchester, and have him make his appearance elsewhere, would subject me to ridicule. With this feeling, unless otherwise directed, I feel it my duty to proceed to execute the movement indicated on yesterday.

Lincoln was quite right. From the 12th, when *Ewell* crossed the Blue Ridge, Hooker with 85,000 men was confronting *Longstreet* with 21,000, *Stuart* with 6000, and *Hill* with 20,000. Up to the 15th, he could throw 60,000 against *Longstreet* and *Stuart*, and cut *Lee's* army in two. If he were not ready to attack, he could at least have seized the passes over the Blue Ridge and held the Loudoun Valley and the Bull Run Mountains. *Lee* would still have been at his mercy. Instead of that, on the

¹ 43 R., 39.

13th, he deliberately moved away from *Lee* and toward Washington, which was well fortified and garrisoned and did not need his protection.

On the 14th,¹ when Hooker withdrew from the Rappahannock, *Hill* began to move up to Culpeper C. H. On the 15th, in order to mislead Hooker as to *Lee's* intentions and at the same time protect *Hill* in his march up the Rappahannock, *Longstreet* with *McLaws's* and *Hood's* divisions, and *Pickett's*, which had just rejoined him, advanced along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge toward Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, with *Fitz Lee's*,² *W. H. F. Lee's*, and *Robertson's* brigades of cavalry under *Stuart* in front and on his right flank, leaving *Hampton's* and *Jones's* brigades along the Rappahannock to follow when *Hill's* corps had passed.

Hooker kept up his march towards Washington for fear that his right flank³ would be turned. *Fitz Lee's* brigade under *Munford* went to Aldie, W. *H. F. Lee's* under *Chambliss* toward Thor- oughfare Gap, and *Robertson's* was left at Rectortown in reserve.

On the morning of the 15th, Hooker might still have thrown all his army on two thirds of *Lee's*. He knew very well what he called⁴ "the perilous position of the enemy." On the 15th Halleck told him of Milroy's disaster, but said that Harper's Ferry ought to hold out for some time, adding⁵:

Your army is entirely free to operate as you desire against *Lee's* army, so long as you keep his main army from Washington. It is believed that *Longstreet* and *Stuart* are crossing the Potomac above and below Harper's Ferry.

¹ 44 R., 315.

² McClell. *Stuart*, 296.

³ 43 R., 44.

⁴ 1 C. W., 1865, 160.

⁵ 43 R., 42.

They certainly should be pursued. . . . Leesburg seems about the best point to move on first.

On the 16th¹ Lincoln called his attention to the "fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line now stretched out from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania." Hooker did not think it prudent.

It appeared to me [he said²] that the wisest course for me to pursue was to move the army on a concentric but inner circle to the one followed by the enemy and to endeavor to keep abreast of his main column.

On the same day,³ Halleck told him that the enemy were surrounding Harper's Ferry; that Schenck said it could not hold out very long; he wished Hooker and Halleck. to know whether he might expect relief. "He can hope for none excepting from your army." Hooker replied: "In compliance with your direction, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry. I expect to reach there in two days."

Hooker complained⁴ that he had not enjoyed the confidence of General Halleck. At 10 P.M. the President telegraphed⁵:

To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of the commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently; but as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them.

At the same time he wrote a private letter explaining his views and adding⁶:

Now all I ask is that you will be in such mood that we

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 160.


² 1 C. W., 1865, 161.



³ 43 R., 46.

⁴ 1 C. W., 1865, 163.

⁵ 1 C. W., 1865, 268.



⁶ 7 N. & H., 212.





ON "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR" BY COL. W. A. LIVERMORE, VOL. III.

WM. J. WILSON, DEL.



can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if indeed he and you shall think it entitled to any consideration at all.

At 10.15 P.M. Halleck telegraphed¹:

I have given no instructions for your army to move to Harper's Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force, sufficiently strong to meet Longstreet, on Leesburg, to ascertain where the enemy is, and then move to the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as circumstances might require. With the remainder of your force in proper position to support this, I want you to push out your cavalry, to ascertain something definite about the enemy. You are in command of the Army of the Potomac and will make the particular dispositions as you deem proper. I shall only indicate the objects to be aimed at. We have no positive information of any large force against Harper's Ferry, and it cannot be known whether it will be necessary to go there until you can feel the enemy and ascertain his whereabouts.

On the 17th Hooker replied²:

Directions have been given for my cavalry to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Winchester and Harper's Ferry, for the purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts and strength of the enemy, and while this is being done, some of the infantry corps will be advanced by easy marches. As soon as the intentions of the enemy are known to me, I shall be able to advance with rapidity.

Again Lincoln and Halleck were quite right. In one day's march, Hooker could have moved his army to Leesburg and the Loudoun Valley, in another, to Snicker's Gap or to Harper's Ferry and the Shenandoah. Comment. *Lee's* army was stretched

¹ 43 R., 47.

² 43 R., 48.

out seventy-five miles, as the crow flies, from Hagerstown to Culpeper. Unless *Ewell* should start back at the instant Hooker began to move, he could hardly hope to escape. As Hooker had the start, he had still a fair chance to cut the animal in two.

The cavalry under Pleasonton¹ was picketing from Sulphur Springs to Rappahannock Station and from there down, holding the bulk of the cavalry Pleasonton's on the right with instructions to attack the reconnaissance-enemy if he appeared. On the 17th of June, Pleasonton started on his reconnaissance which he pushed as far as Ashby's Gap.²

Meanwhile³ on the 17th *Longstreet* had reached the

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 159.

² On June 17th, (43 R., 952), Pleasonton, with Gregg's brigade, left Manassas Junction for Aldie. Kilpatrick's brigade was ordered to advance through Aldie to Front Royal; but at Aldie, he met Fitz Lee's brigade under Munford (43 R., 953). All Gregg's forces were soon engaged, drove Munford back a short distance, and held the pass. Meanwhile Duffié (with the 1st R. I. Cavalry) (43 R., 962) with his regiment passed through Thoroughfare Gap (43 R., 962) driving off Chambliss's pickets there, and reached Middleburg in the midst of the enemy on the afternoon of the 17th, reporting his arrival to Pleasonton.

But Pleasonton, who was at Aldie only about four miles off, did not venture to advance to his relief. In the evening Robertson came up from Rectortown. Munford blocked the way to Aldie. Duffié after a hard fight fled towards Thoroughfare Gap, was surrounded by Chambliss, and finally escaped with a loss of two thirds of his men. On the 18th Robertson and Chambliss guarded the Upperville Road near Middleburg. Munford fell back to Union. (Pleasonton sent one of Buford's brigades to Thoroughfare Gap.) On the 19th Gregg with three brigades drove Stuart back from Middleburg (43 R., 909). In the evening, Jones came up, and on the 20th, Hampton (44 R., 690). Stuart with his five brigades of about 8400 men tried to hold the roads to Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. Pleasonton with about the same number advanced against him and with the aid of Barnes's infantry division of Meade's corps sent to his support drove Stuart back to Ashby's Gap.

³ 44 R., 357.

Blue Ridge. On the 19th he sent troops back to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.

On the 22d, Pleasonton,¹ having assured himself that the enemy had no longer any infantry in the Loudoun Valley, returned to Aldie. Hooker² had complained that *Stuart's* cavalry had hitherto prevented him from obtaining any satisfactory information as to the whereabouts of the enemy. "They have masked all of their movements." Hooker had shown little zeal in trying to penetrate the screen. He would have done better to follow Halleck's advice. On the 22d,³ that part of the Middle Department east of Cumberland then under Schenck was placed under Hooker's direct orders.

Meanwhile *Imboden's* cavalry had damaged the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and Chesapeake Canal along the Upper Potomac, and *White's* cavalry, east of Point of Rocks. On the 22d, *Hill* had come up into the Valley behind *Longstreet*.⁴ *Lee* was ready to move on. *Lee moves on to Pennsylvania.*

He advised *Ewell* that his best course would be toward the Susquehanna. "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it." *Ewell*⁵ marched into Pennsylvania with *Rodes's* and *Johnson's* divisions preceded by *Jenkins's* cavalry by way of Hagerstown and Chambersburg, reaching Carlisle on the 27th. *Early's* division moved from Boonsborough through Greenwood to York. On the 24th, *Longstreet* and *Hill*⁶ were put in motion, and on the 27th, *Longstreet* encamped near Chambersburg, and *Hill* near Fayetteville. *Imboden* was at Hancock on the 27th, and moved north by way of McConnellsburg. *Jenkins* and *White* were with *Ewell* and *Early*.

¹ 43 R., 911.

⁴ 45 R., 914.

² 43 R., 54.

⁵ 44 R., 316.

³ 45 R., 55.

⁶ 44 R., 316.

After Pleasonton had withdrawn, *Stuart* was directed to hold the passes of the Blue Ridge with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac; and with the remainder to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of *Ewell*. *Stuart* suggested that by crossing the Bull Run Mountains, he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear,¹ pass between his main body and Washington, cross into Maryland, and join the army north of the Potomac.² On the 22d *Lee* gave the order authorizing him to pass by the enemy's rear if he thought he could get through, but directing him³ after crossing to proceed with all possible dispatch to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania.

He left *Robertson's* and *Jones's* brigades to hold the gaps of the Blue Ridge.

At 1 A.M. on the 25th,⁴ *Stuart* started from Salem with *Hampton's*, *Fitz Lee's*, and *W. H. F. Lee's* brigades; but met with some delay in passing Hooker's army. On the night of the 27th, he crossed the Potomac at Rowers Ford, less than twenty miles above Washington.

On the 24th, Hooker said⁵:

The aspect of the enemy is not much changed from yesterday. *Ewell*, I conclude, is over the river, and is now up the country, I suppose, for purposes of plunder. The yeomanry of that district should be able to check any extended advance


¹ 44 R., 692.



² The fords of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry down to Edwards Ferry were held by the enemy (3 M. H. S. M., 401). Moreover Longstreet with whom *Stuart* was operating, feared that if *Stuart* should cross between his corps and the enemy it would indicate the Confederate plans (Longstreet, 342).

³ 44 R., 692.

⁴ 44 R., 692.



⁵ 43 R., 55.





MAP FOR "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR", BY COL. W. R. LIVERMORE, VOL. III.

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of that column, and protect themselves from their aggression. Of the troops that marched to the river at Shepherdstown yesterday, I cannot learn that any have crossed, and as soon as I do, I shall commence moving, myself, and, indeed, am preparing my new acquisitions for that event; the others are ready. General French is now¹ on his way to Harper's Ferry,² and I have given directions for the force at Poolesville to march and report to him, and also for all of Stahel's cavalry,³ and, if I can do it without attracting observation, I shall send over a corps or two from here, in order, if possible, to sever Ewell from the balance of the rebel army, in case he should make a protracted sojourn with his Pennsylvania neighbors. If the enemy should conclude not to throw any additional force over the river, I desire to make Washington secure, and, with all the force I can muster, strike for his line of retreat in the direction of Richmond.

The movements of *Ewell's* corps in crossing the Potomac had been duly announced to Hooker.⁴

Hooker⁵ having heard on the 25th that another

¹ 43 R., 55.

² To supersede Tyler.

³ Which had just been transferred from the defences of Washington.

⁴ On the 24th Warren advised Hooker (45 R., 292) to move at once in the direction of Harper's Ferry. "There we can protect Washington as well, and Baltimore better than here, and preserve our communications and routes of supply.

"It is the shortest line to reach Lee's army; will enable us to operate on his communications, if he advances; to throw overwhelming forces on either portion of his army that he allows the river to divide; and is too strong a position for him to attack us in, even if we make heavy detachments."

If Hooker had followed his advice, sent forward a large force of his cavalry to fall upon the rear of Lee's army and delay its passage of the Potomac, and closely followed by forced marches with his infantry, which had been resting for several days, reinforced by part of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, he would have had a fine chance to strike Lee in crossing the Potomac, while Ewell was two days' march away in his front, and Stuart's cavalry two days' in his rear.

⁵ 45 R., 314.

corps was crossing the Potomac, crossed his own army on the 26th and 27th, at Edwards Ferry,¹ and directed Reynolds to send detachments to seize the passes of South Mountain, in order to confine the enemy to one line of invasion; and directed him to follow these detachments with his own corps and those of Sickles and Howard, and take position at Middletown.

Hooker
crosses the
Potomac.

On the 27th,² he ordered Slocum to be ready to march with his command at 4 A.M. on the 28th, adding that a regiment of cavalry and two brigades of French's command would join him at 6 A.M. as he passed. His object was to destroy *Lee's* bridges, if he had them; and "to intercept the commerce that *Ewell* had established in flour,³ grain, horses, and horned cattle, which he was constantly sending to the rear."⁴ This would be a proper service for cavalry, if it were not required elsewhere. On the 27th, however, *Lee* had gained two days' march on Hooker, and was forty or fifty miles away, and in dangerous proximity to the heart of Pennsylvania. It was high time for Hooker to follow him, and unwise to delay his march by dividing his forces.

On the 26th Hooker had inquired⁵: "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned after the public stores and property are removed?" to which Halleck replied: "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity."

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 169.

² 1 C. W., 173.

³ C. W., 174.

⁴ A very different object from that which Warren had in view on the 24th.

⁵ 43 R., 58.

On receiving this dispatch,¹ Hooker telegraphed²:

I find 10,000 men in condition here to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account, etc. [And soon after:] My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in front of more than my number.

I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition, with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

The dispatch was referred to the President, and by his order Hooker was relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and directed to turn it over to General Meade. Hooker went in person to Frederick and, on the morning of the 28th,³ received this order.

Hooker
relieved
from
command.

It is now of comparatively little importance to analyze the feelings and motives of Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck in accepting Hooker's resignation; probably Stanton and Halleck had long desired it, and Lincoln then felt that the safety of the country required it. It was fortunate that they took this action. Hooker had proved his incapacity for so important a command, and his successor, although not a brilliant commander, was an eminently capable one.

It would be hard to find a more difficult task for an army officer to perform than that which was now thrown upon Meade's shoulders. Not only was he called upon to defend his country against the ablest general of his day, who had already pushed his advance farther than ever before; but this at a time when a defeat would bring disaster not only to his own army, but to those in the

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 174.

² 43 R., 60.

³ 43 R., 61.

other theatres of war which were about to reap the fruits of their hard-earned victories.

Meanwhile, in the central theatre of operations, on the 8th of June, after Halleck had telegraphed to Rosecrans,¹ "If you cannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you," Rosecrans² sent a circular to his corps and division commanders and generals of cavalry asking them to answer in writing, according to the best of their judgment, whether they thought that an advance at that time was "likely to prevent additional reinforcements being sent against General Grant by the enemy in our front," and whether they thought "an immediate or early advance of our army advisable."


From the replies to this inquiry, it does not appear that the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland took a broad view of the situation. General Thomas, whose judgment upon such subjects was entitled to the greatest respect, replied³:—


An advance of our army at present would either bring on a great battle, if the enemy felt strong enough, or that it was to his advantage to oppose us, or he would fall back, possibly to Chattanooga, keeping up a sufficient show of force to hold us in check, draw us away from our base, attack and destroy our communications, or threaten them so strongly as greatly to weaken our main force, and then send reinforcements of artillery and infantry to Johnston. I therefore think an advance at this time on our part would give him decidedly the advantage, and consequently is not advisable. By holding your army here ready to act at the first opportune moment, and operate upon and threaten his flanks, Bragg will hardly venture to send more reinforcements to Grant than have already gone.

¹ 35 R., 383.

² 35 R., 394.

³ 35 R., 414.





CENTRAL TENNESSEE

COUNTY FOR THE STUDY OF THE CIVIL WAR POLITICAL DIVISION

Most of the other replies were to the same effect. It is remarkable that these officers should think that *Bragg* would not do what they thought was best for his cause, unless forced to do so by Rosecrans. Garfield, however, Rosecrans's Chief of Staff, and afterwards the President of the United States, recommended an advance; adding¹:—

The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal States renders a decisive blow against the enemy at this time of the highest importance to the success of the Government at the polls, and in the enforcement of the conscription act. The Government and the War Department believe that this army ought to advance upon the enemy; the army desires it, and the country is anxiously hoping for it. Our true objective point is the rebel army, whose last reserves are substantially in the field, and an effective blow will crush the shell, and soon be followed by a collapse of the rebel Government. You have, in my judgment, wisely delayed a general movement hitherto, till your army could be massed and your cavalry could be mounted. Your mobile force can now be concentrated in twenty-four hours, and your cavalry, if not equal in numerical strength to that of the enemy, is greatly superior in efficiency and *morale*.

Rosecrans says in his report² that his depot of supplies at Murfreesboro was established and in a defensible condition by the 1st of May; but that it was not before the 15th of June that he had brought his cavalry "into available condition."

Bragg's main base of supplies was at Chattanooga; but his superior force of cavalry enabled him to command all the resources of the Duck River Valley and the country southward.³ The situation. He had strong intrenched camps at Shelbyville and

¹ 35 R., 423, 424.² 34 R., 403.³ 34 R., 404.

Tullahoma. The position of his infantry was covered by a range of high, rough, rocky hills, the principal routes passing southward from Murfreesboro toward Tullahoma and the line of his communications. *Bragg* held all the passes in these hills. *Polk's* corps was at Shelbyville, *Hardee's* was near Wartrace and held Hoover's, Liberty, and Bellbuckle Gaps.

Rosecrans's plan was to render *Bragg's* entrenchments useless, and if possible secure his line of retreat by turning his right, and moving on to the railroad bridge across Elk River, so as to drive him to battle on ground of Rosecrans's own choice or force him to retreat at a disadvantage. To this end, he proposed to make *Bragg* believe that he would advance on him by the Shelbyville route, and to keep up the impression, if possible, until he had reached Manchester with the main body of his army.

In the middle of June, Rosecrans¹ had present for duty 70,900 infantry, engineers, etc.; 11,800 cavalry, and 5000 artillery; making 87,800 men; of whom 71,800 were at or near Murfreesboro, 7700 at Nashville, and the rest in smaller garrisons.²

To oppose him, *Bragg*³ had 50,000, of whom 16,000, infantry and artillery, under *Polk*, were at or near Shelbyville; 16,800, under *Hardee*, at Wartrace, Bellbuckle, Fairfield, etc.; 1400 on the Tennessee River between Bridgeport and Chattanooga; 9800 cavalry under *Wheeler*, and 4400 under *Forrest*, on the front and flanks of *Bragg's* position from Spring Hill to McMinnville.

¹ 35 R., 422, 423.

² 2200 at La Vergne, 1000 at Franklin, 1100 at Gallatin, 1200 at Carthage, 1200 at Clarksville, and 1600 at Fort Donelson.

³ 34 R., 585.

Rosecrans wished¹ to create the impression that he intended to advance on the enemy by the Shelbyville and Triune pikes, where the topography and the roads afforded great facilities for moving in force; while cavalry movements and an advance toward Woodbury would seem to be feints designed to deceive *Bragg*. Rosecrans's
plan.

On the 23d of June, Mitchell with his cavalry division advanced on the Eagleville and Shelbyville pike, and made an attack on the enemy's cavalry, and drove in their infantry guards on the main line; at night, they filled the country to their rear with camp-fires extending from *Hardee's* left to the Shelbyville road and beyond, indicating the presence of a heavy infantry force in support of the cavalry.² Granger with his own troops and Brannan's division of Thomas's corps moved from Triune to Salem. On the same day, Palmer's division was sent to the vicinity of Bradyville, his advance to seize the head of the defile leading up to the "Barrens" by an obscure road leading to Manchester. The orders for June 24th were: for McCook's corps to seize and hold Liberty Gap, sending one division in advance to cover the crossing of Granger's command from the Middleton road; for Granger to advance on the Middleton road, threaten that place, and cover the passage of Brannan's division, which was to pass by Christiana and bivouac with the rear division of McCook's corps; for Thomas to seize and hold Hoover's Gap and be in touch with McCook; for Crittenden to leave Van Cleve's division at Murfreesboro and concentrate with the other two at Bradyville. Turchin's brigade of cavalry was sent with Crittenden, Minty's brigade went with Stanley

¹ 34 R., 405.² 3 B. & L., 636.

to meet Mitchell who was to attack the Confederate cavalry at Middleton.

These movements were executed with success "in the midst of a continuous and drenching rain which so softened the ground on all the dirt roads as to render them next to impassable." On the right,¹ Mitchell engaged the enemy at Middle-Gaps, and routed him; Stanley joined him with Minty's brigade. Liberty Gap was defended by two regiments² of *Liddell's* Confederate brigade and a section of artillery. The rest of his brigade and a battery were at Bellbuckle five miles south.³ Hoover's Gap was defended by a few regiments of *Wheeler's* cavalry; *Bates's* and *B. R. Johnson's* brigades were at Fairfield, seven or eight miles in the rear. Both passes were seized.⁴

As Rosecrans was doubtful whether *Bragg* would advance to test the Federal strength on McCook's front or mass on the flank of Thomas's corps near Fairfield, he gave orders for the 25th, for Crittenden to advance to Lumley's Stand; Thomas to attack and drive the


¹ 34 R., 538.

² 34 R., 588.


³ Early in the afternoon, Johnson's division of McCook's corps arrived (34 R., 483), drove back the cavalry and the advanced line, and held the pass. Liddell's second line came up in time to cover the retreat of the first.

The rest of McCook's corps and Brannan's division followed. Granger's corps halted at Christiana.

⁴ Reynolds's division of Thomas's corps was the first to arrive. Early in the afternoon Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry in the lead easily drove away the cavalry from the Gap, and pushed on (34 R., 430) beyond McBride's Creek. Stewart with Bates's and B. R. Johnson's brigades met (34 R., 611, 603) Wilder near Beech Grove. About 10 P.M. Clayton arrived (34 R., 603). Reynolds brought his two other brigades on line with Wilder, Rousseau came up to supporting distance, and Negley followed.



0 5 10
SCALE OF MILES



enemy toward Fairfield; McCook to begin an advance by Liberty Gap; Stanley with his cavalry to occupy the enemy's attention at Fosterville; and Granger to support him at Christiana. Should Thomas succeed, and find the enemy retreating toward Wartrace, he was to cover that road with a division, and move with the remainder of his troops rapidly on Manchester; McCook to move in and take his place at Beech Grove, holding Liberty Gap with a division, and finally withdrawing that and following Thomas to Manchester.

On the 25th, Thomas confronted *Stewart* all day; but incessant¹ rain delayed the arrival of Brannan to join his corps, and Thomas did not drive *Stewart* from his position, and could not, therefore, support McCook.² Rosecrans had full possession of both passes; Thomas had clearly turned *Bragg's* right flank; but if McCook should advance from Liberty Gap, he might be exposed to the attack of all *Bragg's* army. The heavy rains³ continued throughout the campaign. On the 26th Thomas with three divisions drove *Stewart* to Fairfield. Reynolds and the baggage moved forward during the night to Manchester. In the evening,⁴ McCook received orders to withdraw quickly and march upon Hoover's Gap.

On the same day *Bragg* at Shelbyville⁵ having learned

¹ 34 R., 406.

² In the morning, Cleburne advanced (34 R., 587) Wood's brigade to Bellbuckle. Liddell took up a position at the outlet of Liberty Gap, about a mile south of the gorge. McCook sent two (34 R., 466) brigades of Davis's division into the Gap to support Johnson. Nothing of a serious nature occurred here until 4 P.M. when Liddell (34 R., 589) thinking that the enemy was going back, advanced his skirmishers to feel him, and so brought on a spirited engagement, from which after an hour or two he thought it prudent to withdraw.

³ 34 R., 466.

⁴ 34 R., 466.

⁵ 34 R., 618.

of Rosecrans's advance, and that *Stewart's* right had been turned, and that a movement to Tullahoma had become imperative, ordered *Polk*¹ and *Hardee* to move their commands there early the next morning.

On the 27th, Rosecrans, satisfied that *Bragg* must leave his intrenched position at Shelbyville,² and that he must expect him at Tullahoma, only twelve miles distant, thought it necessary to close up his columns on Manchester, and prepare for the contest. Meanwhile, he sent Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry to cut, if possible, the railroad in *Bragg's* rear. Thomas's corps reached Manchester by night. McCook got half-way through Hoover's Gap. Crittenden was delayed all day by the mud.


At midnight of the 27th, *Hardee's* corps was at Tullahoma, and *Polk's* was coming in from Shelbyville. *Wheeler* had been left with his cavalry to cover *Polk's* retreat; but it was not an easy task; for Stanley's cavalry,³ supported by Granger's infantry and acting under his general directions, had attacked *Wheeler's* cavalry and artillery at Guy's Gap and driven them to the town. There they made another stand but were pressed in confusion into the river. Many were killed and drowned, and

Shelbyville, with large numbers of prisoners, a quantity of arms and commissary stores, were [says Rosecrans] the crowning results of the cavalry operations that day. It is worthy of note that the waving of flags and cheers of welcome from the inhabitants of this impregnable stronghold of loyalty doubtless gave added vigor and energy to the advance of our troops.

¹ 34 R., 587, 608.


² 34 R., 406.

³ 34 R., 407.




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JUNE 29



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SCALE OF MILES

JUNE 30



By the 28th,¹ *Bragg* had assembled all his infantry in his fortified position at Tullahoma. The incessant rains and desperate roads so delayed Crittenden,² that it was not until the 29th that his last division arrived, badly worn. Rosecrans's army being now closed up, he gave orders for Thomas to occupy the centre at Concord Church and Bobo Crossroads; McCook to take the right on Crumpton's Creek; and Crittenden to come up on the left, near Hall's Chapel.

Rosecrans
to Concord
Church.

It rained almost incessantly during the 30th; but the troops, by dint of labor and perseverance, dragged their artillery and themselves through the mud into position. It is a singular characteristic of the soil on the "Barrens," says Rosecrans, "that it becomes so soft and spongy that wagons cut into it as if it were a swamp, and even horses cannot pass over it without similar results." While the troops were thus moving into position, reconnaissances all along the lines reported that the enemy was in force on all the roads except the one leading southeast to Estell Springs, and that it was the general belief that *Bragg* would fight at Tullahoma. Rosecrans accordingly made preparations to move around and get in *Bragg's* rear.

On the morning of the 28th,³ Wilder started out with his mounted infantry, did some damage to *Bragg's* communications and on the 30th, returned to Manchester.⁴

¹ 34 R., 608, 618.

² 34 R., 407.

³ 34 R., 460.

⁴ He went first to Hillsboro, and thence toward Decherd, which, with some opposition in crossing Elk River, he reached that evening, dislodged the garrison of about eighty men protected by a stockade, burned the railroad station, destroyed trestle work and 300 yards of track, and then retired before the enemy's infantry approaching from the north. A party he had sent out before crossing Elk River to de-

Early in the morning of the 29th, *Bragg*, at Tullahoma, learning that the enemy were advancing against him, ordered his troops into position¹ to meet them. *Polk*, having learned that the enemy had destroyed the railroad at Decherd, and interrupted *Bragg's* communications with the rear; that their mounted force was so great as to render it impossible for him (*Bragg*) to prevent it; and that he had determined to give them battle where he then was; met *Hardee*, in the afternoon, and then, both went to *Bragg's* headquarters for a conference. *Polk* thought it was very injudicious to fight at Tullahoma, and reminded *Bragg* that as his communications were destroyed, his first duty was to re-establish them. *Bragg* replied that they had been re-established since morning. "How do you propose to maintain them?" says *Polk*. "By posting cavalry along the line." *Polk* replied that he did not think *Bragg* had cavalry enough to cover other points and that line also. The enemy would not strike *Bragg* a blow; but reduce him by starvation either to surrender, or retreat (west) by way

stroy the bridge at Estell Springs found it held by the enemy in force. On the 29th, Wilder started up the road to the Cumberland Mountains to strike the railroad again below Cowan and break it if possible. When partly up the mountain, he saw a considerable force of hostile infantry and cavalry at Decherd, moved forward to the Southern University, destroyed a branch railroad there, sent a party toward Tanton, and went himself toward Anderson. Finding both places approachable only by a bridle path, he deemed it impossible to accomplish anything further. Returning to the University, he was overtaken by hostile cavalry in hot pursuit preceding a railroad train loaded with infantry. Leaving a rear-guard to skirmish, and drive them down the mountain, in a shower of rain, which obliterated his trail, he escaped through the woods and mountains just in time to escape the enemy, who, with a large force of cavalry and artillery, were trying to intercept him. He reached Manchester at noon on the 30th without losing a single man.

¹ 34 R., 621.

of Fayetteville, and across the Tennessee in the vicinity of Decatur. In this event, with the animals and men exhausted for want of food, it was doubtful if he could get his army across the river. But, supposing he succeeded, he would find himself in the hills of North Alabama without food, and his army would be forced to disperse to avoid starvation. In the meantime, the enemy would pass over the mountain, take possession of Chattanooga, and march without interruption into Georgia and the Carolinas, taking possession of the heart of the Confederacy. To avoid all these results, his opinion was, *Bragg* should fall back in the direction of his base, so as to keep the line connecting with it all the time covered. *Hardee* was not prepared to advise a retreat. He thought it would be well to have some infantry sent along the line to support the cavalry and to wait for further developments.

This *Bragg* decided to do. The troops remained in line in the rain all day and all night; but on the 30th, finding that the enemy were pressing back his troops, he moved back by night to the Elk River. Rosecrans entered Tullahoma at noon of the 1st of July.^{*} *Bragg* made a short resistance at Elk River; but on the 3d fell back

Bragg
retreats to
Chattanooga.

^{*} Negley and Rousseau pushed on and overtook the enemy late in the afternoon at Bethpage bridge two miles above the railroad crossing, where they had a sharp skirmish.

(34 R., 432.) On the 2d Thomas's other two divisions came up. The enemy was driven back; but as the bridges were burned Thomas could not cross. Moving up to Jones Ford, he drove off the defenders and crossed one brigade farther up the river. At Morris Ford still farther up, Stanley forced a passage with his cavalry. (34 R., 540.) Below the railroad bridge Sheridan forced a passage for two of his brigades over a deep ford near Rocky Creek. (34 R., 408.) On the 3d Sheridan supported by Davis, pursued the enemy to Cowan, where he learned that cavalry only would be found covering their rear.

to Chattanooga, and abandoned to Rosecrans all of middle Tennessee. Rosecrans was not prepared to pursue him; but halted to repair the railroads and bring up his supplies.

Rosecrans had shown much strategic skill in these operations. The fact, however, that they were conducted in rainy weather when the roads were almost impassable makes it highly probable that if he had advanced when Grant first applied for his cooperation, he might have accomplished even more. He had not, it is true, engaged *Bragg* in a pitched battle nor had he cut off his retreat as he might have done had the weather been favorable, but he had driven him out of a fertile tract of land, whose inhabitants were to a great extent loyal to the Union.

For reasons that will soon appear, if for none other, *Bragg* did not abandon Chattanooga to reinforce *Johnston*. Thus in the central theatre of operations, the 4th of July, 1863, the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence was marked by a distinct advance of the Federal arms beyond any point that they had ever before attained, and the deliverance from the Confederate power of all Tennessee except the mountain land and the valley in the east.

On the Mississippi, when Grant and his army were satisfied that Vicksburg could not be taken by assault, they proceeded to build batteries to reduce the enemy's artillery, and to dig trenches to cover the men from fire during their advance close up to the enemy's works.

Grant and
Johnston
reinforced.

Meanwhile, troops were pouring in from all sides to their assistance. Of Grant's own force, on the 23d of

May,¹ Lauman's division came from across the river; on the 3d of June,² Kimball's, and on the 8th,³ W. Sooy Smith's from Memphis. On the 29th of May, Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "The enemy under *Johnston* is collecting in large force to attack me, and rescue the garrison of Vicksburg. . . . If Banks does not come to my assistance, I must be reinforced from elsewhere." On the 11th of June,⁴ Herron's division came from Schofield in Missouri, and on the 14th, two divisions under Parke from Burnside in Kentucky. This increase enabled Grant to make the investment complete, and at the same time left him a large reserve to watch the movements of *Johnston*. Herron's division was put into position on the extreme left, south of McClernand's; Smith's and Kimball's divisions and Parke's corps were sent to Haynes's Bluff. Grant fortified this point on the land side, and made every preparation to resist a heavy force.⁵ On the 31st of May, Grant had with him at Vicksburg⁶ about 50,500

¹ Arrived May 18th (38 R., 321, 323, 327, 345, 346). (37 R., 288) (36 R., 85, 86).

² Before June 4th (37 R., 436) 1 Grant, 544.

³ 1 Grant, 545.

⁴ 36 R., 57.

⁵ About the 24th of May, Johnston, "as the enemy made such demonstrations toward Yazoo City," (36 R., 243) sent W. H. T. Walker's division there to fortify it, and soon after sent Loring's division to its support.

On the 24th of May, Grant posted Osterhaus's division (37 R., 209) at Black River Bridge.

On the 26th (38 R., 352) he detached three brigades from Sherman's and three from McPherson's corps, and placed them under the temporary command of Blair, to drive these troops from the land between the Black and Yazoo Rivers. Blair arrived at Mechanicsburg on the 29th without serious opposition (37 R., 435 ff.) on the way. Here he had a skirmish with a few Confederate cavalry, and returned, devastating the country as he passed. Kimball's division reached Sartaria on the 4th of June (37 R., 436) and reported the enemy in force at Yazoo City and Liverpool.

⁶ 38 R., 370.

men present for duty, and on the 30th of June, 71,800.¹

The Confederate Government could not, with all its efforts, gather troops enough to meet this great army. On the 25th of May, *Evans* arrived from South Carolina; on the 1st of June *Breckenridge's* division² and *Jackson's* cavalry³ from Tennessee. At this time, *Johnston* had about 28,900 present for duty.⁴ Grant, then, had more than *Johnston* and *Pemberton* together. On the 30th of June *Johnston* had only assembled 31,200 men.

On the 24th of May,⁵ Porter sent Commander Walker again up the Yazoo as far as Fort Pemberton, and up the Sunflower and its branches for two hundred miles; he sent out boat expeditions in every direction until all these waters were thoroughly cleared of hostile vessels.

Naval
operations.

During the assault of May 22d,⁶ the navy had cooperated by bombarding the city, without materially helping the assailants; but *Sherman*⁷ thought that if they would enfilade the batteries on the north face, he could carry them by assault; accordingly, on the 27th the *Cincinnati* was sent down; but it was sunk by the plunging fire of the Confederate batteries on Fort Hill.

Attack at
Millikens
Bend.

Johnston,⁸ finding himself too weak to relieve either Vicksburg or Port Hudson, wrote to their commanders to try to save the troops. Port Hudson had been invested

¹ 38 R., 453.

² 38 R., 925, 945.

³ 38 R., 947.

⁴ Gist, 2600, Ector, 1200, Gregg, 2400, McNair, 1300, Wilson, 2400 (36 R., 222), Adams, 2100, Evans, 2100 (38 R., 937; 20 R., 929), Helm, 2000, Stovall, 1900, Jackson's cavalry, 2500 (38 R., 947), Maxey, 2700, J. Adams, 1000, Buford, 2400, Featherston, 1500, Reynolds, 1400.

⁵ Soley's *Porter*, 341.

⁶ Soley's *Porter*, 336.

⁷ 38 R., 329. Soley's *Porter*, 338.

⁸ 36 R., 272.

before the despatch arrived. *Pemberton* was told to suggest a plan for cooperating for its relief; but on the 3d of June,¹ he answered that he could get no information from the outside about the position of the troops.

On the 15th *Johnston* told *Gardner* to keep Banks and his forces occupied, hold out as long as he could, or cut his way out; that *Taylor* would do what he could on the opposite side of the river. On the 31st of May *Johnston*² had written to *E. K. Smith* in command of the Trans-Mississippi begging him to do what he could to succor Port Hudson; but *Smith*, thinking³ that Vicksburg was more important, sent *Taylor* there with *Walker's* division to throw in provisions if possible,⁴ to break the enemy's communications, and destroy his depots and magazines west of the Mississippi, and to cooperate with *Pemberton* and *Johnston*.⁵ After the investment of Vicksburg, Grant had left Dennis on the west side of the Mississippi, with about 1200 white troops, and 2600 colored troops who were under instruction, to protect the depots and magazines there.⁶ *Taylor* reached Millikens about dawn of the 7th of June, drove the defenders, mostly negroes, from their first position, a large levee covered by a hedge, to a second levee by the water's edge. Porter heard of the attack⁷ in time to get the "Choctaw" and "Lexington" up there just as it commenced. The Confederates were mounting the second levee in pursuit when the gunboats came and drove them back. *Taylor*

¹ 36 R., 243.

² 33 R., 915.

³ 33 R., 857. Map, p. 239, Book I.

⁴ 42, R., 71; 21 R., 1048.

⁵ (33 R., 857.) From the effects of the climate and bad weather (33 R., 915) Walker's numbers were reduced to 4000 or 5000 men.

Taylor arrived (37 R., 458) at Richmond, La., on the 5th of June, Walker's division on the 6th.

⁶ 37 R., 446 ff.

⁷ 37 R., 453.

withdrew¹ his forces; but left *Walker's* division in northern Louisiana to operate against Vicksburg.² *Tappan's* brigade of *Price's* division which had just arrived from Arkansas was left with him.

On the 25th of May, Seddon had suggested³ to *Johnston* that if he could communicate with *Holmes*, he should urge him to make a diversion for him by seizing Helena while all available forces of the enemy were being pushed to Grant's aid. *Johnston* referred the matter to *E. K. Smith*, and *Smith* to *Holmes*, who asked and received permission to attack. With about 7600 men,⁴ he reached the neighborhood of Helena on the morning of the 3d of July. *Prentiss*, in command, had 4100 men.⁵ Helena was built on low ground; but all approaches from the land side passed over rugged ground between steep hills⁶ crowned with Federal batteries, which were connected by a line of earthworks, and supported by a strong fort near the city, and by the gunboat "*Tyler*." *Holmes* attacked on the 4th. *Price's* division penetrated the line; but was driven back by the fire of the gunboat and the fort, and by a counter-charge⁷ of the men from the rifle-pits. *Holmes's* loss was 1636, *Prentiss's*, 220. *Holmes* withdrew to the White River. Thus the 4th of July marked the end of all fear of Confederate aggression in Arkansas.

In reply to Seddon's inquiry, *Johnston* said on the 12th of June, "To take from *Bragg* a force which would make this army fit to oppose Grant, would involve yielding

¹ 37 R., 460.² 33 R., 868, 871.³ 32 R., 407.⁴ 32 R., 409-411; 33 R., 832.⁵ 38 R., 452.⁶ 3 B. & L., 456.⁷ 32 R., 388.

Tennessee. It is for the Government to decide between this State and Tennessee."¹

The Confederate Government should have realized by this time that *Johnston*, with the troops at his command, could not drive away Grant, who was intrenched with a much larger number; and should either have sent him more troops, or followed *Beauregard's* suggestion, or tried by some other means to strike a blow that would relieve the pressure.

No more troops were sent; but on the 16th, Seddon telegraphed² that the interest and honor of the Confederacy required that Vicksburg must not be lost without a desperate struggle. *Johnston* explained the situation, and said that he would do all that he could, without hope of doing anything more than to relieve the garrison. On the 21st,³ Seddon telegraphed again, expressing great deference to *Johnston's* superior knowledge and military genius, and adding that the hopes of the whole Confederacy were upon him. On the 24th *Johnston* said that there had been no voluntary inaction.

When I came, all military materials of the department were at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Artillery had to be brought from the east; horses for it and all field transportation procured in an exhausted country—much from Georgia brought over wretched railroads—and provisions collected. I have not the means of moving.⁴

On the 14th of June,⁵ *Johnston* had sent *Pemberton* a despatch saying:

By fighting the enemy simultaneously at the same points of his line, you may be extricated. Our joint forces

¹ 36 R., 226.

³ 36 R., 228.

² 36 R., 227.

⁴ 36 R., 229.

⁵ 36 R., 244.

cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg. My communications with the rear can best be preserved by operating north of the railroad. Inform me as soon as possible what points will suit you best. . . . General Taylor with 8000 men will endeavor to open communications with you from Richmond [La.].

Johnston
and Pemberton.

On the 21st,¹ *Pemberton* suggested that, giving him full intimation in time to act, *Johnston* should move by the north of the railroad, drive in the enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight next morning engage him heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day, and that on that night, *Pemberton* should move by the Warrenton Road to Hankinson's Ferry. On the 22d,² in a reply to a letter of *Pemberton* of the 15th, saying that, though living on greatly reduced rations, he had sufficient for twenty days, *Johnston* replied that *Taylor* had been sent by *E. K. Smith* to cooperate with him from the west bank of the Mississippi; and that in a day or two he (*Johnston*) would try to make a diversion in his favor, and, if possible, open communications; adding³:

Scouts report the enemy fortifying towards us and the roads blocked. If I can do nothing to relieve you,⁴ rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment, if you and General Taylor communicate.

On the 23d *Pemberton* replied⁵:

If I cut my way out, this important position is lost, and many of my men, too. Can we afford that? If I cannot cut my way out, both position and all my men are lost. This we cannot afford. Should suggest the probability of Grant's being open to terms that can result more to our advantage than either of

¹ 36 R., 279. Map XIV.

² 36 R., 244.

³ 36 R., 244, 280.

⁴ 36 R., 280.

⁵ 38 R., 974.

the above actions. Not knowing your force or plans, he may accede to your proposition to pass this army out with all its arms and equipage. . . . I will strain every nerve to hold out, if there is hope of our ultimate relief, for fifteen days longer.

To this despatch *Johnston* replied, while urging him to remain¹:

General E. K. Smith's troops have been mismanaged, and have fallen back to Delhi. . . . Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority.

On the 22d of June,² Grant, hearing that *Johnston* was crossing Big Black River to march against him, sent Sherman out with about 27,000 men to be prepared to meet *Johnston*.³ Haynes's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and batteries had been built on commanding points from there to the Big Black Bridge. These works were then connected by rifle-pits. Grant himself was as well defended against the garrison of Vicksburg as it was against his troops; and he explained to Sherman⁴ that he could easily spare as many men as might be required to reinforce him. Sherman posted his troops on the new line from Haynes's Bluff to the Big Black, and from fourteen to sixteen miles from Vicksburg.

On the 29th of June,⁵ *Johnston*, having gathered supplies and transportation, marched to the Big Black River, and on the evening of July 1st, encamped be-

¹ 38 R., 980.

² 38 R., 428.

³ 1 Sherman, 357; 1 Grant, 548-9.

⁴ 38 R., 430, 431.

⁵ 36 R., 244.

tween Brownsville and the river. Reconnaissances the 2d and 3d convinced him that attack north of the railroad was impracticable; but that south of it the chance for success was much better, although the consequences of defeat might be more disastrous. On the night of the 3d he sent a messenger to *Pemberton* saying¹:

I hope to attack the enemy in your front about the 7th, and your cooperation will be necessary. The manner and proper point for you to bring the garrison out must be determined by you from your superior knowledge of the ground and distribution of the enemy's forces. Our firing will show you where we are engaged. If Vicksburg cannot be saved, the garrison must.

Meanwhile, the siege operations progressed.

On the 18th of June, Grant relieved McClelland from the command of the XIII Corps² and appointed Ord in his place. McClelland's qualifications for command were political rather than military. The President confirmed Grant's action.³

Siege
operations.

¹ 36 R., 281. Map XII., at end.

² 36 R., 164, 168.

³ Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln's private secretaries, say of McClelland:

"Unwilling to trust his exploits of the 22d of May to any less intelligent or friendly chronicler than himself, he wrote, on the 30th of May, and published to his troops, and not to his troops alone but to his fellow-citizens in the North, a congratulatory order, in which he recounted, in the style of Napoleon in Italy, the labors and the triumphs of the Thirteenth Army Corps, giving especial prominence to the affair of the 22d. If he had confined himself to the doughty deeds of his own soldiers, it might have passed unnoticed. He unfortunately sought to gild his own achievements by slighting those of his comrades; and . . . even insinuated that the general-in-chief had not properly supported him. When this order, published in a St. Louis paper, came back to the camp it occasioned such effervescence as may easily be imagined in the corps of Sherman and McPherson . . . and Grant. . .

Trenches had to be dug, so that the assailants could come up and gather in force close up to the enemy's works. The steep parapets had to be battered down, the ditches filled up, and the enemy's artillery reduced or silenced. A large force of engineer officers and men are required to direct such siege operations properly. Only three or four officers, and scarcely any enlisted men, were present; so that much of the labor was spent in vain.

The engineer operations were directed first by Major Prime, and then by Captain Comstock. All kinds of saps and trenches were employed. Cotton bales were freely used for the revetment; and empty barrels were sometimes used for gabions; but the clayey soil was so stiff and so compact that little revetment was required. For the same reason, mining operations were easier, as the galleries did not require sheeting. The Federal approaches were made at ten different points along the line, in order, in the final assault, to divide the forces of the besieged, lest they should throw them all on the successful intruders. As the strong Confederate works on the transverse ridges swept with their fire the deep ravines obstructed by felled timber that lay between them, the approaches followed these ridges, while the adjoining ridges which were parallel to the works, were crowned with batteries, rifle-pits, and shelter trenches, so as to keep up a constant fire on the

immediately relieved General McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, assigning in his place, subject to the President's approval that able and modest soldier, E. O. C. Ord. In announcing this action to General Halleck, Grant said that he had tolerated General McClernand long after he thought the good of the service demanded his removal" (7 N. & H., 287).

defenders, and so that as large a force as possible might assemble near the fortifications.¹

Grant had about 220 pieces of artillery, mainly field or siege guns, twice as many as *Pemberton*, and Porter sent to his aid two batteries of heavy guns with sailors to man them. The Federals were always better at this arm; and many of the Confederate guns were soon disabled. *Pemberton's* supply of ammunition was limited; and thinking that he would need it all for the defence at close quarters, he did not care to expend it in battering down trenches. Accordingly after the first few days, the Federal works advanced much more rapidly than they would against a vigorous defence. Comstock says of the Confederates: "Indeed, their active defence was far from being vigorous, the object seeming to be to wait for another assault, losing in the meantime as few men as possible. This indifference to our approach became at some points almost ludicrous."² Mining was not as essential as with permanent fortifications; for there were no scarp walls to demolish; and as Comstock says, mines could not make an easier way into the enemy's line than existed already; their only use was to demoralize the enemy by their explosion at the moment of the assault.

¹ The embankments in general were only thick enough to stop a bullet and not a cannon ball. The heads of the defenders could be protected while firing over the bank by logs and other devices which would have been dangerous if exposed to the fire of artillery.

² Comstock says: "We were accustomed to cover the front of our night working parties by a line of pickets or a covering party, and the enemy, while we were not nearer than one hundred yards to their line, would throw out their pickets in front of it (37 R., 175).

"On one occasion, in front of Ord's corps, our pickets in being posted became intermixed with the enemy's, and after some discussion the opposing picket officers arranged their picket lines by mutual compromise, these lines in places not being more than ten yards apart."

When the approach along the Graveyard road on Sherman's front was pushed forward¹ to the Stockade Redan, the enemy annoyed the sappers very seriously by using for grenades loaded six and twelve pounder shells with short lighted fuses, which they tossed over the parapet, and tried by mining to blow up the sap-roller. The Federals then ran a mine close under the enemy's parapet, which was ready by the 4th of July, and capable of receiving a heavy charge.²

On McPherson's front an approach was pushed³ along the Jackson road against the Third Louisiana Redan.⁴ On the 22d of June, the sap had reached the ditch; and a mine was driven sixty feet under the parapet, loaded with a ton of powder. On the 25th it was exploded, and immediately after, the trenches were manned by infantry and artillery; fire was opened all along the Federal line; two regiments of infantry entered the crater; but the moment they tried to advance beyond its edge, they were met by a heavy fire from a stockade which the defenders had built behind it, and fell back into the crater, from which they were soon driven by grenades which the enemy threw into it. Another mine was then started; but on the 1st of July, as the enemy's miners were heard approaching, it was exploded,⁵ nearly destroying the Redan, killing many of the defenders in the countermine, and throwing

¹ 37 R., 172.

² 37 R., 190.

³ 37 R., 199, 200, 208.

⁴ The enemy resisted this approach more vigorously than that at any other point by burning sap-rollers, throwing grenades, and countermining. To reply to the grenades a Federal officer improvised two Coehorn mortars, one throwing 6-pounder, and the other 12-pounder shells, (37 R., 208) (3 B. & L., 540), from short logs bored out and hooped with iron bands.

⁵ 3 B. & L., 490-492.

others into the air.¹ No attempt was made to enter the crater.

The operations along the other roads were of like nature, but on a smaller scale. The Confederates made but few efforts to check the progress of the work by either artillery fire or by running out trenches to enfilade those of their enemy.

On July 1st [says Comstock²], the hand-to-hand character of the fighting now showed that in the closer approaches little farther progress could be made by digging alone; the enemy's works were weak, and at ten different points we could put the heads of regiments under cover within from five to one hundred yards of his line. The assault would be but little easier if we waited ten days more and accordingly it was decided to assault on the morning of July 6th.

If Vicksburg had then been defended by fresh troops, it could have held out for a long time. The Federal
Comment. zigzags and trenches pointed out to the defenders where the main attacks were coming; and behind these points, they had already built earthworks and stockades to receive the intruders. They might also have prepared interior lines of defence one after another, and so have compelled the besiegers to fight their way step by step. Vicksburg would not have been as well protected as by the original line; many of the river batteries would have to be moved in or abandoned: but a smaller number of men would be needed to man the new lines; and several weeks or months would be required for the Federals to reduce them.

¹ Grant says that a negro who landed within the Federal lines, when asked how high he had been thrown, replied, "Dunno, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile" (1 Grant, 552).

² 37 R., 175.

In holding the long line, the garrison had already been reduced to the limit of their endurance. On the 28th of June,¹ a letter was sent to *Pemberton* signed "Many Soldiers," ex-
pressing their confidence in him, and Surrender
of
Vicksburg.
saying:

Everybody admits that we have covered ourselves with glory, but alas! alas! general, a crisis has arrived in the midst of our siege.

Our rations have been cut down to one biscuit and a small bit of bacon per day. . . . We are and have been kept close in the trenches day and night. . . . If you can't feed us you had better surrender us, horrible as the idea is, than suffer this noble army to disgrace themselves by desertion. I tell you plainly, men are not going to lie here and perish, if they do love their country dearly. . . . You had better heed a warning voice, though it is the voice of a private soldier.

The army is now ripe for mutiny, unless it can be fed. . . . General, please direct your inquiries in the proper channel, and see if I have not stated stubborn facts, which had better be heeded before we are disgraced.

On the 1st of July, *Pemberton*,² feeling that he must either cut his way out or capitulate, consulted his division commanders, who thought they could not cut their way out. As he saw no prospect of relief from *Johnston*, he wrote to Grant, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg; "to save the further effusion of blood."³ In the course of two hours the reply was received, saying⁴:

The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.

¹ 38 R., 982.² 36 R., 281.³ 36 R., 283.⁴ 36 R., 59 ff.

Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.

When *Bowen*,¹ who had been sent with the letter, returned, *Pemberton* understood that Grant wished to have a personal conference with him; and, at 3 P.M., with *Bowen* and *Montgomery*, he met Grant and a few of his officers. After some consultation, Grant agreed to write to *Pemberton* what terms he would give, and at 10 P.M. on the 3d of July wrote:

GENERAL: In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. . . . On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A.M. tomorrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each.

Grant² explained to Porter that his own feelings were against these terms but all his officers thought the advantage gained by having the forces and transports for immediate purposes more than counterbalanced the effect of sending the prisoners north. *Pemberton* replied by accepting the terms in the main, but submitting an amendment,³ to which Grant replied⁴ saying:

If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 A.M., and then return to the inside, and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.

¹ 36 R., 284.

² 38 R., 460.

³ 36 R., 61.

⁴ 36 R., 285.

The terms were accepted. In accordance with this agreement,¹ the garrison was surrendered at 10 A.M. on the 4th of July, and the Federal forces immediately took possession of the works, and placed guards in the city. *Pemberton* says:

The assertion that the surrender of Vicksburg was compelled by the want of subsistence, or that the garrison was starved out, is one entirely destitute of truth. It must be remembered that for forty-seven days and nights these heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp fogs, and heavy dews, and that during all this period they never had by day or by night the slightest relief. The extent of our works required every available man in the trenches. Confined to the narrow limits of a trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and shell, while the enemy's unerring sharpshooters stood ready to pick off every one visible above the parapet, is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? They had made a most heroic defence.

In this campaign, Grant says² that 37,000 prisoners were taken, and about 10,000 of the enemy killed and wounded. His own loss was about 9000 killed and wounded and 400 prisoners.³

Results.

On the 7th of July,⁴ Grant was appointed Major-General in the regular army, and soon after,⁵ Sherman and McPherson Brigadier-Generals.

A year had elapsed since Farragut and Davis met at Vicksburg and fell back for want of support. Meanwhile, Grant had approached from every point of the compass, until at last, in a masterly campaign, he attained one of the three great objects for which the Federal armies were fighting. The greatest obstacle

¹ 36 R., 285. ² 36 R., 58. ³ 37 R., 167. ⁴ 36 R., 62. ⁵ 38 R., 498.

to the opening of the Mississippi was removed, and the other was sure to follow.

On the 13th, President Lincoln wrote to Grant¹:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought that you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong.

On the 1st of August,² when Halleck received Grant's report, he wrote:

In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of results, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your army have well deserved the gratitude of the country, and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which opened the Mississippi River.

After the failure of the attack on Port Hudson on the 27th of May, siege batteries were built, and connected by a long line of rifle-pits forming

Siege of
Port Hudson. the first parallel. On the 10th of June,³

Banks ordered a feigned attack at midnight by skirmishers along the whole front, which was attended with the loss of a few hundred men, and accom-

¹ 7 N. & H., 326.

² 36 R., 63.

³ Irwin, 192.

plished nothing. On the evening of the 12th, he ordered a vigorous bombardment. At 11 A.M. of the 13th, every gun and mortar of the army and navy opened up a furious cannonade. Banks, at length, sent a flag of truce, and summoned *Gardner* to surrender, which of course he declined to do.

By the 14th [says General, then Captain, Palfrey], the artillery was ready, and the approach up Grover's ravine¹ carried as far as the defence admitted. It was hoped, with the enemy's artillery kept down, and the attack started so near their lines, that the success of another assault would be probable. There was still uncertainty about Vicksburg and the desire to help Grant; Taylor was likely to raise the siege by his operations across the river; and our numbers were diminishing by sickness. A second assault was ordered for the 14th.

The main attack was to be made by Grover² on the Priest Cap in his front.

The artillery cross fire in front of this point of attack [the order says] will commence at 3 A.M. . . . The attacks by skirmishers will commence at 3.30 A.M. or as soon thereafter as General Grover may find best. . . . General Augur will make a feigned attack on the part of the works in front of Holcomb's battery and Slaughter house, to be made vigorously, and converted into a real attack should circumstances favor it. He will also hold his command in readiness to support either General Grover or General Dwight, in pursuance of orders that may be given from these headquarters. A heavy fire of artillery will open at 2.45 A.M. At 3.15 the attack by skirmishers will be briskly made. . . . General Dwight with his command . . . will make an attempt to gain an entrance into the enemy's works on our extreme left. . . . [In case of failure] the command will be held

Assault of
June 14th.

¹ 8 M. H. S. M., 45. Map XIII.

² 41 R., 554, 555.

in readiness to move promptly to reinforce at other points in pursuance of orders that may be given from these headquarters. . . . General Dwight will move at such time after 3.30 A.M. . . . as he may deem most expedient.

Palfrey says¹:

Bags of cotton and fascines were made for filling the ditches; bays of ponton-bridges were taken for bridging them; and parties with hand grenades were organized . . . the order of attack prescribed in special orders was first, skirmishers; then pioneers with axes, saws, picks, and shovels for removing obstacles and opening a path; then a storming party with cotton bags; then pontoniers with bridges; then the assaulting force in line of battle accompanied by light artillery—all of picked men.

The early morning was foggy. The cannonade began at 3 A.M.; but it was about 4 when the first attack began. The result was the same as before.²

¹ 8 M. H. S. M., 44, 45.

² On Grover's front, Paine led his division against the east face of the Priest Cap and its adjoining works, and Weitzel led Grover's division and his own brigade against the north face. In each column, the skirmishers were followed by a regiment loosely deployed carrying hand grenades, and one with cotton bags. The main body of each was formed of columns of regiments each in line of battle. Paine led his attack in person, for some 400 yards (8 M. H. S. M., 47) over felled trees and ditches. The Confederate artillery was soon silenced. "They advanced gallantly," says Palfrey, "and at 100 yards from the works a charge was ordered over open ground. The four regiments [in advance] sprung forward at double quick with enthusiasm and cheering. But the force was too weak. Many reached the ditch. A few entered the works and were captured." "We took position," says Major Richardson of the 38th Mass., "where we could beat away the enemy and compel him to keep concealed behind his works, and waited for the storming column, which [41 R., 129] was to follow us, but the column did not come, and we remained under the works all day, subjected to a broiling sun." They could not leave their cover to advance or retreat. At night they were ordered back.

Weitzel advanced against the north face through a deep and winding

Irwin¹ says it "may be summed up as a bloody repulse; in the whole service of the Nineteenth Army Corps darkness never shut in upon a gloomier field." The total loss was 1805.

After the attack on Millikens Bend on the 7th of June, Taylor returned to Alexandria, and prepared to threaten Banks. In the region of the La Fourche, the population, he says, were "bitterly opposed to Federal rule,"² and the appearance of a Confederate force on the oppo-

Taylor
in La
Fourche.

ravine until his own brigade and Morgan's rested on a ridge 50 yards from the Priest Cap. Birge's brigade, in support (41 R., 130), filed around the left of this position, and moved forward through a ravine to a height which overlooked the enemy's works not more than 100 yards from them. "A regular detail of sharpshooters was kept at work on the brow of the height until sunset." At 10 P.M. they were withdrawn.

Dwight's attack also failed. He sent two regiments along the river against a strong work on the extreme right of the Confederate position, known to the Federals as the Citadel (41 R., 122, 174). He was allowed to pass one regiment unmolested down the hill into the ravine at the base of the work. A second regiment was allowed to march unmolested about half-way down the hill, when the Confederate infantry and artillery opened fire and drove them back. Dwight then tried to advance by the Mount Pleasant road. Clark's brigade at first marched in open order; but for want of room he was soon obliged to form his brigade in column of companies, which exposed it to heavy loss. Thus it advanced to a deep ravine rendered almost impassable by felled trees and a dense growth of chaparral where it was exposed to the defenders' artillery, and those who showed themselves were picked off by their sharpshooters. Clark was recalled; but owing to his advanced position, he did not deem it advisable to withdraw. At 1 P.M. (41 R., 102) the report came to Banks that Dwight's men could not advance further nor retire.

By this advance, Dwight discovered an eminence near the Citadel on which he afterwards planted batteries, and thus (41 R., 14) advanced his lines from 300 yards to distances of 50 to 200 yards from the enemy's works.

Augur's feigned attack was made with (41 R., 14, 45) vigor but without heavy loss.

¹ Irwin, 201.

² Taylor, 138.

site bank of the river would raise such a storm as to bring General Banks from Port Hudson, the garrison of which could then unite with *General Joseph Johnston* in the rear of General Grant."

He sent *Major* with three regiments of Texan cavalry, 650 men,¹ just arrived, toward Port Hudson, while *Mouton* and *Green* with about 2500² moved down the lower Teche.

Banks³ had with him at Port Hudson every man he could collect, except small garrisons at New Orleans, Donaldsonville, Plaquemine, Thibodeaux, Brashear City, etc., mostly invalids. In his campaign west of the Mississippi, he had established a large depot at Brashear City. There were collected large stores of provisions, clothing, ammunition, etc., besides cattle, fugitive negroes, and convalescents. It was defended by a garrison of a few hundred men and a gunboat. Banks had given orders to remove all stores and hold the position to the last.

Taylor proposed to attack this depot with *Mouton's* and *Green's* forces on the west and *Major's* on the east. On the 16th, *Major* made demonstrations⁴ opposite Port Hudson, and then moved south. At Plaquemine he took a few prisoners, at Bayou Goula over 1000 negroes, "stolen by Banks," and at Thibodeaux about 100 men,⁵ mostly convalescents. When Emory at New Orleans heard of his approach,⁶ he sent Stickney with 800⁷ men from Brashear City, and Cahill with 300⁸ by rail from New Orleans to meet him, leaving only 250 men to guard New Orleans. Stickney arrived on the 20th.⁹ *Major* attacked on the 21st, but was

¹ Taylor, 139.

⁴ 41 R., 217.

⁷ 41 R., 196.

² Taylor, 138.

⁵ 41 R., 193.

⁸ 41 R., 197.

³ 8 M. H. S. M., 54.

⁶ 41 R., 188.

⁹ 41 R., 193.

repulsed. Cahill then arrived. On the 22d, *Major*¹ moved on to Bayou Bœuf, where he arrived on the 23d, and heard the cannonading at Brashear City.

Meanwhile on the 22d, *Mouton*, who was at Berwick, approaching from the west² organized an expedition of 325 volunteers, who at night rowed across Grand Lake in skiffs, stole around behind Brashear, and attacked the garrison in the rear while *Mouton* engaged their attention by his artillery fire in front. The garrison of about 300 men present for duty and 400 convalescents, most of them able to bear arms, and all the stores, were captured. Four thousand or five thousand negroes were again reduced to slavery. *Taylor* had regained³ the key of the southwest.⁴ He says⁵: "For the first time since I reached Western Louisiana, I had supplies, and in such abundance as to serve for the Red River campaign of 1864."

Taylor then divided his command. On the 24th,⁶ *Green* with part of *Major's* men marched for Donaldsonville; and *Mouton* with two regiments of infantry went by rail to Thibodeaux, whence he sent pickets down the line to Bayou des Allemands, twenty-five miles from New Orleans. *Green* arrived at Donaldsonville on the 27th and attacked the fort there.

All Emory's force then amounted to but 1600 men,⁷ most of which he withdrew to New Orleans. *Green* was repulsed with heavy loss by the garrison of the fort at Donaldsonville, 225 men,⁸ with the aid of one of Farragut's gunboats. About the 4th of July,⁹ *Taylor* placed twelve guns on the Mississippi below Donaldsonville, and for three days the river was closed

¹ 41 R., 217.² *Taylor*, 141; 41 R., 215.³ 8 M. H. S. M., 56.⁴ 41 R., 213.⁵ *Taylor*, 143.⁶ *Taylor*, 143.⁷ 41 R., 189.⁸ 41 R., 15.⁹ *Taylor*, 144; 41 R., 15.

to transports, and *Taylor's* mounted scouts pushed down to a point opposite Kenner, sixteen miles above New Orleans.

On the 4th of July, Emory wrote to Banks¹ respectfully suggesting "that unless Port Hudson be already taken, you can only save this city by sending me reinforcements immediately and at any cost. It is a choice between Port Hudson and New Orleans." To which Banks replied on the 5th²: "Operations here can last but two or three days longer at the outside, and then the whole command will be available to drive back the enemy who is now annoying our communications and threatening New Orleans."³

At Port Hudson, by the assault of June 14th, the Federal lines had been advanced in many places, and this was the main advantage gained.⁴

It was determined to increase the artillery on the extreme left, and try another assault very much on the same plan. Palfrey, then acting chief
Approach by
trenches. engineer, made an emphatic remonstrance.

He was then directed to propose a plan for regular approaches. It seemed to him, however, that it would be sufficient to bring the storming party into the ditch by a covered way, and to support it and the assaulting column by a strong fire from the rear; that the key point was the Priest Cap in front of Grover. He submitted his plan, which was accepted.

The plan⁵ was to take the approach from which the assault of the 14th had started as part of a parallel, to widen and improve this, and to extend it to the left along the enemy's

¹ 41 R., 51; Irwin, 250.

² 41 R., 51.

³ New Orleans might have been taken, but could not have been held against Banks's army and Farragut's fleet.

⁴ 8 M. H. S. M., 51.

⁵ 8 M. H. S. M., 57.

line. . . to erect two mounds or trench cavaliers to enfilade and command the interior of the Priest Cap; and to execute a zigzag or boyau of approach into the ditch by full sap. In connection with this it was proposed to enter by full sap into the ditch of a detached work north of the Priest Cap. This work would have flanked our approaches to the Priest Cap and also the ground inside of it after it should be carried. It was thought that by this plan the interior of the Priest Cap could be made untenable; that our men could move into its ditch under cover; that the fire from the enemy's parapet could be met on equal terms by ours from one parallel; that their men could be kept from mounting their parapet to repel our assault from the ditch; and that a line as long as the parallel could march over it in good order to support the storming party from the ditch.

The task was not difficult and the ground was very favorable for it; but neither the officers nor men were familiar with such work. On the extreme left, an oblique approach was ordered from the low ground near the river on the slope of the ravine. At other positions along the line, rifle-pits and trenches were started without much plan; but no importance was attached to them. The trenches were very substantial with a width at bottom of at least ten feet, and a cover of at least eight feet. From the parallel, the boyaux, or zigzags, ran toward the ditch of the Priest Cap and Citadel. As they approached, the enemy began to use hand grenades.¹

The exposure and the climate caused much sickness, and the men that still remained on duty were worn out. Satisfactory positions thirty yards off were

¹ On Dwight's front they were rolled into the trench through wooden troughs which the Federals seized and pulled away from the enemy in a tussle.

gained for two towers, or trench cavaliers, in front of Grover.¹ On the 1st of July, when the parallel was finished for some three hundred yards at a distance of forty or fifty yards from the parapet, it was decided to extend it as proposed, to breach the earthen parapet, run the sap down the interior of the Priest Cap, and make an interior retrenchment across its base. In the meantime, mines were started against the Citadel and against the Priest Cap. At the Citadel the mine finally got under the covered way and at the Priest Cap it got under the scarp and parapet.

On the 7th of July,² *Beall* reported to *Gardner* of the work in front of Grover: "The works of the enemy . . . are very strong and extensive
 Surrender of . . . will I think enable him to throw a
 Port
 Hudson. force of men inside our works without our
 being able to drive him back. . . . There
 is more discontent among the men, within the last few days, than I have discovered before, and I very much fear that the officers are at the bottom of it." On the same day the Federals received the news of the fall of Vicksburg which they hailed with much joy and noise.

Irwin says³:

Instantly an aide was sent to the "general-of-the-trenches" bearing duplicates in "flimsy" of a note from the adjutant-general announcing the good news. One of these he was directed to toss into the Confederate lines.⁴ Once more the cheers of our men rang out as the word passed, and again the forest echoed with the strains of "The Star-

¹ They were built of sugar hogsheads four rows deep at the base and three tiers high, giving a command of twelve to fifteen feet. They were manned by picked sharpshooters with men to load and pass up rifles to them. ² 8 M. H. S. M., 61. ³ 3 B. & L., 597.

⁴ Some one acknowledged the receipt by calling back, "That's another damned Yankee lie."

Spangled Banner" from the long-silent bands. Firing died away, the men began to mingle in spite of everything.

Palfrey reported that everything was ready for the final assault which Banks ordered for the morning of the 9th, but an hour later, *Gardner* sent a flag of truce; and at 7 A.M. of the 9th, the place was unconditionally surrendered.

It would be a mistake to suppose that its surrender was due to the fall of Vicksburg. The garrisons of both fortresses were worn out; and the siege operations at Port Hudson had been even more successful than those at Vicksburg; for troops could assemble in the parallel at the Priest Cap, and cross the defensive works with so wide a front that their superior numbers would bear down all opposition.

Nicolay and Hay say¹:

There remained but one act to close the mighty drama of the struggle for the great river of the West. . . . This was accomplished on the 16th of July, when the steam-boat *Imperial* quietly landed at the wharf in New Orleans, arriving direct from Saint Louis, laden with a commercial cargo, having passed over the whole course of that great thoroughfare of commerce undisturbed by a hostile shot or challenge from bluff or levee on either shore.

¹ 7 N. & H., 327.





CHAPTER X.

GETTYSBURG.

THE change of commanders was a great relief to the Army of the Potomac; but not perhaps to all of its officers. Hooker's care for his soldiers had made him many friends; but few indeed would wish to trust him to fight another great battle. Meade had the general confidence of the Army of the Potomac, with which he had served long and efficiently. This feeling of relief was heightened by the aspect of the country through which they then began to travel.

The bloody slopes of Marye's Hill, the dismal woods of Chancellorsville far in the rear; moving on good Northern roads . . . marching between vineclad cottages which did not seem to belong to the same world as the mud plastered log-huts they had left far behind—the good troops . . . gallantly as they had borne themselves in disaster, were yet wonderfully heartened by scene and circumstance, by friendly greeting and the look of home.¹

A new problem was now before each army. The Confederates felt that a glorious opportunity had come at last to put an end to the dangers that had been hanging over them, and to reap the fruits of their hard labors and sufferings in fighting for their fire-

¹ Walker's *Hancock*, 100.

sides. But this motive, so powerful with them heretofore, was now to be turned against them. The Federal troops were now to fight not only to uphold the Union and resist the encroachments of the slave power, but also to defend their own firesides from the invader. These motives gave rise to heroic deeds, which have made the name of Gettysburg, where the two armies were to meet, the pride of the united American nation, and have won for this nation the admiration and the honor of the civilized world.

In the order to Meade, Halleck said¹:

You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, manœuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle. All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders. Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders. You are authorized to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officer or other person you may deem proper, and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient. In fine, general, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer on you, and you may rely upon our full support. . . . I shall always be ready to advise and assist you to the utmost of my ability.

Halleck's
order.

¹ 43 R., 61. See Map IV., at end of Book I.

To which Meade replied¹:

The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier, I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns toward Baltimore, to give him battle.

Halleck approved of Meade's views as to the movements of this army, adding²:

All available assistance will be given you. General Schenck's troops outside the line of defences will move as you may direct. General Couch is also directed to co-operate with you, and to move his forces as you may order.

Meade says in his report³:


The situation of affairs at that time was briefly as follows: The Confederate army, commanded by General R. E. Lee, estimated at over 100,000 strong, of all arms, had crossed the Potomac River and advanced up the Cumberland Valley. Reliable intelligence placed his advance (Ewell's corps) on the Susquehanna, at Harrisburg and Columbia; Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg, and Hill's corps between that place and Cashtown. My own army, of which the most recent return showed an aggregate of a little over 100,000, was situated in and around Frederick, Md., extending from Harper's Ferry to the mouth of the Monocacy, and from Middletown to Frederick.

Meade's army was in fact a little stronger than *Lee's*; but the difference was not so great as to affect materially his plan of operation. Meade thought that as

¹ 43 R., 61.

² 43 R., 62.

³ 43 R., 114.



long as *Lee* remained in undisturbed possession of the land, he would continue to levy contributions. If he should cross the Susquehanna, he would have Harrisburg and even Philadelphia at his mercy. He could supply his army with food and forage from the region he occupied; but he would have to bring his ordnance supplies from Virginia through the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys over a route that grew longer and longer as he advanced. In living off the country, he would be forced to scatter his forces. Meade's obvious duty was to advance, and, if possible, attack the fragments of *Lee's* army before they could concentrate; if not, to take up a strong position to cover Baltimore, threaten the Cumberland Valley, and force *Lee* to attack him, scatter, or starve. It was of first importance that *Lee* should not cross the Susquehanna. Couch was holding it with 10,000 or 12,000 hastily gathered militia. These troops were not reliable in the open; but they could destroy the bridges and delay *Lee's* passage until Meade could come up and catch him, as Lincoln would say, "jumped half over the fence."

Comment.

Meade says¹:

Under this existing state of affairs I determined, and so notified the General-in-Chief, that I should move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on both sides of that line as far as I could consistently with the safety and the rapid concentration of that army, and should continue that movement until I either encountered the enemy, or had reason to believe that the enemy was about to advance upon me; my object being at all hazards to compel him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna and meet me in battle at some point. It

Meade's
plan.

¹ I C. W., 1865, 329, 330.

was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer—that when I came into his immediate neighborhood some manœuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him.

On the 29th of June, Meade's Army was put in motion, and on the evening of that day was in position with the left at Emmitsburg and the right at Meade advances. New Windsor. Buford's division of cavalry was with the advance at Fairfield. Kilpatrick's division was in the front at Hanover, where he encountered *Stuart's* cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac, and, passing Meade's right flank, was making its way toward Carlisle, having escaped Gregg's division which was bringing up the rear.¹ Orders were given² to French, commanding at Harper's Ferry, to move with 7000 men of his command to occupy Frederick and the line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; and, with the balance of his force, to remove and escort the public property to Washington.

This day's march brought Meade's army twenty miles nearer to Harrisburg; his left flank about the same distance from the main body of *Lee's* army, and resting on the mountain range, which separated them, his right wing near Westminster, the terminus of a railroad leading to Baltimore, which city as well as Washington he covered in his new position. Westminster then became an advanced base for his operations.

On the evening of the 27th,³ *Lee*, having heard that

¹ 43 R., 114.

² 45 R., 401.

³ 45 R., 943. Or perhaps of the 28th, as the reports do not fully agree.

Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing by way of Middletown, took measures to concentrate his forces, and ordered *Ewell* to move his troops back to Chambersburg; but on reflection, the order was modified.¹ "In the absence of cavalry," says *Lee*, "it was impossible to ascertain his [the enemy's] intentions"; but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains." *Longstreet*³ thought that this would "draw [Hooker] into battle, in keeping with the general plan of the campaign,

Lee recalls
Ewell.

¹ On the morning of the 28th, or perhaps of the 29th, he wrote to Ewell (45 R., 943): "If you have not already progressed on the road, and if you have no good reason against it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, via Heidlersburg, where you will have turned most of the way, and you can thus join your other divisions to Early's, which is east of the mountains. When you come to Heidlersburg, you can either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down to Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can send, if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg. But if the roads which your troops take are good, they had better follow you."

² Lee says in his report (44 R., 316): "The cavalry force at this time with the army [consisted] of Jenkin's brigade and White's battalion. . . . It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements." But Stuart was on a wild goose chase on the other side of the Federal army. Hooker had crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th, and Lee must have heard of it from scouts or otherwise; but he had little faith in the accuracy of such reports; he had depended upon Stuart to learn the disposition and designs of the hostile troops from day to day or from hour to hour. He felt perfectly safe, however, for if Hooker should attack him, he looked for another Chancellorsville. If Hooker remained where he had crossed, Lee would be safe. If he should cross the mountains, Lee could take him at a disadvantage. A scout could tell Lee that the Federal army was at Middletown; but if Stuart's cavalry had been where it should have been, between the two armies, or in front of Meade, Lee would probably have known the disposition of Meade's forces, soon after many changes were made.

³ Longstreet 347; 44 R., 8. 35

and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our trains," and so advised Lee. Lee thought so too, and directed *Ewell*, if practicable, to move to Heidlersburg; and then, either directly to Cashtown, or by the turnpike to Gettysburg. "The advance of the enemy to the latter place," Lee says,¹ "was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops." The distance to Cashtown by way of Gettysburg was greater; but the turnpikes were much better than the cross-road. Lee wished him "to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require."

If Hooker should "advance farther west," Lee might, perhaps, strike him half over the mountain; or

Comment. if he persisted in attacking Lee's trains in the

Cumberland Valley, Lee could throw himself between him and Baltimore, with the mountains between them; and live off a country which he had not yet plundered. Washington indeed was so strongly fortified that he could not take it before Hooker could return²; but his line of retreat to Virginia would be open; and Baltimore would be at his mercy. Under the circumstances, Lee took the best course to meet any probable contingency. A good turnpike road leads through a mountain pass from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, about twenty-five miles east and a little south. At the eastern end of the pass, at Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg, was a strong position for defence. At this point of vantage, Lee proposed to concentrate his army, safe against an attack from the

¹ 44 R., 317.

² And catch him between his army and its garrison of 30,000 men. But his cavalry could do some damage and cause much alarm by galloping through the intervals between the forts that surrounded it.

east, and ready to move down either valley as his enemy's movements might require.

*Hill*¹ was ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and *Longstreet* to follow the next day, leaving *Pickett* at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by *Imboden*. *Heth's* division reached Cashtown on the 29th. In the morning of the 30th, *Pettigrew's* brigade, sent by *Heth* to reconnoitre, or perhaps to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of the force, he was unwilling to hazard an attack with his single brigade, and returned to Cashtown. *Hill* arrived with *Pender's* division in the evening; *Johnson's* division had already started with the trains for Chambersburg before *Ewell* received his new orders. On the night of the 30th,² *Ewell* with *Rodes's* division was at Heidlersburg, *Early*, three miles off, on the road to Berlin, and *Johnson*, between Green Village and Scotland.

Hill and
Ewell
advance.

On the 30th Meade moved on, placing Reynolds in command of Sickles's and Howard's corps,³ which, with his own, formed the left wing of the army; and told him to make such dispositions and give such orders as circumstances might require. Reynolds was a warm personal friend of Meade, who had a high respect for him, and implicit confidence in his judgment; he was probably the most popular man in the army; it was understood that the command of the army had been offered him, and that he had refused. Combative by nature, he burned at the thought that the enemy should be permitted to desecrate the soil of a loyal State. He believed that nothing could resist the fury of the Federal troops of

Meade
moves on.

¹ 44 R., 317.

² 44 R., 444.

³ 45 R., 414.

the Army of the Potomac when fighting for their firesides, and could not brook the thought of tolerating for a moment the presence of these invaders. Buford entered Gettysburg in the forenoon just in time to meet *Pettigrew*.

On the evening of the 30th, Meade gave orders for Sickles's corps to move to Emmitsburg,¹ Hancock's to Taneytown, Sykes's to Hanover, Slocum's to Two Taverns, Reynolds's to Gettysburg, Howard's to Gettysburg, or supporting distance, Sedgwick's to Manchester, cavalry to the front and flanks well out in all directions.

The order said: "From present information *Longstreet* and *Hill* are at Chambersburg, partly advanced towards Gettysburg; *Ewell* at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg." Meade thought that by advancing he had relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia; "and now," he says,² he "desires to look to his own army, and assume a position for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires; or to rest his troops."

On the night of the 30th,³ he instructed his engineers to select some ground on which, in case the enemy should advance beyond South Mountain, he might be able to concentrate, and be prepared to give him battle. On the morning of the 1st of July, he sent a circular to his corps commanders saying⁴:

Meade
selects a
defensive
line.

It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position renders such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive, and attack, it is his intention, after holding them

¹ 45 R., 416, 418.

² 45 R., 416.

³ 1 C. W., 1865, 330.

⁴ 45 R., 458.

in check sufficiently long, to withdraw the trains and other *impedimenta*; to withdraw the army from its present position, and form a line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek.

He explained how, in this case, the corps should be moved; and added that whenever such circumstances should arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement should be at once communicated to his headquarters and to all adjoining corps commanders. At about the same time¹ that Meade sent this circular to Reynolds, he sent instructions to him saying²:

The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile, he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. If the enemy is concentrating to our right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position.³ . . . The general having just assumed command . . . would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition

Meade and
Reynolds.

¹ C. W., 348, 355.

² 45 R., 460.

³ "The numbers of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from 6000 to 8000. Our numbers ought to equal it, and, with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue."

of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does.

Hill's orders did not require him to advance beyond Cashtown; but before *Lee's* army had crossed the Potomac, the plan had been for *Hill's* division to take the route east of the mountains and follow one of *Early's* divisions to York, and when ordered to move to Cashtown, *Hill* did not appear to realize that *Lee* intended to concentrate his army there. Both *Hill* and *Heth* were combative, and determined to see what was confronting them on the road to the Susquehanna. At 5 A.M.¹ on the morning of the 1st of July, without orders from *Lee*, *Hill* advanced with *Heth's* and *Pender's* divisions and *Pegram's* and *McIntosh's* battalions of artillery, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist chiefly of cavalry. Soon after daylight, he moved *Anderson's* division from Fayetteville in the direction of Cashtown.

At Heidlersburg,² *Ewell* received orders to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate, and a note from *Hill* saying he was at Cashtown. The next morning, July 1st, he moved with *Rodes's* division toward Cashtown, ordering *Early* to follow by Hunterstown. Before reaching Middletown he received notice from *Hill* that he was advancing upon Gettysburg.

At 10.40 P.M. of the 30th,³ Buford wrote to Meade that *Hill's* corps, was massed back of Cashtown, and that *Ewell* was said to be coming over the mountains from Carlisle.⁴

¹ 44 R., 607. ² 44 R., 444. Map XVI., at end. ³ 43 R., 924.

⁴ Captain Rosengarten of Reynolds's staff says: "It was Buford who first called attention to the concentration of roads at Gettysburg that

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, JULY 1, 1863

	Provost Gd. Artillery Res.		2,600 2,600		Guns 110
	CORPS	DIVISIONS		BRIGADES No. of Regts. in each	23
I	Reynolds 11,900 (573)	Wadsworth Robinson Doubleday	4,100 4,100 3,700	Meredith, 5; Cutler, 6. Paul, 5; Baxter, 6. Rowley 4; Stone, 3; Stannard, 3.	
II	Hancock 12,200 (203)	Caldwell Gibbon Hays	4,500 4,000 3,700	Cross, 4; Kelley, 2; Zook, 4; Brooke, 5. Harrow, 4; Webb, 4; Hall, 5. Carroll, 4; Smyth, 4.5; Willard, 3.4.	24
III	Sickles 11,300 (289)	Birney Humphreys	5,800 5,500	Graham, 6; Ward, 8; De Trobriand, 5. Carr, 6; Brewster, 6; Burling, 6.	30
V	Sykes 12,200 (334)	Barnes Ayres Crawford	4,700 3,900 3,600	Tilton, 4; Sweitzer, 4; Vincent, 4. Day, 3.1; Burbank, 2.6; Weed, 4. McCandless, 4; Fisher, 5.	26
VI	Sedgwick 13,800 (367)	Wright Howe Newton	4,700 4,000 5,100	Torbert, 4; Bartlett, 4; Russell, 4. Grant, 5; Neill, 5. Shaler, 5; Eustis, 4; Wheaton, 4.	48
XI	Howard 10,300 (373)	Barlow Steinwehr Schurz	3,200 3,200 3,900	Von Gilsa, 4; Ames, 4. Coster, 4; Smith, 4. Schimmelfennig, 5; Krzyzanowski, 5.	26
XII	Slocum (William's) 10,500 (351)	Ruger Geary Indep.	4,100 5,300 1,100	McDougall, 6; Colgrove, 5 Candy, 6; Kane, 3; Greene, 5. Lockwood, 3.	20
Cav.	Pleasanton 13,900 (445)	Buford Gregg Kilpatrick	5,800 4,300 3,800	Gamble, 3; Devin, 4; Merritt, 5. McIntosh, 5; I. Gregg, 4. Farnsworth, 4; Custer, 4.	50
Tot.	96,100 (330)		101,300		357

gave it such strategic importance. It was his energy in pushing forward, his foresight in thrusting his force out, not invited, that almost compelled the Confederate army to come to Gettysburg and thus brought on the battle there. At daylight on the morning of July 1st, his advance picket saw the enemy approaching on the Chambersburg road, and at 5.30 the first fire came from our side, as the dismounted cavalymen took refuge behind the abutments of the bridge over Willoughby Run." (*Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, 24.)


ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JULY 1, 1863

	CORPS	DIVISIONS		BRIGADES No. of Regts. in each	Guns
I	Longstreet	McLaws	7,300 (429)	Kershaw, 5; Barksdale, 4; Semmes, 4; Wofford, 4; Garnett, 5; Kemper, 5; Armistead, 5.	
	21,400	Pickett	5,400 (360)	Law, 5; Robertson, 4; Anderson, 5; Benning, 4.	84
		Hood	7,700 (428)		
		Artillery	1,000		
II	Ewell	Early	6,300 (370)	Hays, 5; Smith, 3; Hoke, 3; Gordon, 6.	
	22,200	Johnson	6,300 (332)	Stuart, 5; Walker, 5; Nicholls, 5; Jones, 6.	
		Rodes	8,600 (390)	Daniel, 5; Doles, 4; Iverson, 4; Ramseur, 4; O'Neal, 5.	84
		Artillery	1,000		
III	A. P. Hill	Anderson	7,200 (343)	Wilcox, 5; Wright, 4; Mahone, 5; Perry, 3; Posey, 4.	
	22,000	Heth	7,600 (447)	Pettigrew, 4; Brockenbor- ough, 4; Archer, 5; Davis, 4.	
		Pender	6,200 (326)	Perrin, 5; Lane, 5; Thom- as, 4; Scales, 5.	80
		Artillery	1,000		
Cav.	10,000	Stuart	10,000 (416)	Hampton, 6; Robertson, 2; Jones, 3; F. Lee, 5. Jenkins, 4; W. H. F. Lee, 4. Artillery	24
Tot.	75,600		75,600 (372)		272

The Confederates made a report on May 31st and one on July 31st. There was comparatively little straggling. The numbers given in the table are taken from this report making allowance for troops added or detached, or lost in action before July 1st, and a small allowance for stragglers; they agree closely with estimates made by Alexander and others. (Alexander, 368-370; *N. Y. at Gettysburg*, 101-107; T. L. L., 102, 105; 43 R., 151, 668, 674, 678, 156, 160, 163, 166; 40 R., 846, 848, 823; 26 R., 1086; 44 R., 708, 713, 714, 719). The number of Confederate guns is taken from Alexander. The Federal report shows only the total for each corps; the number for each division is proportioned to the number of regiments. The figures in parentheses show the average strength of an infantry regiment. For the artillery on both sides, twenty men are estimated to each gun.



These tables show the approximate numbers of officers and enlisted men present for duty in each army, etc. The Federals made a report (43 R., 151) on June 30th and one on July 4th. Making allowance for troops who joined or were detached, and for losses in battle reported, the numbers in the former report are still in excess of those in the latter. As some corps made long marches to reach the battle-field, there were many stragglers, and this has been taken into account in estimating the numbers given in the table, which are, in general, less than those calculated from the report of June 30th, and greater than those from the report of July 4th.

Twelve roads from all points of the compass meet at Gettysburg. The army that held it would have



NS OF TROOPS
 JULY 1 A.M.
 PERAL
 FEDERATE

0 1500 2500 3500 4500 FEET



greater mobility, could concentrate quicker and strike in any direction. If Meade could seize it first, he could, perhaps, throw all his army between the wings of *Lee's*; if *Lee* should concentrate first, Meade might meet him there, or withdraw to Pipe Creek. Meade's troops were then from six to twenty-four miles from Gettysburg, *Lee's* from eight to twenty-four. Willoughby's Run, a little stream, fordable in this region, flows south about a mile west of Gettysburg. On each side, the ground rises by a gentle slope of about 50 feet in 400 or 500 yards to the top of an irregular ridge. The Chambersburg Pike leads to Gettysburg from the N. W. by W. and the Hagerstown road, from the W. S. W. The eastern ridge runs N. N. E. for about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile from the Chambersburg Pike, and there joins another called Seminary Ridge somewhat higher and running nearly N. This point, about a mile N. N. W. of Gettysburg, is called Oak Hill. Seminary Ridge crosses the pike about $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile W. of the town, and $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile E. of Willoughby Run. The eastern slope of Oak Hill and Seminary Ridge is much steeper than the western, falling off 120 feet in 300 yards to more level ground north of the town. The ground in this region was cleared of timber excepting at McPherson's grove, $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile south of the Chambersburg Pike on the east bank; and a strip of woods a mile long and $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile wide, about $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile from the west bank, extending from a line $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile south of the Chambersburg Pike to the Hagerstown road.

Early in the morning of the 1st of July, *Davis's* brigade of *Heth's* division of *Hill's* corps was drawn up in line of battle on the western ridge just north of the pike, *Archer's* just south of it; *Pettigrew's* and *Brocken-*

Heth
encounters
Buford.

borough's were massed in reserve; *Pender's* division in line of battle farther back.

By daylight¹ Buford had gained information of the enemy's position and movements, and made arrangements for "entertaining him until General Reynolds could reach the scene." He dismounted his two cavalry brigades (3100) and deployed them behind the eastern ridge, placing Gamble's brigade with Calef's battery in line, the right resting on the railroad track, and the left near the road to Fairfield,² and Devin's brigade from Gamble's right to the road to Mummasburg. By spreading out, and firing rapidly with their carbines, the cavalry made *Heth* believe that he had met a large body of infantry. At 8.30 A.M., Calef's battery fired the first gun.³ Two Confederate batteries then opened fire on Calef; he held his position; but as the fire increased, Devin retired gradually to the rear by regiment. It was ten o'clock before *Heth* ventured to advance his first line, "the object being," he says, "to feel the enemy; to make a forced reconnaissance, and determine in what force the enemy were; whether or not he was massing his forces at Gettysburg."

Reynolds⁴ now commanded the left wing of the army, Doubleday the I Corps. At 8 A.M.⁵ Reynolds, with Wadsworth's division of this corps, moved from Marsh Creek on Gettysburg. When within a mile of the town, hearing that the enemy were approaching from the direction of Cashtown,⁶ and believing that if he went into the town they would shell and destroy it, he took a position in front of the town, and sent back word to the two other divisions of the I Corps to hasten their

¹ 43 R., 927.

⁴ 43 R., 243.

² 43 R., 934.

⁵ 43 R., 265.

³ 43 R., 1030.

⁶ 1 CW., 1865, 413.

march, and instructions to Howard where to post his corps in reserve.¹ At about 10 A.M. he came up to Buford's cavalry; Cutler's brigade led the column, followed by Hall's battery and Meredith's brigade. Reynolds sent² Hall's battery to relieve four of Calef's guns on the pike; and two of Cutler's regiments to support it, and Cutler with the three others across the railroad to relieve Gamble.

Forming line of battle behind the ridge, Cutler advanced to the top without stopping to reconnoitre, and there found *Davis's* brigade coming from the northwest across his right flank. By Wadsworth's orders, two regiments suffering heavily fell back, and formed on the railroad track near the Seminary; the other, not hearing the order, halted about two hundred yards back.³ Hall's battery was outflanked and forced to withdraw.⁴ South of the pike,⁵ Meredith's "Iron Brigade" advanced at a run into line of battle in front of the cavalry on the left of the road and up a gentle slope. When on its crest, the leading regiments, receiving a volley of musketry, obliques to the right into McPherson's woods. *Archer's* brigade outflanked these regiments on their left; but in swinging around to envelope them, exposed its own right to Meredith's following regiments, which in turn outflanked it and captured a number of prisoners, including General *Archer* himself. At about 10.15⁶ General Reynolds, while placing this brigade in position, was killed. Doubleday succeeded to the command. Gamble's cavalry was withdrawn, and Devin's⁷ deployed about a

Davis
outflanks
Cutler.

Meredith
outflanks
Archer.
Reynolds
killed.

¹ Doubleday, 126; 43 R., 401.

² 43 R., 281.

³ 43 R., 266, 282, 285.

⁴ Doubleday, 129.

⁵ 43 R., 273.

⁶ 43 R., 266.

⁷ 43 R., 279, 245, 939.

mile north of the town to watch for *Ewell's* approach.

Cutler's two regiments on the pike,¹ seeing the right of their brigade give way, retired a short distance and then changed front to the right to meet

Doubleday outflanks Davis. *Davis's* men, who also changed front to meet them. At the same time, Doubleday, who

had held one of Meredith's regiments in reserve, sent it to their assistance. A railroad cut 150 yards north of the pike offered good shelter to the troops who should hold it. Some of *Davis's* men were the first to reach it. The Federals advanced, threw their right forward across one end of the cut, outflanked and enfiladed the defenders, who then surrendered, except a few who escaped through the other end. The opposing lines were reformed.² Cutler³ formed his brigade in two lines on the crest he had first occupied.

In this fight, the numbers engaged on opposite sides were about equal. The Federals drove back their

Comment. enemy by the superior skill with which, except in the first instance, they handled their brigades; each wing of the surrounding force was itself surrounded. Throughout the battle of the 1st of July, they won many fights by so handling their brigades as to bring both a front and a flanking fire on one brigade after another of their enemy in succession.

It would hardly be fair to infer that Reynolds, in his patriotic zeal, had exceeded his orders in bringing on the

¹ 43 R., 287.

² The remnants of Archer's brigade fell back and formed on the right and left of Heth's second line. Pender's division (44 R., 656) closed up on Heth's. Meredith's brigade, following Archer, advanced across Wiltoughby Run; but was soon recalled by Doubleday to the grove where it had first formed. Calef's battery was again advanced to replace Hall's.

³ 43 R., 282.

battle. The correspondence shows that Meade trusted to his judgment; and the last letter, which perhaps was never delivered, shows that Meade wished to fight at Gettysburg if the enemy were to concentrate to the north or west, and if the ground were favorable. The loss of the favorite general of the Army of the Potomac at the opening of the first fight on the soil of a free State, was gloomy indeed; but it was a gloom that urged it on to make the battle worthy of this great sacrifice.

At 11 A.M. there was a lull in the battle. *Hill* was satisfied that the enemy was in force before him, and did not for a while attempt to push his reconnoissance any farther. Doubleday was master of the field; but he could not with Wadsworth's division alone hold out against *Heth*, who, as he knew, had twice his numbers, and as he thought, was followed by all of *Hill's* corps.

On the 30th of June,¹ Howard was at Emmitsburg. At 3.30 A.M. on the 1st of July, he was ordered to move with his corps to the support of Reynolds; at 8 A.M., to march to Gettysburg. At 11.30² he arrived on the field in person, and being senior to Doubleday, assumed command, placing Schurz in command of the XI Corps. From the roof of a building,³ he saw *Ewell's* men coming down on Doubleday's right flank; and at the same time Doubleday saw them, and asked Howard to protect that portion of the line with the XI Corps.

Howard
takes
command.

The remainder of the I Corps, consisting of Robinson's and Rowley's divisions, had just come up. Doubleday immediately placed Robinson's division in reserve at the Seminary to throw up some slight intrenchments to aid him in holding that point in case he should be driven back.

Robinson
and Rowley
arrive.

¹ 43 R., 701.

² 43 R., 247.

³ 43 R., 247.

He divided Rowley's division; sending Stone's brigade to the open space at the turnpike between Meredith's in the wood and Cutler's just north of the railroad, and the other brigade under Biddle to the left and rear of Meredith, both brigades facing west.¹ Three quarters of an hour after Cutler had reformed his brigade, he discovered the enemy moving forward in large bodies of infantry on his right. With Wadsworth's approval, he changed front to hold them in check. At about 1 o'clock, Doubleday sent two regiments of Baxter's brigade forward to form on Seminary Ridge on Cutler's right. At 2,² the rest of the brigade came up. At about 1 P.M., the head of the XI Corps column arrived at Gettysburg. Howard sent Schurz with his own and Barlow's divisions to the north of the town, remaining near the cemetery with von Steinwehr's division, and notifying Sickles who was at Emmitsburg, and Slocum near Two Taverns.

Schurz³ posted his own divisions under Schimmelpfennig in two lines north of the town and west of the

Schurz posts two divisions north of town. Carlisle road, and Barlow's division in echelon on Schimmelpfennig's right. At about 2 o'clock the deployment was completed; and Schurz pushed forward his skirmishers, who soon became engaged with the enemy.

Fearing⁴ that if any hostile forces should advance by the Heidlersburg road, his right flank would be turned, he asked to have a brigade of von Steinwehr's division placed north of the railroad near the station, in echelon on the right and rear of Barlow. Soon after, finding that without orders Barlow had moved his division about a mile to the front and right to occupy

¹ 43 R., 315, 329.

² 43 R., 307.

³ 43 R., 727.

⁴ 43 R., 728.

the knoll which now bears his name, thus losing connection with Schimmelpfennig's division, and exposing his own to the whole force of any attack coming from the northeast, Schurz advanced Schimmelpfennig's right to establish the connection; and he was none too soon.

Meanwhile *Lee* was far away.¹ In the forenoon he wrote from Greenwood,² eight miles east of Chambersburg, to *Imboden* to come to this point and relieve *Pickett*; and said that his headquarters Lee arrives
in person. for the present would be at Cashtown. Before arriving there, however,³ "occasional cannon shots in that direction were heard." "Its significance," says *Pendleton*, his chief of artillery, "was not then fully understood." "After a brief pause near Cashtown, to see how it would prove, the commanding general, finding the cannonade to continue and increase, moved rapidly forward." It was about 2.30 or 3 P.M. when he arrived on the battle-field.

In the morning,⁴ when *Ewell* had received notice from *Hill* that he was advancing upon Gettysburg, he turned the head of *Rodes's* column toward that point by the Middletown road, sending Ewell
arrives. word to *Early* to advance directly on the Heidlersburg road. *Ewell* notified *Lee* of his movements, and was told that *Lee* did not want to bring on a general engagement until the rest of the army came up. By the time this message reached him, *Hill* was already engaged, and *Ewell's* artillery had opened fire. Thinking it was too late to avoid an engagement, he determined to push the attack vigorously, and drew up

¹ For much valuable information, and many interesting suggestions about the influences that helped to bring on the battle, I am indebted to *Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign*, by John S. Mosby.

² 45 R., 947.

³ 44 R., 348.

⁴ 44 R., 317, 444.

Rodes's division in line of battle on Oak Hill, squarely across Doubleday's right flank.¹

Rodes,² seeing the Federal troops approach, determined to attack those on the hill with *O'Neal's* and *Iverson's* brigades, his centre and right, while moving *Doles's* brigade a little to the left, so as to hold those from the town in check until *Early* should arrive, which he knew would not be long. *O'Neal*, *Iverson*, and *Daniel* were to advance, *O'Neal* directly against *Baxter*, who was on the ridge facing west; *Iverson* on *O'Neal's* right, and *Daniel* on *Iverson's* right and rear, to support him if necessary. The artillery on both sides fired with good effect. Through some misunderstanding, *O'Neal* sent forward only a part of his brigade, and remained behind with the rest. *Rodes*,³ advancing with *Iverson*, and seeing the enemy in force as he thought to oppose his advance, halted him until he could bring the artillery to play upon them.

This gave *Baxter* his opportunity. Either by *Robinson's* order or at his own motion, *Baxter* faced to the north and met the advance of *O'Neal's* regiments in front, while *Schimmelpfennig's* skirmishers and *Dilger's* battery on *Schurz's* line enfiladed them from their left, drove them back in disorder, and then changed front to the left, crept up to the crest of the ridge, and lay in wait behind a stone wall for *Iverson's* men to approach. When *Iverson*, swinging around to envelope *Baxter's* left,⁴ had come within about one hundred yards, *Baxter* suddenly

¹ With *Iverson* on the right, *O'Neal* in the centre, both on the ridge, and *Doles* on the left in the plain, *Daniel* behind (44 R., 566), and on the right of *Iverson*, and *Ramseur* in reserve.

² 44 R., 552.

³ 44 R., 579.

⁴ 88th Penna. in the War for the Union, John D. Vautier, 124ff.

rose, and fired on his front, while Cutler and even Stone¹ and the Federal artillery enfiladed him from his right. Five hundred of *Iverson's* men² lay dead and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade. Baxter then charged, and captured a large part of the brigade. As *Iverson* was swinging around to the left, *Daniel* on his right had moved to the front, leaving three regiments to support *Iverson*, and pushing on with the two others south towards the railroad cut, where *Davis* had met Cutler in the morning. This exposed him to the cross fire of the Federal artillery. Cutler, on the ridge facing to the north, changed to the left,³ and enfiladed *Daniel's* advancing line; Stone, on the pike facing west, changed front to the right with two of his regiments to meet *Daniel*, and sent one of them forward to the railroad cut, and drove *Daniel* back; but Stone's regiment in the cut, enfiladed by a battery on *Heth's* line, was forced to fall back to the road.⁴ In this way, *Rodes's* disjointed attack had been shattered by adroitness of the Federal brigades under Doubleday's direction while *Hill* looked on but did not venture to attack.

*Early*⁵ then came in sight of Gettysburg on the Heidlersburg road, and finding *Rodes* engaged with the enemy, formed his troops across the road.⁶ At 3 o'clock, he advanced⁷ towards Barlow's knoll. *Rodes* then ordered another advance against Doubleday's right flank and *Heth* against his front. When Barlow was advancing to the knoll,⁸ *Doles* had moved to the left to meet him; and *Gordon*

*Early drives
Schurz.*

¹ Doubleday, 143.

³ 43 R., 282.

⁴ 43 R., 330.

² 44 R., 579.

⁵ 44 R., 468.

⁶ Gordon on the right, Hays on the centre, Avery on the left, and Smith in reserve in the rear of Avery, Jones's artillery in front of Avery.

⁷ 43 R., 729.

⁸ 44 R., 582.

on the right of *Early's* line advanced to support *Doles*.¹ Schimmelpfennig then advanced with von Amsberg's brigade against *Doles's* right flank. *Doles* changed front to the right, extended his right wing, and outflanked van Amsberg; but this exposed his own left flank to Ames and Krzyzanowski. As his left was breaking, however, *Gordon*,² who had crossed Rock Creek, captured Barlow, drove von Gilsa's men from the knoll through the ranks of Ames's brigade,³ "creating considerable confusion," and came down upon Ames's right flank. All Barlow's division was retreating with little or no regularity when an order came from Schurz to fall back. He says,⁴ "It was now clear that the two small divisions under my command had a whole corps to contend with." *Gordon*⁵ followed Barlow's men across the fields towards the town until he came to a low ridge behind which the Federals made another stand; *Early* halted him and ordered up *Hays* and *Avery*.⁶ At last, Coster's brigade of von Steinwehr's division, which Schurz had asked for, came up.⁷ Schurz led it out of the town, deployed it on the right of the roads near the railroad depot, and checked the enemy long enough to cover the retreat of Barlow's division, now under Ames. Meanwhile, Schimmelpfennig's division had been ordered back; and all passed through the town of Gettysburg with heavy loss.

This was a serious reverse for the Federals, mainly due to the action of the heroic Barlow, who was prompted, perhaps, by the laudable desire to redeem the reputation lost at Chancellorsville by the division he now commanded. He had posted this division of some 3200 men on the extreme right of the

¹ 44 R., 492.² 44 R., 582.³ 43 R., 712.⁴ 43 R., 728.⁵ 44 R., 469.⁶ With Hoke's brigade.⁷ 43 R., 729.

Federal position, with its right flank in the air, and exposed to the attack of *Early's* division of some 6300. The position would have been well chosen if the sole object had been to keep the enemy from Gettysburg and if the ground on the right had been as favorable for defence and held by a strong enough force. As it was, instead of saving the reputation of his troops by advancing them to the post of danger, he exposed them to precisely the same disaster that they had suffered at Chancellorsville, two months before. The collapse of the XI Corps exposed the I to the same danger. The advanced position near Oak Hill had been well taken to protect Doubleday's corps against *Hill's* advance from the west; but as soon as *Early* appeared in force, Howard should have withdrawn all the troops to Cemetery Hill.

At the same time that *Early* advanced against Schurz, *Rodes* ordered up *Ramseur's* brigade, and hurled it,¹ with the scattering remnants of *O'Neal's* and *Iverson's*, on Baxter's bri- Rodes
drives
Robinson.gade, which was still holding its position. Doubleday,² finding that Baxter was in danger, sent Paul to replace him. Here³ he remained until after Schurz's command had withdrawn, holding back the enemy, and capturing many prisoners in a counter charge.

At 3 o'clock also, *Heth's* second line advanced,⁴ but was held in check by Meredith and Biddle.⁵ *Pender's* division advanced; and at about 4,⁶ *Daniel* with three

¹ 44 R., 554.

² 43 R., 249.

³ 43 R., 299, 295.

⁴ 44 R., 637, 642.

⁵ Pettigrew's left regiment was in the woods, and did not hear the order to fall back. Outflanking Meredith's left, it drove back the regiment on the flank, and enfiladed the next, while (43 R., 267) Brockenborough attacked from the front.

⁶ 44 R., 567, 571.

regiments made another advance against Stone's brigade from the north,¹ while *Davis* and *Scales* of *Pender's* division attacked him from the west,² and *Doubleday* withdrew forced him to fall back to Seminary Ridge. to Seminary Ridge. Meanwhile *Daniel's* two other regiments formed on the right of *Ramseur* and *Iverson*, and advanced against Cutler on this ridge. As all *Doubleday's* reserves³ were engaged, he called back *Biddle* and *Meredith* to the entrenchments in front of the Seminary. On their right was Stone, then *Baxter*, *Cutler*, and *Paul*. This was the situation⁴ at about 4.30 P.M.

At about 4, *Doubleday*⁵ had sent *Halstead*, his adjutant-general, to *Howard* for reinforcements or for an order to retreat. He found him in the Cemetery; *Halstead* says that he looked the *Doubleday* asks for relief. picture of despair, and told him to say that he had no reinforcements to send, that he had only one regiment in reserve.⁶ *Halstead* called his attention to the enemy then advancing in line of battle overlapping the Federal left by nearly half a mile; but here as at *Chancellorsville*, *Howard* failed to admit that there was any danger, and insisted that *Halstead* mistook rail fences for troops. When finally convinced, he refused to authorize *Doubleday* to retire; but sent an order for *Buford* to go to his support. *Doubleday* says⁷: "The First Corps had suffered severely in these encounters, but by this additional delay, and with the overwhelming odds against us,

¹ Now under *Wister*, as *Stone* had been wounded; *Wister* changed front forward (43 R., 332) with the right wing of his left regiment, and with this wing, the centre regiment advanced to the cut.

² 43 R., 330.

³ 43 R., 250.

⁴ 43 R., 307.

⁵ 3 B. & L., 285.

⁶ *Doubleday*, 146.

⁷ *Doubleday*, 146.

it was almost totally sacrificed. . . . [Buford] expressed himself in pretty round terms at the idea that he could keep back *Hill's* entire corps with Gamble's cavalry brigade alone." Buford's men dismounted, and occupied a grove south of the Fairfield road where with their fire they checked the advance of *Pender's* right.¹ At about 4.30, Robinson was ordered² to withdraw; but he did not receive the order until nearly 5. His division was outflanked right and left and he retired fighting.

As *Pender's* division advanced and passed over *Heth's, Lane*, on the right,³ was so much delayed by Buford's fire that he was unable to attack the enemy in front. *Perrin*, in the centre, upon ascending the hill near the Seminary, was met by *Biddle's* fire from behind the breastwork, a semicircular rail entrenchment which Paul's brigade had thrown up, and from the artillery near the Cash-town road. *Scales*, on the left, with his left resting on the Cashtown road, attacked Stone in the flank, and followed him as he withdrew to Seminary Hill; when he came within seventy-five yards of the enemy's fortified position, he was brought to a halt by the fire of grape and musketry. *Scales* says⁴: "Our line had been broken up, and only a squad here and there marked the place where regiments had rested." After a vigorous resistance, Doubleday gave the order to retreat. On the way, he met⁵ an aide from Howard⁶ with orders directing him to fall back gradually, disputing every inch of ground, and to form near his position, the XI Corps on the right and the I Corps on the left of the Baltimore Pike. The

¹ See *First Day's Fight at Gettysburg*, by R. L. Ashurst, Philadelphia, 1897.

² 43 R., 290.

³ Doubleday, 149.

⁴ 44 R., 665, 657.

⁵ 43 R., 704.

⁶ 44 R., 670.

I Corps marched¹ at a walk through the town of Gettysburg, fighting the enemy, who crowded in on both, from the west, north, and northeast, and entered from different directions, taking many prisoners; but followed no farther.

After *Lee* had arrived, he learned from the prisoners that his troops had been engaged with two corps of the *Lee does* Army of the Potomac, and that the rest of it not pursue. was approaching under Meade.

Without information as to its proximity, [he says²], the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour. In the meantime, the enemy occupied the point [Culps Hill] which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon four miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about four miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement. It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the

¹ Doubleday, 150.

² 44 R., 317.

whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our excessive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

*Ewell*¹ had received *Lee's* message on entering the town of Gettysburg. He could not, he said, bring the artillery to bear on the Federal position; and all the troops with him were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting. He therefore determined when *Johnson* arrived, to take possession of Culp's Hill, which in a measure commanded it; but long before *Johnson* arrived, the skirmishers of Slocum's corps were seen in that neighborhood, and some Slocum's
men arrive. mounted men, perhaps Kilpatrick's, advancing on the York road,² gave rise to the report that a large force was advancing in that direction too; this led *Early*, though he "had no faith in this report," to detach *Smith's* and *Gordon's* brigades to keep a lookout on this road, "and stop any further alarm." Slocum's arrival at about 4 P.M. had turned the scale in the Federals' favor.

In the battle of the 1st of July, the numbers present for duty were roughly as follows. Of the Federals, the I Corps, 10,200; the XI Corps, 10,300; the cavalry, 3100; making in all 23,600. Of Numbers
and losses. the Confederates, *Heth's* division, 7600; *Pender's*, 6200; *Rodes's*, 8600; *Early's*, 6300; making 28,800. The Federal force was then a little more than three-

¹ 44 R., 445.

² 44 R., 469.

fourths as great as the Confederate. Neither side was much sheltered by artificial defences.

The cavalry and the I Corps covered themselves with glory; the cavalry in holding back a large body of infantry until the I Corps appeared, and the I Corps in resisting all day the attack of about twice its numbers while suffering a loss of 36 per cent. in killed and wounded, and 21 per cent. in missing, inflicting a still greater loss upon their enemy.¹ The two divisions of the XI Corps, badly placed, fell back before a force about aequal to its own, after a loss of 25 per cent. in killed and wounded, and 19 per cent. in missing, and inflicted only about one third as great a loss upon the enemy.

It was better for Meade to fight a battle at Gettysburg provided that he could concentrate there quicker

Comment. than *Lee*; especially if he could gather a

force large enough to drive *Hill* back to the mountains, and cut off *Rodes* and *Early* and crush them. *Lee's* army upon the whole was at least as far away as Meade's; and all except these two divisions were compelled to advance by the single road through the mountains from Chambersburg. Reynolds was right in checking *Hill*; and Howard was right in supporting Doubleday. The line of defence as he laid it out was possibly too extended and too far from Doubleday, and Doubleday's line was extended too far to the north to connect with Schurz. After Barlow's rash advance, Howard should have drawn him in; and as soon as *Early* appeared on the right and *Pender* on the left, Howard should have withdrawn all his line to Cemetery Ridge, where he had prudently prepared an entrenched position, instead of ordering Doubleday to hold out to the

¹ Vanderslice, 66. See table, pp. 413, 414, 489.

last. If he had begun to fall back before 3 P.M., he could by proper manœuvres have delayed the enemy's advance as long as he actually did by leaving his troops to be sacrificed; and meanwhile he could have made his position stronger. It might have been demoralizing to make a backward move; but it would not have been as bad as it was to repeat the disaster of Chancellorsville. The practical gain from repelling the enemy's attack on this prepared position would have quickly restored the loss of morale. After this fight, as after *Jackson's* flank march at Chancellorsville, some critics hold that the victors should have pushed on; and here as there, our present knowledge of the troop-positions shows that they were wise in halting.

In the first day's fight, although the Federal loss had been slightly the greater, the Confederate troops engaged had suffered too severely to be of material service in the fight of the following day; the Federals had secured a strong position in which they could fight on the defensive, and hold it until their army could be assembled.

Results of
the first
day's fight.

At 1.10 P.M., Meade at Taneytown, hearing that Reynolds¹ had been killed or badly wounded, sent for Hancock, who had just arrived with his corps,² and directed him to go in person to the front; and in case of Reynolds's death, to assume command of the XI and I Corps there, and of the III Corps, then at Emmitsburg; and if he thought the ground and position there better than Pipe Creek to fight a battle under existing circumstances, to so advise Meade, and he would order up all the troops.

Hancock
goes to the
front.

¹ 45 R., 461.

² At 11 A.M.

At about 3.30 P.M., Hancock arrived at Gettysburg, and assumed the command. Some of Reynolds's and Howard's corps were retiring through the town.¹ Buford's cavalry was on the plain to the left of Gettysburg. Hancock gave orders to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in front. The position was already partially occupied by Howard. Warren arrived soon after, and going over the ground with Hancock, they came to the conclusion that if that position could be held until night, it would be the best place for the army to fight on if it were attacked.² Wadsworth's division of Reynolds's corps was placed on Culp's Hill. The rest of the corps under Doubleday was on the right and left of the Taneytown road, and connected with the left of Howard's corps. Slocum's corps³ was at Two Taverns when the information was received that Reynolds's and Howard's corps were engaged at Gettysburg. Slocum started at once. Williams's division arrived at 4 P.M.,⁴ and was, by Slocum's order, placed about a mile east of Rock Creek to the right and rear of Wadsworth's division. Geary's division, which was sent forward to report to Howard, was placed by Hancock on the high ground to the right of and near Little Round Top, where it was in position at 5 P.M.⁵ Hancock then sent an aide to Meade to inform him of the state of affairs and to say that he would hold the position until night. He said that "the position of Gettysburg was a very strong one, having

¹ 43 R., 368.

² 1 C. W., 1865, 377. Hancock says: "Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position."

³ 43 R., 758; 45 R., 465.

⁴ 43 R., 819.

⁵ 43 R., 825.

for its disadvantage that it might easily be turned, leaving to Meade the responsibility whether the battle should be fought at Gettysburg or at Pipe Creek." Between 5 and 6 o'clock, Slocum arrived in person, and Hancock, having completed his dispositions, transferred the command to him, and returned to Taneytown.

At 3 P.M. Sickles started¹ from his position north of Emmitsburg with the 1st and 2d brigades of Birney's division, and at 6, after a march of ten miles, arrived within two miles of Gettysburg.²

At 3 P.M. Humphreys's division, except Bur-
ling's brigade, started from near Emmitsburg,
but, through a mistake of the guides, took the wrong
road. At 1 A.M. on the 2d it bivouacked about a mile
and a half from Gettysburg.

At 1.30 P.M., Hancock's corps left Taneytown, and at 9 o'clock³ bivouacked for the night about three miles⁴ south of Gettysburg.

At 7 P.M. Sykes's corps left Hanover; at midnight⁵ it bivouacked six miles east of Gettysburg.

On the morning of July 2d,⁶ at about 3 A.M., Meade met Howard near the Cemetery gate, and rode with him over the position then held by his corps.⁷

At 8 A.M. on the 2d, the V, XII, I, XI, II, the III corps except two brigades, and Buford's cavalry, formed a continuous curve from the Baltimore Pike near Rock Creek along Culps Hill and Cemetery Ridge to the foot of Little Round Top.⁸ The skirmish line

¹ 43 R., 482; 45 R., 465. Map XVII., at end.

² *New York at Gettysburg*, 31; 43 R., 530.

³ 43 R., 400.

⁴ 43 R., 369.

⁵ 43 R., 595.

⁶ 43 R., 705.

⁷ Which was disposed with its centre near the Baltimore Pike; Ames's division on the right, Schurz in the centre, von Steinwehr on the left.

⁸ Hancock's corps started at daylight, arrived on the field about 7 A.M. of the 2d, and was soon placed in position, the right connecting with

was posted 600 or 700 yards west of the Emmitsburg road. The VI Corps was about twelve miles southeast of Gettysburg, and steadily approaching. De Trobriand's and Burling's brigades joined Sickles's corps at about 9. At 10 A.M., Buford's cavalry, which was posted in front of the left flank, was through some unfortunate misunderstanding withdrawn and sent to the rear. It had suffered severely in the first day's fight: and Meade proposed to give it a rest; but not until other cavalry came to relieve it. By Meade's orders,¹ Warren reconnoitred the position on the right. Meade, he says, "had it in contemplation to order an assault from our right if his troops could be got into that position, and be prepared for it before anything else took place. From the reconnaissance that I made I advised General

Howard's corps, and on the left with Sickles's, the line of battle extending along the crest from the left of Cemetery Hill to Round Top.

Sykes's corps, starting early in the morning, arrived near Rock Creek at about 7 A.M., and was placed in line on the right of Williams's division. (43 R., 592, 595, 759).

At 5 o'clock in the morning of the 2d, Geary's division was moved to the right, and placed in the woods east of the turnpike, between Rock Creek and the crest of the hill held by Wadsworth's division.

About 8 A.M., Sykes's corps and Williams's division were moved to the left and across Rock Creek, Williams's division taking position on the right of Geary's with its right resting on the creek.

At about 9 A.M., Burling's, and at 9 or 10 A.M. (43 R., 519, 570), De Trobriand's brigade of Birney's division arrived (43 R., 482). At 7 A.M., under orders from Sickles, Birney's division relieved Geary's to the right of Round Top. Early in the morning, Humphreys's division was massed near the crest of the ridge running from the Cemetery to Round Top.

Just before dark (43 R., 665) on the evening of July 1st, Sedgwick's corps, in camp near Manchester, received orders to move to Taneytown, and the troops were immediately put in motion. During the night, other orders were received; and the corps was pushed on along the Baltimore Pike to Gettysburg, where it arrived between 3 and 4 P.M. after a march estimated at more than thirty miles.

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 377.

Meade not to attack in that direction, because of the character of the ground." Slocum concurred in this advice.

The position selected for the Federal army is shaped like a fishhook. The shank is formed by Cemetery Ridge, which connects the Round Tops on the south with the Cemetery on the north. The line then curves around to the east and then south to Culps Hill which corresponds to the point of the hook. The total length is about three miles. Round Top rises about 330 feet in 500 yards, and Little Round Top about 220 feet in 300 yards above the bed of Plum Run on the west, Culps Hill about 170 feet in 500 yards above Rock Creek on the east. Both of the extremities of this line are strong, and capable of defence by infantry against superior numbers. Cemetery Hill is not so high, and its slopes are gentler.¹

Federal
position.

The position, although not an especially good one, was too strong to be attacked in front, because along the greater part of the line, the Federal troops could sweep with their fire the ground in front for a distance of 400 or 500 yards, while more or less protected against the fire of musketry or case shot by intrenchments, which they could quickly prepare; the ground in the rear was in most places covered from the sight, and in some from the shot, of the enemy. The distance from the point of the fishhook to the shank was a little more than a mile; so that any point attacked could be readily reinforced. Troops could generally move from one part of the line to the other

Comment.

¹ On the official map the elevation of the top of Cemetery Hill is taken at 500 feet above an arbitrary plane. That of Round Top, 664; Little Round Top, 548; Culps Hill, 508; and the open square in the centre of Gettysburg, 412 feet.

without being discovered; and the reserves could find shelter behind the rocks and hills, and in the depressions. As long as the Round Tops on the south and Culps Hill on the northeast were held, the position could not be outflanked. At Cemetery Hill, it was somewhat more exposed,¹ presenting a weak salient to the north, where the line could be enfiladed; and where the Confederate artillery could pour in a heavy fire from the east, north, west, and southwest; and the infantry could approach under shelter from the north and west to within a few hundred yards of the intrenchments, and, with somewhat more exposure, from the northeast.

Alexander, in his memoirs, says of this part of the position: "Briefly the one weak spot of the enemy's line, and the one advantage possessed by ours, were never apprehended."² If, however, East Cemetery Hill should be carried, a line could still be held running along the ridge from Culps Hill to the top of Cemetery Hill proper. If the Federal reserves were properly handled, this line could only be carried by overwhelming numbers. South of the Round Tops, the ground falls off into comparatively level country, which was partially wooded, but nowhere impassable for infantry, and traversed by lanes quite practicable for artillery.

In such a position as this, the defender can generally

¹ The rifled guns of that day were at their best at about 400 yards, but their effect was about two thirds as great at 1200, one third at 2000, and one fifth at 2800 yards.

² He gives as a probable reason, the scarcity of trained staff and reconnoitring officers, and the fact that Ewell had discontinued and withdrawn the pursuit on the afternoon of the 1st, when he was about to undertake this position. The assailants advancing from this direction, though sheltered for a while, would be exposed to a close flanking fire of all the artillery from Cemetery to Culps Hill, beside the direct fire from Cemetery, and the reverse fire from Culps Hill.

bring a greater force to the decisive point because his intrenchments enable him with few troops to hold off a larger force in other parts of the field.

Of *Lee's* army, *Rodes's* division of *Ewell's* corps was at Gettysburg on the north, *Early's* and *Johnson's* divisions on the high ground north and northeast, and *Pender's* division of *Hill's* ^{Confederate position.} corps on Seminary Ridge about three quarters of a mile northwest, of Meade's position; *Ander-son's* and *Heth's* divisions, less than a mile in the rear of *Pender*. *Longstreet's* corps, which had camped four miles in the rear, was just coming up.

*Fitzhugh Lee*¹ says of his uncle on the evening of the 1st of July:

Lee, impressed with the idea of whipping his opponent in detail, was practically ready and eager for the contest next day and so was his confident army. . . . He knew the Union Army had not yet concen- ^{Lee's plans.} trated, and was anxious to attack before they could.

At 5 P.M. of the 1st of July, *Longstreet* had reported to *Lee* on Seminary Ridge:

"We could not" [he said] "call the enemy to a position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital." "If he is there to-morrow" [said Lee], "I will attack him." [Longstreet was astonished.] "If he is there to-morrow it will be because he wants you to attack. . . ."²

On the same evening,³ *Lee* rode to the town of Gettysburg, and met *Ewell*, *Early*, and *Rodes*. He finally decided that *Longstreet* should commence the battle by

¹ *Lee's Lee*, 275, 276.

² *Lee's Lee*, 276; Alexander, 386; Longstreet, 358.

³ *Lee's Lee*, 276.

a forward movement on *Hill's* right, seize the commanding positions of the enemy's left, and envelope and enfilade the flank of the troops in front of the other two corps.¹

Fitzhugh Lee says²:

Lee's plan of battle was simple. His purpose was to turn the enemy's left flank with his 1st Corps, and after the work began there, to demonstrate against his lines with the other two in order to prevent the threatened flank from being reinforced, these demonstrations to be converted into a real attack as the flanking wave of battle rolled over the troops in their front.

Lee did not like *Ewell's* bent line, his left was too far around the curve of the fishhook; so that he decided to draw him more to his right. *Ewell*,³ however, went to *Lee* and represented to him that Culp's Hill was unoccupied by the enemy and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as he could judge. *Lee* decided to let him remain, and, after 12 o'clock at night, sent orders for *Johnson* to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so. *Johnson* found that the hill was occupied by a superior force of the enemy.

At or before daylight on the 2d,⁴ *Longstreet* went to *Lee's* headquarters and "renewed his views against making an attack." *Longstreet's* plan⁵ was to file around the Federals' left flank and force Meade to attack.⁶

¹ Fitzhugh Lee quotes Early as saying that Lee left the conference with the distinct understanding that Longstreet would be ordered to make the attack early next morning; and Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery, says that Lee told him that night that he had ordered Longstreet to attack on the flank at sunrise next morning. This Longstreet indignantly denies.

² Lee's *Lee*, 276.

³ 44 R., 446.

⁴ Longstreet, 362; Lee's *Lee*, 277.

⁵ Lee's *Lee*, 278.

⁶ "Lee might possibly have moved toward Frederick on the 2d,"

But [says Fitz Lee], Lee could not move around now and manœuvre, or scatter his legions to gather supplies as he had done, because his opponent was uncomfortably near. He could not march *en masse* with a host subsisting by pillage, and to concentrate was to starve. There was no alternative—he must fight. . . . Why should Lee lose the advantages of his more rapid concentration? . . . His unerring sagacity told him he would catch Meade partially in position, but he was disturbed because one of his principal officers had not the faith and confidence necessary to win success.

If Lee had been correct in his estimate of the relative strength of the opposing forces on the morning of the 2d, it would have been advisable to attack as soon as possible; but in this he was wrong. "In consequence of the reluctance of the officer next in command to fire the opening gun," says Fitz Lee, "Lee [sent a staff officer] to Ewell at sunrise to see whether, after viewing the position in his front by daylight, he could not attack from his flank," but found that the hills had been strengthened during the night. Later he rode there himself, not wishing to draw Longstreet into battle when he did not want to go; but saw that nothing could be done; so at 11 A.M., he gave a positive order to Longstreet to move to his right and attack.

Although Lee had fewer troops than Meade, and his

says Fitz Lee, "and thus force Meade back to Westminster; but he could not hope to reach Baltimore or Washington, or a point between these cities, before Meade. From Westminster, cars could have conveyed the Union troops more rapidly than his could have marched, and if Meade had followed him toward Washington, he would have been caught between the powerful works then defended by thirty or forty thousand troops and General Meade's army, while the change of base would have greatly endangered his line of communication. The closer the two armies approached Westminster, the larger the numbers of the Unionists would grow."

line was twice as long, he proposed to attack Meade's left. He could only hope for success by concentrating there the main body of his army, and

Comment.

keeping the rest of it out of action, while making demonstrations to deceive Meade as to the point of attack.^{*} By attacking from all sides at once, he could not expect to be much superior in numbers at any point; and he gave Meade the advantage of fighting everywhere from behind his intrenchments. As soon as he had decided that *Longstreet* was to attack, he knew that *Ewell's* corps should be withdrawn; but as his nephew says: "*Lee*, to the strong courage of the man, united the loving heart of the woman. . . . He had a reluctance to oppose the wishes of others or to order them to do anything that would be disagreeable and to which they would not consent." His tender-hearted nature was a source of strength, and enabled him to do with his men what he could not have done without it; but it is safe to say, that he would not have yielded to its promptings if he had not thought he would succeed; and it is most improbable that he would have thought he could succeed, if he had not so often violated the principles of grand tactics with impunity. He must have believed that the Federal army was so completely shattered by successive defeats that he could neglect all these principles, which he understood as well as any man on the battle-field. He thought that it was better to risk the consequences of a false move, than to offend

^{*} Knowing as we do that the Federal army was superior in numbers to the Confederate, it follows that if both had been properly handled the Federals would be successful. If Meade's forces had all been deployed on a single line from Round Top to the Cemetery and Culp's Hill, and Lee had been allowed to envelope Meade's left flank with the greater part of his army, he might, perhaps, have rolled it up as he proposed.

his subordinates or demoralize his own army. He was gambling in the art of war.

An imprudent move on the Federal side gave *Lee* an advantage upon which he could not have counted. We have seen¹ that on the evening of the 1st of July, when Geary's division was placed in position, he was ordered by Hancock to occupy the high ground to the right of Little Round Top; on the morning of the 2d, he was removed to Culps Hill, and replaced in part by Sickles's corps. Birney formed his division with its left resting on Little Round Top, and its right in a direct line toward the Cemetery, connecting with Humphreys's division.² As Sickles did not like his position, he went to headquarters, and reported the fact and the circumstances which led him to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked³ Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it; but as his engagements did not permit him to do so, he sent Hunt, his chief of artillery,⁴ who went with Sickles to the Peach Orchard on the Emmits-

Sickles
dislikes
his line.

¹ 3 B. & L., 416.

² His picket line was in the Emmitsburg road, the sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance. Sickles says that he was directed by Meade to relieve a division of the XII Corps, which was massed a little to his left (1 C. W., 1865, 297), and which had taken position there during the night. "I did so," he says, "reporting, however, to General Meade that that division was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity," that Birney, pursuant to his orders, occupied a position identical with that indicated by Hancock (3 B. & L., 417).

³ "I did not," he says, "receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters." Meade says (in his testimony) that when Sickles asked whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such a manner as in his judgment he should deem most suitable, he answered: "Certainly, within the limits of the general instruction I have given to you. Any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you."

⁴ 3 B. & L., 301.

burg road; there Sickles pointed out the ridges to which he proposed to advance his line, because they commanded the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and constituted a favorable position for the enemy to hold. On the other hand, Hunt saw¹ that "it would so greatly lengthen our line—which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps—as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it, and it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front." At Hunt's suggestion, Sickles ordered a reconnaissance to ascertain whether the wood was occupied by the enemy. Hunt would not authorize Sickles to move his corps forward; but reported to Meade for his instructions, explaining that Sickles's proposed line was a good one in itself, that it offered favorable positions for artillery; but that its relations to other lines were such that he could not advise it, and suggested that he examine it himself, before ordering its occupation.

Sickles, instead of leaving his corps on the line that he had taken between Round Top and Cemetery Hill, advanced, and formed Birney's division facing southwest from Devil's Den, 500 yards in front of Little Round Top, to the Peach Orchard on the Emmitsburg road; and Humphreys's division facing northwest along this road from Birney's right, to a point 700 yards in front of the left of Hancock's corps. In his testimony, Sickles says²:

Sickles
advances.

¹3 B. & L., 302. Map XVIII.

²1 C. W., 1865, 298. "I waited for some time for orders, but received none. The enemy's demonstrations became more and more decided. . . . My outposts became engaged and were being driven back from their supports. I determined to wait no longer the absence of orders, and proceeded to make my dispositions on the advanced line, as it is called."

It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take—as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force—would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us.

The result showed that Sickles was wrong in this conclusion. It does not follow that a position is untenable because the enemy hold another 1000 or 1200 yards off and 30 feet higher. The flanks of Meade's line along the "fishhook" were strong; and any points without natural advantages could be defended, either by placing more troops there or by allowing the enemy to pass and preparing to receive him.¹ Comment.

The new line was nearly a mile longer than the one he was told to occupy.² It exposed a salient, almost a


¹ Sickles says, in his article in *Battles and Leaders* (3 B. & L., 417), that "the direct line from Hancock's left to Round Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, boulders, and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, impracticable for artillery, and hopelessly dominated by the ridge in front." There is indeed a swale swamp, etc., a little to the west of the direct line, but as the enemy would have to pass it before attacking him, his position was all the stronger for it. He might have posted his infantry where they could protect themselves by trenches, or in the edge of the woods, and sweep with their fire these swales and the ground in their front; there were points from which artillery could sweep this ground with their flanking fire, or that for some distance in front with their direct fire.



² The ground at the Peach Orchard rises 30 or 40 feet in 400 or 500 yards from the basins of little brooks on the south and west. Along the Emmitsburg road for some 800 yards north of the Peach Orchard, it is a little higher than the original line, and has a good field of fire in front.

right angle, to the enemy, in a position where they could enfilade both faces, approach under cover, and bring a strong force to bear upon it before it could be reinforced. Meade's original line presented one salient at the Cemetery, where Lee could readily concentrate half his army, and which required Meade's constant care and attention to be prepared to bring up his reserves. *Alexander* says of Sickles's advance¹: "It exchanged strong ground for weak, and gave the Confederates an advantage not otherwise possible. They would be quite sure to crush the isolated Third Corps. If their attack was properly organized and conducted, it might become possible to rush and carry the Federal main line in pursuit of the fugitives." Sickles admitted that he could not defend so long a line with his own corps; but he thought it would be a good one if Meade would bring up troops enough to defend it. The duty of a corps commander is to carry out the orders of his chief. It is only in exceptional cases that he can be justified in departing from them to gain some advantage that may offer itself under circumstances that were not foreseen. There are more ways than one to fight a battle; and it rests with the commander in chief to change his dispositions on the

From that point the line which Sickles occupied is on the eastern slope of the ridge, with a very limited field of fire, and little or no natural protection against hostile fire. About 500 yards west of the Peach Orchard, is a ridge of about the same height running north and south, which may be regarded as an extension of Seminary Ridge, wooded up to the crest on the western slope; and offering to the enemy a long line upon which to plant his artillery, and bring a converging fire upon that of Sickles at the Peach Orchard. The ground from Peach Orchard to Round Tops is rugged and woody, and covered in places with large boulders. Upon the whole, it is little better, if any, for the defenders than for the assailants; and is in some respects like the line to which Sickles objected.

¹ *Alexander*, 393.





instant that new conditions make it wise. It is easy to imagine what would happen if each corps commander should plan a battle of his own, dispose of his corps accordingly, and ask the general in chief to come and examine his new position and order up half the army to support him.¹

While² making his dispositions on this line, Sickles received an order from headquarters to attend a consultation of corps commanders; but before he got there, the sound of the cannon announced that the battle had opened. He found that the consultation had been broken up. Meade's new dispositions. Meade excused him from dismounting, and told him to return at once and that he would follow him. On Sickles's return, he found that *Longstreet* was advancing. Meade soon afterwards arrived, and said that Sickles's line was too extended, and expressed his doubt as to his being able to hold it. Sickles said that he could not with one corps hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that if supported, the line could be held, and in his judgment it was a strong line and the best one. He said,³ however, that if Meade disapproved of it, it was not yet too late to take any position he might indicate. "'I think it is too late,' said Meade. 'The enemy will not allow you. If you need more artillery call on the reserve artillery.' (Bang! a single gun sounded.) 'The Fifth Corps—and a division of Hancock's—will support you.'"⁴ Meade then

¹ If Sickles thought that the advanced position was better to defend with his own corps than the line he was told to defend, it was right for him to recommend it, but there was no excuse for his occupying it without proper authority.

² I C. W., 1865, 298.

³ I C. W., 1865, 299.

⁴ *Two Days of War*, by Henry Edwin Tremain, 63.

galloped back, sending Warren,¹ his chief engineer, to look after the left of the position near the Round Top.² He also sent several other staff officers to hurry up Sykes, who was already on his way, and sent Caldwell's³ division of Hancock's corps to report to him.

Birney formed his line with Ward's brigade near Devil's Den on the left, De Trobriand in the centre, on a rocky knoll, and Graham on the right in the Peach Orchard with his right on the Emmitsburg road.⁴ Humphreys formed Carr's and Brewster's brigades in two lines,⁵ his left joining the right of Birney's division, and his right resting opposite the left of Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps. Burling's brigade was moved to the left to support Birney.

As it had been a severe test for Meade to be called upon to command an army on the eve of a great battle; so after taking up a strong position, the
Comment. task was made much harder by this step, which forced him at the opening of the fight to make his own plans conform to those of a subordinate. This he accomplished in part by sending troops to defend the new lines; while he himself took a central position from which he could direct the movements of all the corps, and be prepared to meet an attack from whatever quarter it might develop. It would have been better if he had given positive orders to draw the line back as soon as it could be done with safety. It would have

¹ I C. W., 1865, 377.

² I C. W., 1865, 332.

³ 43 R., 369.

⁴ Smith's battery was placed so as to command the gorge at the base of Round Top, Winslow's battery on the right of Ward's brigade, Clark's and Ames's batteries farther to the right, in rear of the Peach Orchard, supported by Graham's brigade with a regiment each of Ward's and De Trobriand's; Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turnbull's batteries were placed near the Emmitsburg road, on the front, parallel with it.

⁵ 43 R., 531.

discouraged the troops; but not so much as it did to leave them to be slaughtered.¹ Although Meade neglected this precaution, he showed skill and energy in reinforcing the line, and in directing the general course of the battle. *Alexander* says²:

Meade saw the danger, and with military foresight prepared to meet it with every available man. There was not during the war a finer example of efficient military command than that displayed by Meade on this occasion. He immediately began to bring to the scene reinforcements, both of infantry and artillery, from every available corps and every part of his line.

When Warren³ reached Little Round Top, he found it unoccupied except as a signal station. He realized, of course, that it was the key to the whole position. Great Round Top was higher; Warren at
Little
Round Top. but its slopes were steep, and it was heavily wooded. If the enemy should gain Little Round Top, they would not only take Sickles's new line in flank, but if they should plant their guns there, they would enfilade the line between that point and Cemetery Hill, and the troops defending it would have to change front. Warren saw that the long line of woods on the west side of the Emmitsburg Pike furnished an excellent place for the enemy to form out of sight, so [he says] I requested the captain of the battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling through the air, the sound of it reached the enemy's troops and caused every one to look in the direction of it. This motion revealed to me the glistening of gun-barrels and bayonets of the ene-

¹ Sickles's high rank made it awkward to place another officer in general charge of the movements in this part of the field.

² *Alexander*, 393.

³ 3 B. & L., 307.

my's line of battle already formed and far outflanking the position of any of our troops; so that the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top was unopposed . . . The discovery was intensely thrilling to my feelings, and almost appalling.

Warren immediately sent a written despatch to Meade to send a division at least to him; but before a single man arrived, he saw the whole line of the enemy advancing in splendid array, "shouting in the most confident tones." The musket balls began to fly around and the signal officer was about to withdraw, but Warren persuaded him to keep waving his flags to make the enemy believe that the hill was occupied in force.

At the conference of corps commanders¹ when the battle opened, Meade had ordered Sykes to throw his whole corps to the left of the line, and hold it at all hazards. Various staff officers from Sickles met him on the way and asked for assistance. He explained to them that it was impossible for him to give it; the key of the battle-field was intrusted to his keeping; and he could not and would not jeopardize it by a division of his forces. Warren met him² at the Wheat Field and Sykes sent Vincent's brigade with him at double-quick to Little Round Top.³

At 11 A.M., when *Longstreet* received the order to attack, *Pickett's* division and *Law's* brigade of *Hood's* division⁴ were absent. Fearing that his force was too weak to make an attack, he waited until 12 M. for *Law* to arrive. *Lee* had instructed him to keep the column out of sight of the Federal signal station on Little Round Top, and had

Longstreet
advances.

¹ 43 R., 592.

⁴ 44 R., 358.

² 43 R., 600, 622, 623.

³ 43 R., 616, 617.

sent with him engineer officers to point out the route. After the head of *McLaws's* division had passed Black Horse Tavern,¹ it was found that the road led over the crest of a hill which was in full view of the signal station. *Longstreet* then countermarched, losing four or five miles, and advanced *Hood's* division, which had been in the rear, by another route.

At about 3 P.M.,² his troops reached the Emmitsburg road about 1000 yards south of the Peach Orchard, and formed on the right of *Anderson's* division of *Hill's* corps. The artillery on both sides opened fire. At about 3.30 P.M., thirty-six Confederate guns were in action against the Peach Orchard and the adjacent lines, and ten against the Federal left.³

Lee and his friends have gone so far as to charge his failure to *Longstreet's* repeated delays. "Had I had *Stonewall Jackson* at Gettysburg," he said,⁴ "I would have won a great victory"; "be- Comment. cause he knew," says *Fitz Lee*, "it would have been sufficient for *Jackson* to have known his general views without transmitting positive orders, and that *Stonewall*, quick and impatient, would have been driving in the enemy's flank ere the rays of the morning sun lifted the mists from the Round Top."

Buford, however, would doubtless have given warning of his approach in time for *Hancock* and *Sickles* to meet him, and at least hold him in check until *Sykes* could come and drive him back.

¹ 44 R., 366, 372.

² *Alexander*, 394; 44 R., 391, 367, 372.

³ *Alexander*, 395. The ranges were generally between 500 and 700 yards.

⁴ *Lee's Lee*, 281.

At about 4, *Hood* received the order to advance.¹ The order of attack was, that as soon as *Longstreet's* two divisions came into position, the movement should begin on the right, *Law's* brigade leading, and the other commands taking it up successively toward the left.²

Lee's
order of
attack.

Law advanced at double-quick across the ploughed field east of the³ Emmitsburg pike for half a mile or more, under heavy artillery fire. Two regiments then moved towards Round Top, and three towards Little Round Top. *Robertson* was ordered to⁴ keep well closed on *Law's* left, and let his left rest on the Emmitsburg Pike; but his brigade would not fill the space between the pike and *Law's* left, and by trying to keep in touch with it, he also suffered heavily from artillery. Two of his regiments moved toward Little Round Top, and two toward Devil's Den.

Hood's first
line
advances.

Ward, who was holding this position with his brigade and Smith's artillery, advanced his right and centre, and both sides rushed to obtain possession of a stone wall between them. Ward sent to *Birney* for reinforcements. After sending *Vincent* to Little Round Top, Sykes suggested that *Birney* should close his division on Smith's battery, and hold the edge of the woods on its right⁵; and

Sykes
forms the
Federal left.

¹ 3 B. & L., 320.

² Law sent out scouts to locate the left of the Federal line; and (3 B. & L., 321) finding that there was no force on Round Top, and that the other side of the "mountain" could be reached by a good farm road, was satisfied that the true point of attack was Round Top, and the Federal left and rear. Hood agreed with him; but Longstreet, who had himself so repeatedly advised in vain against the proposed attack directed Hood to begin at once.

³ 44 R., 391.

⁴ 44 R., 404.

⁵ 43 R., 592.

promised to fill the gap that he opened. Birney agreed,¹ and Sykes posted Barnes with Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades in the edge of the woods on De Trobriand's right, forming with Birney a continuous line from the open ground south of the Peach Orchard to Plum Run at the foot of Little Round Top; but both flanks of this line were open. Sykes then turned to meet Ayres's division which was coming next.

Meanwhile one of *Law's* regiments, with the two regiments of *Robertson* that had joined it, advanced directly to Little Round Top and two moved up Plum Run. Vincent had just arrived and formed his line along the slope of the hill where the men were partly protected from fire by large bowlders with which it was covered. *Law* tried in vain to break the centre of this line. At every charge he was repulsed with terrible slaughter. He then attacked the right regiment, which through some misunderstanding of its orders was thrown into confusion.

But Warren again had seen the danger, and riding up to his old brigade, then Weed's of Ayres's division of Sykes's corps, "by order of General Meade," detached the leading regiment, and brought it up to Little Round Top followed by Hazlitt's battery, just as the right of Vincent's line was falling back. Sykes, returning, found the greater part² of Weed's brigade moving away from Little Round Top by Sickles's order, and at once sent it back "at double-quick step." The hill was saved but only after a hard struggle.³

¹ He sent one regiment from De Trobriand and one from Burling to Ward's support and one from each to close the gap between Ward and De Trobriand.

² 43 R., 593.

³ The two regiments on *Law's* right passed over the summit of Round Top, and then, finding it unoccupied except by the sharpshooters retiring


Hood's second line, *Benning* and *Anderson*, did not follow *Law* to the Round Tops, but turned to the left, and joining *Robertson*, closed in upon Ward's left flank, and drove his men and Smith's guns from the rock and woods between Devil's Den and the Wheat Field.¹ *Benning's* advance was then checked by the fire from Little Round Top, and *Anderson's* by that of De Trobriand and Sweitzer upon his left flank, which forced him to fall back.


On *Anderson's* left,² *Kershaw* of *McLaws's* division had been directed to commence the attack as soon as *Hood* became engaged.³ After *Anderson* had withdrawn, as *Law*, then commanding *Hood's* division, had seen nothing of *Kershaw*,⁴ he hurried back, and

before them, turned to the left and bore down on Vincent's brigade, slightly outflanking its left, at Little Round Top; but were repulsed. This was between 5 and 6 P.M. The account of this attack by Col. Oates of the 15th Alabama, in his *War between the Union and the Confederacy*, appears to be in accordance with military probabilities. The reports of the Federal officers appear to convey a wrong impression about the difficulties of repelling these two regiments.


¹ Ward at Devil's Den (43 R., 494), reinforced from De Trobriand (43 R., 506-514; 44 R., 404), extended his left to cover the gorge, and swinging his right around to the stone wall, outflanked Robertson's left (3 B. & L., 324). Hood had been wounded, and Law, who succeeded to the command of his division (3 B. & L., 324), seeing Ward's advance, brought up Benning from his second line on Robertson's right, and Anderson on his left. Two regiments from Laws's own brigade at the foot of Little Round Top joined in the advance; and all closed in upon Smith's battery, and the flank of Ward's brigade, and drove them from their position, while Anderson's men crossed the stonewall at the southwestern point of the Wheat Field. ² 44 R., 366-8.

³ Swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on his right and co-operating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal line and told that Barksdale on his left would move with him and conform to his movements. ⁴ 3 B. & L., 325.





0 100 200 300 400 500 YARDS



asked for immediate support on his left. At about 5.40 P.M.,¹ *Kershaw* moved toward the knoll where Barnes had just been posted, so as to strike it with his centre, and thus attack the orchard on its rear. Changing front to the left as he passed the Rose house, his line was broken. This checked its advance, subjecting it to a heavy fire of artillery. The two regiments on the left advanced toward the Peach Orchard; the two on the right, toward the wood; that in the centre, toward the batteries near the cross-road in their front.² *Semmes*³ followed *Kershaw* at about 300 yards. *Anderson* and one regiment of *Benning* again advanced. After fighting for some time, Barnes fell back.⁴ Thus De Trobriand's right was exposed, and he in turn fell back fighting to the northern edge of the Wheat Field.

Barnes might have held his ground against the troops who were coming against him; but not, perhaps, against all those of *Anderson*, *Kershaw*, and *Semmes*. **Comment.** He doubtless realized that if the enemy should concentrate a large part of his force, as he might and ought to have done, upon any part of Sickles's line, it would be broken, and the fragments exposed in detail to superior numbers. By moving back, he was in a better position to form with Sickles's retiring troops, and with those who might come up to support him, a new line which would stop the enemy's advance. It was most unfortunate that the attempt was made to hold the advanced line.

Burbank and Day of Ayres's division were placed⁴ on the right of Weed at Little Round Top; but soon

¹ Alexander, 395.

² 44 R., 368; 43 R., 601, etc.

³ Sweitzer yielded slowly, and took a position next to the road north of the Wheat Field. Tilton retired to the support of Bigelow's battery about 400 yards in the rear.

⁴ 43 R., 634, 644.

moved at double-quick across the marsh toward the Wheat Field and Devil's Den. Then Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps arrived at the front, and was put in position by a staff officer of Sykes with orders "to check and drive back the enemy who were advancing on the right of the V and the left of the III Corps."¹ If he had taken a position along the north and east of the Wheat Field, between Ayres and Barnes, he could have held it indefinitely, and had troops to spare. Instead of this, he advanced Cross's brigade in line of battle through the Wheat Field, with his left wing extending into the woods, and sent Kelley's brigade on Cross's right against *Kershaw*.² An aide of Sickles came up for reinforcements, and persuaded Zook³ to take his brigade still farther to the right. Brooke was held in reserve.

Birney⁴ formed a line across the Wheat Field with all the troops he could collect from De Trobriand's and Burling's brigades; and as Cross and Kelley advanced, charged through the field. *Semmes* and *Anderson* fell back to the stone wall on the south of the field while *Kershaw* was driven through the woods by Kelley and Zook.⁵

When Cross's ammunition gave out,⁶ Caldwell directed Brooke to advance and relieve him. Brooke passed Cross's line, and pushed on without support

¹ 43 R., 379.


² 43 R., 379, 389.


³ Tremain, *Two Days of War*, p. 83.

⁴ De Trobriand, 500; 43 R., 483, 520, 570, 571.

⁵ Zook's brigade (44 R., 398) appears to have moved off to the left, and his troops were intermingled with Kelley's in one confused mass. *Kershaw*'s right regiment kept Kelley in check for some time, but it was soon folded back "until its two wings were doubled on each other, or nearly so."

⁶ 43 R., 400.





TOUR INTERVALS 4 FEET

beyond De Trobriand's first position.¹ Caldwell saw his danger, and applied for aid to Barnes, who sent Sweitzer across to the southern edge of the Wheat Field. Brooke then asked for help²; and Caldwell ordered Zook up to his right. Caldwell advances too far. Burbank followed by Day wheeled to the right into the Wheat Field, and advanced into the woods.⁴ Thus the Federal left was turned around until it formed a broken line running nearly west from Little Round Top, and facing south, with its right and rear exposed to an attack from the direction of the Peach Orchard on the northwest. It is hard to divide the responsibility for these unfortunate manoeuvres.

Meanwhile, the two regiments of *Kershaw's* left had been driven back by the fire from the Peach Orchard, and that of his centre by this fire and that of the batteries near the Millerstown road.

Alexander, who had great respect for *Longstreet*, says:

By some unaccountable lack of appreciation of the situation, Barksdale, Wofford, and all the brigades of Anderson's division are still left idle spectators of the combat while Hood's division is wearing itself out. . . . Longstreet of course is responsible. . . . It must be said that the management of the battle on the Confederate side during the afternoon was conspicuously bad. The fighting was superb. But there appears to have been little supervision, and there was entire failure everywhere to conform to the original plan of the battle as indicated by Lee. . . . Our effort this afternoon will be seen to be a monumental failure.³

¹ And drove back Anderson and Semmes. At length, Kershaw's right gave way (44 R., 369) and fell back to reform at a stone wall near the Rose house, some 200 yards to its right and rear. Brooke pressed forward far ahead of the line and drove the Confederates back (43 R., 400).

² 43 R., 646.

³ Alexander, 393, 394, 397.



At 6.20, however, *Barksdale* at last advanced on the Orchard.¹ *Kershaw's* two left regiments then rallied; and advancing from the south, while *Barksdale* advanced from the west, broke into the western angle of the Peach Orchard, which had long been exposed to heavy fire from the long line of Confederate guns. All the Federal batteries except Bigelow's then withdrew. *Graham's* men rallied at the edge of the Orchard and at the little cross-road northeast of *Want's*; but were obliged to yield. As soon as the apex of *Sickles's* line was broken, both wings collapsed. If *Longstreet* had attacked the Peach Orchard earlier in the day, he would probably have done better.

Wofford,² following *Barksdale*, soon swept *Graham's* men before him, and then pressed on toward the Wheat Field, while *Barksdale*, turning to the left, followed *Graham's* men, who were falling back on *Humphreys*. When *Wofford* came out of the Orchard, *Kershaw* gathered his own men and those of *Semmes* behind the stone wall near the Rose house in reserve, while *Anderson*³ advanced against *Brooke*, who held him at bay for some time, but fell back when, he heard that his right was turned. The Federal line while held in front by *Anderson* and *Benning*, was pressed

¹ One regiment of *Ward's* and one of *De Trobriand's* had been detached from their brigades, and formed on the southern edge of the Orchard. One of *Burling's* regiments formed at the cross-roads near *Want's* house; the other remained in reserve; all were under *Graham's* command. When *Barksdale* appeared, two more from *Brewster's* brigade were successively sent to him. *Graham* sent three regiments (43 R., 497-504) over the cross-roads to defend the approach from the southwest, and two or three more across the *Emmitsburg* road as far as the *Sherfy* house.

² 44 R., 369.

³ 44 R., 397, 401.



on its right and rear by *Kershaw* and *Wofford*. *Zook*, *Kelley*, *Brooke*, *Sweitzer*, *Burbank*, and *Day* were driven back under cross fire in some confusion and with a loss of over 2000 men.

Both sides had nearly reached the limit of their endurance. *Longstreet's* men, however, felt that they had driven the enemy back to their last stronghold and that one more desperate push would reward them for all that they had suffered. Following the fugitives up the slope of the ridge north of Little Round Top, they were horrified to see another line of Federal troops coming over the crest to meet them. *Sykes* had brought up his 3d division under *Crawford*. If any more force were required to hold the Confederates in check, all *Sedgwick's* corps was now at hand directly in *Crawford's* rear.¹

Crawford
and
Sedgwick
secure the
Federal left.

At about 6 P.M.,² *Sickles* was dangerously wounded; and *Birney* succeeded to his command. The retreat of *Graham's* men from the Peach Orchard exposed the left of *Humphreys's* division; and *Barksdale* veered off to his left to take it in flank. *Alexander* with six batteries of artillery then galloped across the *Emmitsburg* road, and came into action on the eastern slope of the rising ground about the Peach Orchard.³ *Brewster* with *Humphreys's* left brigade, exposed to an enfilading fire, fell slowly back to the right and rear with great loss. At about 6.30 P.M., the troops of *Anderson's* division, *Wilcox*, *Perry*, and *Wright*, on *Barksdale's* left, began to advance in succession⁴;

Barksdale
and *Wilcox*
drive
Humphreys
back.

¹ This corps had arrived at Rock Creek at 4 P.M., and at about 6 was ordered to move with all dispatch and support the II, III, and V, Corps.

² 43 R., 483.

³ *Alexander*, 399.

⁴ 44 R., 617; *Wilcox* had to move 300 or 400 yards to the left to clear

Birney ordered Humphreys to throw back his left, and form a line oblique to and in rear of the one he then held. This last attempt to save a piece of Sickles's advanced line was attended with fearful consequences; for it exposed Carr with Humphreys's right brigade, some 700 yards in advance of Hancock's line, to precisely the same danger to which Brewster was already exposed.

Perry advanced,¹ and poured in a destructive cross-fire on Carr's right flank. Humphreys at last received orders to fall back to the ridge between Cemetery Hill and Round Top; his line of retreat with his left refused carried him farther and farther from the shattered remnants of Birney's division. *Barksdale*, *Wilcox*, and *Perry* followed, pouring in their fire with that of *Alexander's* batteries on Humphreys's front and flanks.

I have never [he says] been under a hotter fire of musketry and artillery combined. For the moment, I thought the day lost. I did not order my troops² to fall back rapidly; because, so far as I could see, the crest in my rear was vacant, and I knew that when troops got to moving back rapidly, it was exceedingly difficult to stop them just where you wanted to stop them. . . . I disliked to fall back at double-quick before the enemy.³

When Meade heard that Sickles was disabled,⁴ he ordered Hancock to assume command of the III Corps, in addition to that of his own. By this arrangement, the immediate command of the III Corps devolved

Barksdale's brigade and this caused some delay. *Seeley's* and *Turnbull's* batteries fired upon *Barksdale* and *Wilcox* as they advanced.

¹ 44 R., 631; 43 R., 543.

² 1 C. W., 1865, 392.

³ *Seeley's* battery remained to the last moment, withdrawing without difficulty; *Turnbull's* fell back with the infantry.

⁴ 43 R., 370.

upon Gibbon. Hancock immediately led Willard's brigade of Hay's division toward the left; and was about to advance to the support of Birney's division, when he found that it had all been driven to the rear.¹ Hancock directed Humphreys to form his command on the ground which Caldwell had occupied in the morning. At 7.30, *Barksdale* was wrapping his brigade around Humphreys's flank. Willard charged,² and drove back *Barksdale's* right; but as he pushed on,³ the cross fire from *Alexander's* artillery and *Barksdale's* retiring infantry was too severe. Willard's brigade retired in good order; but with the loss of its commander and a large part of the brigade.

Willard
charges
Barksdale.

At Hancock's request for reinforcements, Meade had sent two divisions of the I Corps, now under Newton; but they had not yet filled the space between the left of Hancock and the right of Sykes's corps.⁴ This space was swept by the fire of the Federal artillery, which, when the infantry was driven back from the Peach Orchard, had been skilfully posted by Lieutenant-Colonel McGilvery on the slope just east of the headquarters of Plum Run to cover their retreat; but it could not keep down the fire of *Alexander's* guns nor check the advance of *Barksdale*, who still pushed on around Humphreys's left.

Just as *Barksdale's* men were emerging in disorder

¹ Bigelow's battery, which had been posted near to the Trostle house, retired by prolonge, firing cannister which for a short time effectually checked the advance of the enemy, and thus gave McGilvery time to form a new line of three or four batteries.

² *New York at Gettysburg*, 57.

³ 43 R. 472.

⁴ At 6.30 or 7.00 p.m., Doubleday took his position on Gibbon's left. At about 7.00 or 7.30, Robinson came up on Doubleday's left, extending the line to connect with Crawford's division of Sykes's corps.

from the bushes at the head of Plum Run, Hancock came riding by. The 1st Minnesota, of Harrow's brigade of Gibbon's division, was the only 1st Minn. regiment at hand. Hancock ordered it to charges charge. Eighty per cent. of this gallant Barksdale. regiment fell; but *Barksdale's* brigade was again driven back with heavy loss.¹

On Humphreys's right at the Codori house, and between it and Hancock's original line, the three other regiments of Harrow's brigade and Brown's battery, sent out to fill the gap left by Sickles's advance, fired at the Confederate line as it passed. Two regiments of Hall's brigade advanced,² delivered a few volleys on the enemy's line as it passed, and then, themselves out-flanked, retreated with a loss of nearly one third of their number.

By this time the number of Humphreys's troops was very small, says Hancock,³ scarcely equal to an ordinary battalion, but with many colors, this small command being composed of the fragments of many shattered regiments.

On *Perry's* left, *Wright* advanced, charged upon the two regiments at the Codori house, drove them back, held for awhile three of Brown's guns, and Wright reaches Federal line. pushed on to within fifteen or twenty yards of the main line of battle of Gibbon's division,⁴ sheltered by a low stone wall and a barricade of fence rails. A few of *Wright's* men leaped over the line; but were speedily dispatched. This was the farthest point reached by the Confederates. The others were driven back by the fire of the defenders, and pursued by some of Webb's and Standard's men as far as the Emmitsburg road.

¹ 43 R., 425. ² 43 R., 436, 448, 451. ³ 43 R., 371. ⁴ 43 R., 446.

On *Wright's* left¹ *Posey* advanced nearly to the Emmitsburg road, driving back a regiment of *Smyth's* brigade. At about dark he was recalled.

At about 6 P.M., *Meade*² had moved *Williams's* division and *Lockwood's* brigade of *Slocum's* corps from the right of the line to the rear of the ground where *Caldwell* had been in the morning.

On *Humphreys's* left³ there was still a gap defended only by *McGilvery's* batteries. To drive back the hostile bands that were approaching here, General *Meade* in person brought up two regiments of *Lockwood's* brigade of the XII Corps, which drove the enemy from the field and advanced almost to the Peach Orchard. The remnants of *Humphreys's* two brigades joined in this advance and recaptured *Bigelow's* guns which had been captured near the Trostle house by a regiment of *Barksdale's* brigade. *Barksdale* was mortally wounded. *Wilcox* had called⁴ for support, but as no support came, withdrew his men, "to prevent their entire destruction or capture." *Perry* followed.

Lockwood
charges
Barksdale.

The Confederate troops were exhausted by the unequal contest. *Longstreet's* advance on the right had already been stopped by *Sedgwick's* appearance north of Round Top. *Alexander* says⁵:

Confederate
attack
repulsed.

The mere sight of the long lines and solid blue masses which appeared to the Confederates as they cleared the woods, and scanned the opposite slopes, was calculated to paralyze the advance. . . . [A story] of the time was that the Federal commander was heard to give his orders: "At-

¹ 44 R., 633; 43 R., 465.

³ 43 R., 371.

⁴ 44 R., 618.

² 43 R., 773, 778.

⁵ *Alexander*, 407.

tention, universe! Nations into line! By kingdom! Right wheel." [March.]

Longstreet so disposed his command as to hold the ground gained on the right,¹ withdrawing his left to the Peach Orchard; *Hill's* troops fell back to Seminary Ridge.

Early in the morning of July 2d,² *Ewell* had received orders from *Lee*, that as soon as guns of *Longstreet's* corps were heard, he should make a diversion in its favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered. At about 5 P.M., *Johnson* began a heavy cannonade, but after an hour, finding that his guns were overpowered by those of the enemy, withdrew all but one battery. At about sundown, *Early* moved *Hays's* and *Hoke's* brigades against Cemetery Hill. The right of the line advanced directly for the northern spur, which was steep, and so sharp that there was no room for the defenders to hold a line that would sweep with their fire the ground at its foot. *Harris's* brigade of *Ames's* division was posted one or two hundred yards back of the northern crest, and here the assailants approaching from the front and flank³ broke through at the apex, struck the right wing of *Harris's* brigade in the rear and took many prisoners,⁴ broke the line of *von Gilsa's* brigade,⁵ and pushed completely through *Wiedrich's* battery into *Rickett's*. *Howard* sent *Schurz* with two regiments of his division; and *Hancock* sent *Carroll's* brigade to *Ames's* support.⁶ The cannoneers of the captured batteries defended their guns with handspikes, stones, and fence-rails.⁷ The infantry, falling back,⁸ held the enemy in check until *Schurz* and

¹ 44 R., 319.

² 44 R., 446.

³ 43 R., 715-720.

⁴ 43 R., 714.

⁵ 43 R., 358.

⁶ 43 R., 706, 729.

⁷ 43 R., 354.

⁸ 43 R., 714.

Carroll came up, and drove them down the hill. *Hoke's* brigade (under *Avery*), on the left of *Early's* line, was not protected in its advance by the contour of the land, but exposed to a terrific fire¹ in front and flank from the long line of Federal batteries on Culp's and Cemetery Hills. The Confederates say that they fell back before the line of infantry they found confronting them on the hill.

Gordon's brigade was to support them; but when *Early* saw that no advance was made by *Rodes* on his right, he halted *Gordon*, because "it was evident that the crest of the hill could not be held by my two brigades² supported by this one without any other assistance; and that the attempt would be attended with a useless sacrifice of life."

Rodes, whose line passed through the town of Gettysburg, had been ordered to cooperate with the attacking force on his right as soon as any good opportunity³ offered. Seeing a stir among the enemy in his front, he thought that the opportunity had come, and proposed to *Early* to attack in concert with him. *Early* agreed and attacked, as we have seen, without waiting for *Rodes*, who says he "had to traverse a distance of 1200 or 1400 yards, while General *Early* had to move only half that distance without change of front; the result was that, before I drove the enemy's skirmishers in, General *Early* had attacked and had been compelled to withdraw." *Rodes* thought to attack would be a useless sacrifice of life; but took up a strong position southwest of the town in the hollow of an old roadbed and nearer to the enemy, so as to be ready to attack in the morning.⁴

¹ 44 R., 480.

² 44 R., 470.

³ 44 R., 556.

⁴ Alexander, 411.

We saw that at about 6 P.M.,¹ Slocum's corps, temporarily under Williams, was ordered to that part of the field first held by Caldwell's division. Johnson takes Greene's brigade, however, was left at Culp's Hill to guard the trenches. Williams with Ruger's division and Lockwood's brigade arrived, as we saw, in time to do good service by striking the last blow to the assailants of Sickles's line. Geary was to follow with Candy's and Kane's brigades; but through a mistake in his instructions, he took the road which led him across Rock Creek Bridge. Greene, with one brigade on the left of the line, had to occupy the intrenchments of the whole army corps.

Just as Williams and Geary had left, the enemy appeared in their vacant trenches. A regiment which Greene had moved out to extend his line was taken in flank, and fell back to a trench nearly at right angles to its new position, and covering the right flank of the brigade. Greene sent to Wadsworth and to Howard for assistance; three regiments came from each. After *Longstreet* and *Hill* had been repulsed, Williams and Geary were sent back to Culp's Hill.² At about 10 P.M. the attack ceased. Kane's brigade came up soon after, and Candy's at 1.30 A.M. of the 3d, and both formed on Greene's right.

When Ruger returned, finding the breastworks on the extreme right of the original line unoccupied, he took possession of them; and placed his division for the night in a strong position facing north with his right resting on Rock Creek. Lockwood bivouacked near Ruger's left. Neither side was willing to risk a night attack.

¹ 43 R., 759, 773, 778, 856.

² 43 R., 759, 761, 774, 856.

Meade acted wisely in sending a large force of the XII Corps to Cemetery Ridge. As it proved, the position could have been held without it, but it made it more secure. In war there is always an element of chance to be considered. If the attack on that position could be repulsed, Meade might, if he chose, turn the greater part of his force on Culp's Hill. It was most unfortunate, however, that all of Geary's brigade was not left to guard the trenches. Few officers could have accomplished what Greene did with his little band in holding off such overwhelming numbers.

The losses of the Federals in the second day's fight have been computed at 9039, those of the Confederates at 7129.¹

We have seen that on the 22d of June, when *Stuart* was ordered to cross the Potomac, he suggested that he should pass to the rear of the Federals, and proceed with all dispatch to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania. *Lee's* authority for this route was given upon the condition² that Hooker's army was moving northward; otherwise *Stuart* was ordered to withdraw to the west of the mountain, cross at Shepherdstown, and move over to Frederick. In either case, after crossing, he must move on and feel the right of *Ewell's* troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. Hooker did not move north as soon as expected; so that *Stuart's* direct route would have taken him through the heart of the Federal army. He was delayed for several days in reaching the Potomac; and after crossing, was more intent on collecting provisions, and creating an alarm in Washington, than on placing himself with all dispatch on

Stuart's
raid.

¹ Vanderslice, 111, 112. See table, p. 289.

² 45 R., 913, 923.

Ewell's right.¹ He reached Gettysburg on the 2d of July.²

His long absence was a bitter disappointment to *Lee*, whose movements preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the lack of his cavalry, somewhat as *Hooker's* had been by *Stoneman's* absence, two months before. As soon as it was known³ that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, *Lee* sent orders to *Robertson* and *Jones*, who had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to join the army

¹ 44 R., 694. On the 28th, within three or four miles of the capital, he captured a train of one hundred and twenty-five wagons, about eight miles long; and then moved north no faster than he could move this train. On the same day, he captured about four hundred prisoners, and waited to parole them, cut the telegraph wire, etc. He reached Union Mills on the 29th, encountered Kilpatrick's cavalry division at Hanover on the 30th, his column strung out with Chambliss's brigade in front, then a long train of two hundred wagons, and then Hampton's brigade in the rear, while Fitz Lee's on the left was out of touch (44 R., 696). Kilpatrick held the town.

Stuart says: "Our wagon train was now a source of serious embarrassment, but I thought, by making a *détour* to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. . . . I was satisfied. . . . that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna. . . . The night's march, over a very dark road, was one of peculiar hardship, owing to the loss of rest, to both man and horse. After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance." Thus Kilpatrick had cut him off from Ewell, who with Early and Rodes was then near Heidlersburg, about ten miles northwest of Hanover. "Reaching Dover, Pa., on the morning of July 1st," he says, "I was unable to find our forces. . . . After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle, where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived . . . in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out."

Stuart wanted to levy contributions on the inhabitants, but found the town occupied in force by the Federals under W. F. Smith. During the night Stuart received a dispatch from Lee that the army was at Gettysburg and had been engaged with the enemy's advance.

² 44 R., 697. Having a skirmish on the way, at Hunterstown, with Kilpatrick. See Map IV., at end of Book I.

³ 44 R., 321.

without delay. *Stuart* was put in position on the York and Heidlersburg roads on the left of the army.

Meanwhile,¹ after the Army of the Potomac crossed that river, Kilpatrick's cavalry division was kept in front, and Gregg's on the right flank. At daybreak the 2d of July, Gregg with McIntosh's and Irwin Gregg's brigades and Randol's battery, left Hanover at daybreak, and at about noon took position on the Hanover road near its intersection with the Low Dutch road, about three miles east of Gettysburg. Huey's brigade had been sent to Westminster to guard the trains. At about 7 P.M., where the Hanover road crossed a low ridge about two and one half miles east of Gettysburg, Gregg encountered a line of infantry skirmishers from *Johnson's* division of *Ewell's* corps which fell back a short distance. At about ten, Gregg fell back to the point where the Baltimore Pike crosses White River.

During the night of the 2d and the morning of the 3d, the right of *Lee's* army was exposed to an attack from the troops behind the Round Tops; but the V Corps was exhausted by hard fighting, and ^{Meade's} opportunity. the VI by long marching. If, however, Meade had given his troops a few hours of sleep, he could have started Sedgwick before daybreak to make a circuit around *Longstreet's* right flank, and fall upon his rear, while Sykes attacked him in front, and the cavalry cut off his retreat or otherwise cooperated.

Soon after the fighting had ceased,² Meade called a council of war of his corps commanders, and after some conversation, put the question in writing, "Should

¹ *The Right Flank at Gettysburg*, by Wm. Brooke-Rawle.

² 3 B. & L., 313.

the army remain in its present position or take up some other?" With a few limitations all voted to

remain and await another attack. Just
Meade's as the council broke up Meade said to
Council.

Gibbon, commanding the II Corps, "If *Lee* attacks to-morrow it will be on your front." Gibbon asked why. "Because," he said, "he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our centre." Gibbon hoped he would. Several who ought to know more about war have severely criticised Meade for holding this council, and because, during the day, he had required his chief of staff to prepare orders for retiring to Pipe Creek in case it should be advisable. There is no better preparation for a bold attack or a vigorous defence than the certainty of a safe retreat if needed to a stronger position.

Lee says¹:

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right

Lee orders would enable the artillery to render the assault-
assault. ing columns, we should ultimately succeed, and

it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time.

The advantages which *Lee* had gained were unimportant. The opposing armies now confronted each other on ground of Meade's own choosing. *Lee* had no good reason to believe that the losses he had

¹ 44 R., 320. See Map XIX., at end.

inflicted were any greater than those he had suffered. He could not now hope to turn Meade's left.

Longstreet had from the first realized the danger of a frontal attack and protested against it.¹ After sunset *Lee* rode over and gave him his orders.

I thought that it would not do [said *Longstreet*]; that the point had been fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting up his defences; that the divisions of *Longstreet* objects. *McLaws* and *Hood* were holding a mile along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and get on our rear towards the Potomac River; . . . that the column as he proposed to organize it would have only about thirteen thousand men; . . . that the column would have to march a mile under concentrating battery fire, and a thousand yards under long range musketry; that the conditions were different from those in the days of Napoleon, when field batteries had a range of six hundred yards and musketry about sixty yards. . . . He said that the distance was not more than fourteen hundred yards. . . . He concluded that the divisions of *McLaws* and *Hood* could remain on the defensive line; that he would reinforce by divisions of the Third Corps and *Pickett's* brigades, and stated the points to which the march should be directed. I asked the strength of the column. He stated fifteen thousand. Opinion was then expressed that the fifteen thousand men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to proceed.

This was written some time after the war; but it is probable that it gives a fair account of the conversation.

¹ *Longstreet*, 385, 386.

Longstreet was ordered to attack the next morning,¹ reinforced by *Pickett's* three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, and *Ewell* to assail the enemy's right at the same time. "General *Longstreet's* dispositions," says *Lee*, "were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General *Ewell*, General *Johnson* had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him."

During the night, *Ewell*² reinforced *Johnson* with *Smith's* brigade of *Early's* division, and *Daniel's* and *O'Neal's* of *Rodes's* division. At 1 A.M., *Johnson* driven from *Culp's Hill*. *Rugg's* and *Kinzie's* batteries of U. S. Artillery under *Muhlenberg*³ were placed in position behind the centre of the line formed by *Geary's* and *Ruger's* divisions. At 4.30 A.M., they opened fire on the left of *Johnson's* line; and *Kane* and *Greene* attacked the troops in their front; but with little success. Soon after 4 A.M.,⁴ *Ruger*, ordered to try the right of the line of breastworks, sent forward the 27th Indiana and 2d Massachusetts of *Colgrove's* brigade; but through a mistake in the transmission of the order, the attack was made in earnest, without success, and with loss of about half their number.⁵ Meanwhile,⁶ *McDougall* on *Ruger's* left gradually swung around to the right. At 7.30, *Lockwood* came up to *Greene's* support. At about 8 *Johnson* attacked in vain. At 8.45, *Shaler's* brigade came from *Sedgwick's* corps. Soon after 10 A.M., *Steuart's* brigade on *Johnson's* left⁷ formed line at right angles to the

¹ 44 R., 320.² 44 R., 447.³ 43 R., 870.⁴ *Ruger* says 10, but see *History of the 27th Indiana, by a member of Co. C.*, 378 ff.⁵ 43 R., 781.⁶ 43 R., 784.⁷ 44 R., 511.

breastworks it had occupied, and advanced against Geary's right. The left of his line, thus exposed to a flank fire from Williams's artillery, and to a fire in front, flank, and rear from his infantry, was driven back¹ with great loss. *Johnson*, finding the enemy² too strong to be dislodged, fell back to the creek and at night withdrew to the northwest of Gettysburg.

Lee reinforced *Longstreet* with *Heth's* division, and two brigades of *Pender's* division of *Hill's* corps. *Hill* was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford *Longstreet* further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained. *Longstreet's* batteries were placed in positions which *Lee* thought "would enable them to silence those of the enemy." *Hill's* artillery and part of *Ewell's* were ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely.

Lee orders
Longstreet
to attack.

A clump of trees, which has since become famous, was indicated as the proposed point of attack.³ Orders were given to *Pickett* to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the centre of the assaulting column would arrive at the point; his line was to be the guide, and *Pettigrew*, in command of *Heth's* division, moving on the same line was to assault this point at the same moment.⁴ *Anderson* was ordered to hold his division in

¹ 43 R., 830.

² 44 R., 504.

³ 44 R., 359.

⁴ *Pickett's* division was formed with two brigades in the front line, supported by the third, and *Wilcox's* brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.

readiness to move up in support if it should be necessary. *Alexander*,¹ acting chief of artillery, was directed by *Longstreet* to post all of his guns for a preliminary cannonade; and then to take a position whence he could best observe the effect of the fire, and determine the proper moment to give the signal for *Pickett* to advance. The signal for the opening of the cannonade would be given by *Longstreet* himself after the infantry brigades were all in position.²

Meade still held the line of the "fishhook"; Slocum at Culp's Hill, Howard at Cemetery Hill, Hancock, and Newton now commanding the I Corps, Meade's position. along Cemetery Ridge, Sykes and Sedgwick at the Round Tops with McCandless's brigade advanced, and Howe's division withdrawn to protect the left flank against an approach from the south. Birney, with Sickles's corps, was in reserve behind Hancock and Sykes. Although Meade had more guns than *Lee*, he had no room on the front assailed to mount them. Six batteries were on Cemetery Hill behind Howard's corps; five behind the right and centre, and ten directly in front of the left of Hancock's corps; and two of long-range rifles on Little Round Top. The point of attack was held by Hancock's corps, which was drawn up³ on a line beginning near the Emanuel Trostle house on the Emmitsburg road about half a mile from the outskirts

Heth's division, under the command of Pettigrew, was formed in one line and was supported by part of Pender's division, under Trimble.

¹ *Alexander*, 418.

² Of Longstreet's eighty-three guns, eight were left on the extreme right to cover that flank, and seventy-five were posted along the Emmitsburg road in the position from which Sickles had been driven; sixty-three guns (Vanderslice, 123) of Hill's corps were on Seminary Ridge on Alexander's left and rear and extending as far as the Chambersburg Pike.

³ Walker's *Second Corps*, 291.

of Gettysburg, and extending south about five hundred yards along Hays's front, the southern half along a stone wall which then ran westward one hundred yards and then south again, along Gibbon's front, forming the "bloody angle." There the wall was lower, and surmounted by a country post and rail fence for about one hundred yards to a point directly in front of the clump of trees to which *Longstreet's* attack was directed; south of this the stone wall was replaced by an ordinary rail fence, which had been thrown down to form the revetment of a shelter trench, which afforded cover against direct fire to troops lying down.¹

Between 10 and 11 A.M. [says Hunt, Meade's chief of artillery, then at Cemetery Ridge²], a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was covered by batteries already in line, or going into position. They stretched—apparently in one unbroken mass—from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely if ever, abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly

¹ Hays's division was posted in two lines from the right of the line to the angle; Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division, from a point north of the angle to one in front of the trees; and then Hall's and Harrow's brigades of the same division. Rowley's brigade of Doubleday's division of Newton's corps was on the left of Gibbon, Stannard's in a clump of trees a little in advance of Rowley's left, and Stone's in the second line. Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps occupied the lowest part of Cemetery Ridge, on Doubleday's left and about abreast of his second line.

Of the artillery, six batteries under Osborne were on Cemetery Hill behind Howard's corps; five, Woodruff's, Arnold's, Cushing's, Brown's, and Rorty's, all under Hazard, behind Hays's and Gibbon's divisions; ten, under McGilvery, directly in front of Caldwell's division; two of long-range rifles, under Gibbs and Rittenhouse, on Little Round Top.

² 3 B. & L., 371.

be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell, . . . but it most probably meant an assault on our centre, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half-mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire. With such an object the cannonade would be long and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success. From the great extent of the ground occupied by the enemy's batteries it was evident that all the artillery on our west front . . . must concur as a unit. . . . It was of first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such a condition as to make them an easy prey. [The battery commanders were, therefore, ordered] to withhold their fire for fifteen or twenty minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire on those batteries that were most destructive to us—but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault.

These orders had just been given when, at 1 P.M., the signal gun was fired, and the Confederates opened fire.

The scene [says Hunt'] was indescribably grand.² . . . Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek

¹ 3 B. & L., 372 ff.

² The cannonade of one hundred and thirty-eight Confederate and eighty Federal guns was the heaviest and most terrible ever witnessed upon any battle-field in this country (Vanderslice, p. 123).

shelter. . . . [This fire also] instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over the whole field. . . . Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests, I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead.

Meade had moved his headquarters to Powers Hill. Hunt ordered the fire to cease and soon found that Meade had already so directed. During the cannonade, "the men of the infantry," says Haskell,¹ "have seized their arms, and behind their works, behind every rock, in every ditch, wherever there is any shelter, they hug their ground, silent, quiet, unterrified, little harmed." Many who had been without sleep, and almost without food, for twenty-four hours, fell asleep directly in front of the Federal batteries that were firing over them. The artillery suffered severely; caissons were exploded, pieces dismounted, and horses and men shot down. Several of the batteries, disabled or without ammunition, were withdrawn and replaced by fresh ones.

Before the firing began, *Longstreet* said to *Alexander*: "The intention is to advance² the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When that moment arrives, advise Gen. *Pickett*, and, of course, advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack." Neither *Alexander* nor *Longstreet* approved of the charge; but when


¹Haskell, 97.



²Alexander, 421.

the fire of the Federals ceased, *Alexander* felt sure that they were "feeling the punishment"; and, as his ammunition was nearly exhausted, at 1.40, sent a note to *Pickett*: "For God's sake come quick¹ . . . or my ammunition will not let me support you properly." The note reached *Pickett* in *Longstreet's* presence. He read it, and handed it to *Longstreet* who read and stood silent. *Pickett* said: "General, shall I advance?" "*Longstreet*," says *Alexander* in his memoirs, "knew that it must be done, but was unwilling to speak the words. He turned in his saddle and looked away. *Pickett* saluted, and said: 'I am going to move forward, sir,' and galloped off." At 2.30² *Pickett* gave the order. *Alexander* then found³ that his supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen.

Pickett's men moved at a walk majestically on, keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half-way between their first position and that of the enemy, they halted for a short rest in a ravine which partially sheltered them from the enemy's fire, and then moved on. *Kemper's* and *Garnett's* brigades formed *Pickett's* first line,⁴ and *Armistead's* alone the second line. In order to reach the clump of trees, *Pickett* made a half wheel to the left with each brigade.⁵ *Alexander*⁶ selected fifteen or eighteen guns which had some ammunition left, followed *Pickett*, and came into action on the rising ground just west of the Emmitsburg road. In *Heth's* division under *Pettigrew* (from left to right) were *Archer's*, *Pettigrew's* own, *Davis's*, and *Brockenborough's*

¹ *Alexander*, 423.² 44 R., 385.³ 44 R., 360.⁴ *Kemper's* on the right.⁵ *Vanderslice*, 125.⁶ 3 B. & L., 365.





brigades. Behind the right of this line were *Scales's* and *Lane's* brigades under *Trimble*; about 14,000 in all. *Pettigrew's* orders were to attack¹ the enemy's batteries, keeping dressed to the right.² In moving off there was at first some confusion³ in the line, as *Pickett's* division was continually moving to the left. This was soon corrected; and the advance was made in good order. By the time⁴ they reached the Emmitsburg road, the two divisions were on a line; and together they crossed the road.⁵

"The infantry," says Alexander,⁶ "had no sooner debouched on the plain than all the [Federal] line, which had been nearly silent, broke out again with all its batteries. A storm of shell began bursting over and among [the Confederate] infantry. . . . All the [Confederate] guns, silent as the infantry passed between them, reopened over their heads when the lines had got a couple of hundred yards away." The Federal artillery fired only at the infantry. The batteries⁷ on Hancock's front had by his orders kept up their fire when by Hunt's orders the others had ceased; so that when the column advanced, their long-range ammunition was exhausted, and they could not fire until the enemy came within canister range.⁸ As the lines converged⁹ most if not all of the regiments played into close column by division as they advanced.¹⁰ As they approached the point of attack they were exposed to the front and slant fire of the infantry, and to the front, slant, and enfilade fire of the artillery

¹ 44 R., 650.

² And moving in line with Pickett's division which was on his right, and to march obliquely to the left.

³ 44 R., 643.

⁴ Vanderslice, 130.

⁵ 44 R., 647.

⁶ 3 B. & L., 375.

⁷ 3 B. & L., 375, 385, 386.

⁸ Walker, 294.

⁹ 43 R., 461.

¹⁰ 43 R., 437.

from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops.¹ Their graceful lines underwent an instantaneous transformation in a dense cloud of smoke and dust; arms, heads, blankets, guns, and knapsacks were tossed in the air, and the moan from the battle-field was heard amid the storm of battle.² Both flanks of the advancing line were shot to pieces while in the centre the losses were made up by those who were led by their instinct and object to crowd in towards the clump of trees.

As *Pettigrew* moved on, his left flank was exposed to a well directed flank and reverse fire³ at close range from the 8th Ohio, which had been out on *Pettigrew's* picket duty and halted to see the enemy's attack.

lines pass by. *Pettigrew's* line of march⁴ led his division against that of *Hays*, which, strongly posted behind a stone wall, reserved its fire until the assailants came within a distance of 100 or 200 yards, and then delivered a most galling fire of musketry and artillery that so reduced their ranks, already cut up, that, after a short fusillade, seeing that any further attempt to carry the position was hopeless, they fled in confusion or fell on the ground and surrendered.⁵ *Archer's* brigade, however, on the extreme right of *Pettigrew's* line, keeping in touch with *Pickett's* division,⁶ reached the Federal works at the angle. *Lane's* and *Scales's* brigades then rushed forward, and took position on *Pickett's* left.

¹ To the enfilade fire (44 R., 386) of the batteries on the Round Tops and the front and slant fire of McGilvery's forty guns and soon afterwards that of Doubleday's and half of Gibbon's infantry and of Hazard's artillery, while Pettigrew's lines came under the front fire of the other half and the slant fire of Osburne's artillery and for a while even of Howard's infantry.

² A Northern officer, quoted in Lee's *Lee*, 297.

³ 43 R., 462.

⁵ 44 R., 659; 43 R., 465; Walker, 297.

⁴ 44 R., 659.

⁶ 44 R., 659.

Garnett's brigade of *Pickett's* division, much shattered, kept up the advance until within twenty paces of the wall held by *Webb's* brigade, when, for a moment, it recoiled under the terrific fire both from the batteries and from the sheltered infantry.

Pickett's
attack.

Kemper, by a flank march, closed in on *Garnett's* right with the loss of a large part of his brigade from the fire of *Hall's* men at close range as they passed. *Armistead* crowded in between *Kemper* and *Garnett*, and all rushed forward in their rivalry "to plant the Southern banner on the walls of the enemy."

As *Kemper* passed,¹ *Hancock* galloped up to *Standard's* brigade of *Doubleday's* division, and ordered him to move his regiments to the front, and attack the flank of the assailants. The low wall at the point of attack was held by the 69th and part of the 71st Pa.,² of *Webb's* brigade, and by *Cushing's* battery,³ which was run down to the wall when the enemy approached.⁴ The rest of the 71st was behind the wall in the rear and just north of the angle. The 72d was held in reserve about a hundred yards back behind the crest of the hill. Three of *Cushing's* limbers had been blown up,⁵ wheels shot off his guns, and all replaced under fire; till at last, severely wounded himself, his officers all killed or wounded, and with but cannoneers enough to man a section, he pushed his guns to the fence in front, and was killed while serving one of his last rounds of canister into the ranks of the advancing enemy.

General *Armistead* then gathered several hundred men of his own⁶ and of *Kemper's*, *Garnett's*, and *Archer's* brigades; and with several battle-flags leaped

¹ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, 296.

² 43 R., 432.

³ Vanderslice, 126.

⁴ 43 R., 428.

⁵ 43 R., 437.

⁶ *New York at Gettysburg*, 78.

over the wall, and passed through the gap that the guns had held. The right of the 69th swung back. The men of the 71st rallied on the rest of their regiment in the rear. The 72d was ordered up to hold the crest, advanced to within forty paces of the enemy's line,¹ and fought persistently; but the Confederates gained ground.

Confederate Hall,² seeing the break in Webb's line, charge moved his brigade by the right flank, closing repulsed. in upon the enemy who had crossed the wall.

The enemy [says Hall] was rapidly gaining a foothold; organization was mostly lost; in the confusion commands were useless. . . . With the officers of my staff and a few others who seemed to comprehend what was required, the head of the line, still slowly moving by the flank, was crowded closer to the enemy. . . . In some places the line was several files deep.

Three regiments from Harrow's brigade joined in the line.

So eager are the troops to join in the fray [says Walker³] that men break from the ranks and rush toward the point where the head of the Confederate column . . . still lies within the Union lines, incapable of making further progress, and fast being walled in by a force against which it may not long contend. It is a moment for personal example, and personal examples are not wanting.

Several officers ride mounted through an interval between the Union battalions, and call upon the troops to go forward.

The line [says Hall⁴] remained in this way for about ten minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when,

¹ Part of the 69th and 71st Pa. held their position even after the enemy were in their rear.

² 43 R., 439.

³ Walker, 298.

⁴ 43 R., 440.

by a simultaneous effort upon the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the enemy, and after a few minutes of desperate, often hand to hand fighting, the crowd—for such had become that part of the enemy's column that had passed the fence—threw down their arms and were taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fled in great disorder. The Second Brigade [Webb's] had again joined the right of my line, which now occupied the position originally held by that command.

Twenty colors were captured within a space one hundred yards square. Many men of both our own and of the enemy had their clothes blown off for a large space around their wounds by the close discharge; between 1500 and 2000 prisoners were taken.

On the left, two regiment's of Stannard's brigade of Doubleday's division¹ advanced, changed front to the right, and poured in their fire on the right flank of the assaulting column. Sickles's corps under Birney was advancing to turn *Pickett's* right. On the Federal right, Hays advanced his right wing against *Pettigrew's* left, and Robinson was coming up to turn it and then fall upon *Pickett*.

In twenty or thirty minutes² after *Pickett's* division had advanced, *Wilcox's* and *Perry's* brigades of *Anderson's* division went to its support. Not a man of *Pickett's* division could *Wilcox* see; but on he moved, down the slopes, with *Perry's* brigade on his left,³ and reached the head of Plum Run just as *Pickett's* division had been routed. One of Stannard's regiments faced about, and poured in its fire on *Perry's* left flank. *Wilcox* and *Perry*, seeing

Wilcox's
advance.

¹ 13th and 16th Vt.

² 44 R., 620.

³ 44 R., 632.

nothing of *Pickett* and no hope of support from infantry or artillery, fell back.

It is a popular belief that if this gap where *Armistead* entered had not been closed, Meade's line would have been shattered and the battle lost. But

Comment. this is far from probable. About 30,000¹ men were closing around the 3000 of *Pickett's* shattered division, which was left in a medley mass without organization, exhausted by their heroic efforts to push ahead where as many of their comrades had been slaughtered, and where their little band was rapidly melting away before their eyes. If they had forced their way through into the mass of troops that was awaiting them, what could they do? Where could they go? They had no power to manœuvre. Instinct would force them to lay down their arms, or crowd together in a surging mass that would push on over the bodies of slain and wounded enemies and friends, wherever the boldest or rashest might lead it. Penetrating a hostile line like that on Cemetery Ridge was like entering the jaws of a monster.

On the morning of the 3d, *Jenkins's* brigade was assigned to *Stuart's* command.² It was acting as
Cavalry mounted infantry, and equipped with En-
battle on field rifles, but through some error was only
Federal furnished with ten rounds of ammunition.
right. In the afternoon, *Stuart* with this brigade, those of *Chambliss*, *Hampton*, and *Fitz Lee*, and three

¹ At 3.30 Shaler's brigade, then at Culp's Hill, was sent to report to Newton (43 R., 681). Eustis and Torbert (43 R., 663) between 4 and 5 P.M. (43 R., 785), McDougall about 4 P.M.—at 4.30 P.M. (43 R., 801), and toward the close of the day Lockwood were sent from the same point to support the centre of the line. Artillery was brought up from the right and left and from the reserve.

² McClellan's *Stuart*, 337.

batteries of horse artillery, moved out on the York turnpike to a point about three miles east and a little north of Gettysburg, to guard *Ewell's* left flank, and to command a view of the routes leading to the enemy's rear¹; he also proposed, if opportunity offered, to make a diversion which might aid the Confederate infantry; he took up a position behind a low and partly wooded ridge south of Stallsmith's,² dismounted one battalion of Jenkins's brigade, and sent it forward to occupy Rummel's barn and a line of fences on its right.

On the morning of March 3d, Gregg was ordered to resume his place on the right of the infantry line and make a demonstration. Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division was already at the crossing of the Hanover and Low Dutch roads. Gregg placed his two brigades so as to cover the ground from Custer's left to the right of the XII Corps. Early in the afternoon, Gregg received word that a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been observed from Cemetery Hill moving toward the right of our line. At the same time Custer was relieved and ordered to join Kilpatrick on the left of the line. McIntosh's brigade took position mounted in the woods on the Low Dutch road facing northwest and in a clover field near the Lott house. At about 2 P.M., McIntosh deployed a strong skirmish line towards the wooded crest about half a mile in front of his position. *Jenkins* then advanced his skirmish line, and occupied a line of fences a short distance to the south from Rummel's barn. McIntosh's line, which reached a stone and rail fence

¹ 44 R., 699.

² Which commanded a wide stretch of open land to the south reaching beyond the roads leading east from Gettysburg, where his mounted men were out of sight.

parallel to that occupied by the enemy was dismounted, reinforced, and extended, and became quickly engaged.

To meet this, the Confederate skirmish line was strongly reinforced from the woods by dismounted men, and the batteries were placed in position on the wooded crest, and opened fire. Randol's battery, of three-inch ordnance guns, went into position near the Lott house, and fired on Rummel's barn, compelling the enemy to abandon it. The Federal line then advanced, driving back *Jenkins's*, *Fitz Lee's*, and *Hampton's* dismounted men. The right of the Federal line still rested in the woods. Gregg stopped Custer, who went at once to McIntosh's support. One regiment¹ extended to the left of the skirmish line along Little Run to cover the Hanover road; another² reinforce the right. Pennington's battery of six guns went into position on the Hanover road. Randol and Pennington soon silenced the Confederate guns. A regiment from *Chambliss's* brigade, mounted, advanced in line to the support of the Confederate skirmishers, and made a terrific onslaught. Then two of *Chambliss's* regiments charged, mounted, the right of the Federal skirmish line, and drove it back; one of *Fitz Lee's* regiments charged and was met by one of Custer's; then, the rest of *Hampton's* and of *Fitz Lee's*; then Irwin Gregg's brigade arrived but did not advance beyond the line of the artillery, which kept up its fire on *Stuart's* cavalry at distances from three-quarters of a mile to fifty yards, while McIntosh's and Custer's cavalry fired on it from right and left and those who were mounted charged from time to time in small bands from every direction.³

¹ The 6th Mich.

² The 5th Mich.

³ The Federal ammunition was running short. Fitz Lee sent forward the 1st Va., which charged the Federal right and centre.

After a hard fight, both sides retired to the ground they had occupied before the fight. Each side claims to have driven the other from the field.

The number of Federals was about 5000, of whom not more than about 3000 were actually engaged. The number of Confederates was about 7000, of whom

The right of the Federal skirmish line swung back behind a fence; the 7th Mich. at once moved forward from the direction of the Reeve house in close columns of squadrons and advanced to the attack; but on coming up to the fence, halted. The 1st Va. came up on the other side. Both regiments fought face to face across the fence with their carbines and revolvers, while a scorching fire was poured upon the 1st Va. from either flank. The Confederate dismounted line came up and assisted the 1st Va. to pass the fence, while one or two of Chambliss's regiments came mounted. The 7th Mich. gave way in disorder, the enemy following in close pursuit. The 1st Va. becoming strung out by this movement, was exposed to a heavy fire from the two batteries in front, and from the dense skirmish lines on the flanks, while some of the 5th Mich., who had succeeded in mounting, advanced to assist the 7th. The 1st Va. then fell back on its supports, which were advancing to its assistance. This was at about 4 o'clock.

Stuart sent two regiments of Hampton's brigades (44 R., 698; Vanderslice, 137) in close columns to charge the Federal batteries, which poured into them percussion shell and canister, from three-quarters of a mile. The dismounted men fell back right and left, and such as could, got to their horses. The mounted skirmishers rallied and formed line. The 1st Mich. in close columns of squadrons charged from between the batteries. The Federals used sabres; the Confederates mostly sabres but some pistols. A Federal battery kept up its fire until the enemy, was within fifty yards, and the head of the 1st Mich. had come into the line of its fire. Staggered by the fearful execution of the two batteries (W. Brooke-Rawle, 24) the men in the front line of the Confederate columns drew in their horses and wavered. Some turned, and the columns formed out to the right and left; but those behind kept pushing on. Custer charged with the 1st Mich., and checked Hampton's advance. Three more regiments of Hampton's brigades followed; but met with a like fate. The Federals closed in upon them from every side. Then came four regiments of Fitz Lee's brigade. All were attacked in flank by McIntosh's men from the woods. Small parties rallied and mounted and poured down from all sides.

Jenkins's brigade of mounted infantry, 1600, retired after firing ten rounds.

The Federals lost 201 in killed and wounded and 74 in missing; the Confederates 125 and 57. This contest, which was held on the Federal right at the time of the great infantry charge on the left centre, was creditable to the Federal cavalry; it completed their education by giving them practice in the use of their horses and sabres.¹ *Stuart's* horses were sadly jaded by their long raid, the Federal artillery was very effective, and the Federal horsemen did not hesitate to attack superior numbers.

On the 1st of July, after the cavalry fight at Hanover, Kilpatrick² with his division went to Berlin to intercept *Stuart*, but failed. On the 2d, he marched across the country, and reached the battlefield at 2 P.M.; then, Gregg sent him to Hunterstown, where he had a skirmish with *Stuart*, then, to Two Taverns, where he arrived at daylight of the 3d. At 8 A.M., Pleasonton sent him to attack the enemy's right and rear with his division and Merritt's Regular brigade, then at Emmitsburg. Custer remained on the right flank with Gregg. At 1 P.M., Farnsworth reached the enemy's right; at 3, Merritt came in on Farnsworth's left. *Law*, in command of *Hood's* division, met this attack³ by deploying *Anderson's* brigade and a regiment of *Robertson's* from the base of Round Top nearly to Willoughby's Run. At 5.30, after *Longstreet's* charge had been repulsed, Kilpatrick ordered an attack with both

¹ This fight has been thought by some to prove the superiority of the sabre to the firearm. Custer's bombastic report (quoted by W. Brooke-Rawle, 27) challenges the annals of war to produce a more brilliant or successful charge of cavalry. But some features of the fight Custer perhaps overlooked.

² 43 R., 992.

³ 44 R., 397.

brigades, Merritt, dismounted, on the left, and Farnsworth, mounted, on the right.¹ Farnsworth protested against throwing his handful of men over rough ground through timber against a brigade of infantry; but Kilpatrick took the responsibility and ordered him to charge. Farnsworth with one of his regiments broke through the Confederate skirmish line, and galloped along until he came under the close fire of a regiment of *Law's* brigade, which had turned back to meet him; then wheeled about, and rode up to a battery on *Anderson's* line; was driven back by the fire of its support; wheeled back, and struck the fire of another of *Law's* regiments; and then tried to force his way home through the skirmish line but was surrounded and killed. These manœuvres only served to divert the attention of one or two Confederate brigades that were watching the developments of the battle.

As soon as the grand assault was repulsed, Meade² went to the extreme left of his line with the determination of advancing the left, and making an assault upon the enemy. When he arrived, he gave the necessary orders for the pick-

Advance of
V and VI
Corps.

ets and skirmishers in front to be thrown forward to feel the enemy, and for preparations to be made for the assault. At five o'clock, Crawford received orders from Sykes to advance McCandless's brigade, then just east of the Wheat Field, to enter the woods, and drive out the enemy. Sedgwick sent two brigades to cooperate. At about 5.30, McCandless, followed by Nevin, with Bartlett in reserve, dashed across the Wheat Field, cleared the woods in front, and then turned to the left, charged *Benning's* brigade on the left flank, and captured many prisoners. *Long-*

¹ Vanderslice, 140.

² C. W., 1865, 333.

street's right fell back to Seminary Ridge.¹ "The great length of the line," says Meade, "and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the movement subsequently made, before the report given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated."

The next day, which was the 4th of July, it was reported to Meade from the extreme right that the

July 4th. enemy had disappeared; but that they still maintained their appearance on his left and

centre. Slocum's corps advanced; and Howard's pushed into Gettysburg, and found that the enemy had retired from his circular position and assumed one nearly parallel to Meade's left and centre. It rained very violently during portions of this day, "so violently," says Meade, "as to interrupt any very active operations if I had designed making them."

During the night he learned that the enemy had retired through the Fairfield and Cashtown passes.

The battle of Gettysburg will ever be memorable for the valor displayed by the troops on both sides,

Heavy unsurpassed in any other battle in this or
losses. perhaps in any war. Troops have seldom

endured as heavy fire as that directed against the assailants on each side in this battle; and yet in this and in other battles of this war, the troops on both sides, in several cases, continued to advance under such ordeals. Col. T. L. Livermore estimates the number of Federals killed and wounded as 17,684, or 212 to every 1000 actually engaged, and that of the Confederates 22,638, or 301 to every 1000. Such ratios

¹ N. Y. at Gettysburg, 87; 43 R., 654, 657.

**ESTIMATE OF LOSSES IN KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING
JULY 1-3.**

FEDERALS			CONFEDERATES			
Artillery Res.		242	Reported Modified			
I 6059	Wadsworth Robinson Doubleday Artillery	2155 1690 2103 106	I 7539	McLaws Pickett Hood Artillery	2178 2888 2280 181	2178 2888 2280 181
II 4369	Caldwell Gibson Hays Artillery	1275 1647 1291 149	II 5937	Early Johnson Rodes Artillery	1188 1873 2853 22	1600 1873 3300 22
III 4211	Birney Humphreys Artillery	2011 2092 106	III 6735	Anderson Heth Pender Artillery	2115 2850 1690 80	2115 4300 2200 80
V 2187	Barnes Ayres Crawford Artillery	904 1029 210 43	Cavalry 240	Stuart Artillery	240	240
VI 242	Wright Howe Newton Artillery	18 16 196 12	20,448		20,448	23,257
XI 3801	Barlow Steinwehr Schurz Artillery	1306 946 1476 69	LOSSES ESTIMATED BY T. L. L., 28,063			
XII 1082	Ruger Geary Indep. Artillery	359 540 174 9	LOSSES ESTIMATED BY VANDERSLICE:			
Cav. 852	Buford Gregg Kilpatrick	418 56 355 23	Federal Confed.			
Total		23,045	Reynolds's Grove Oak Ridge XI Corps Line	4071 1689 3195	4288 2355 977	
Killed	Wounded	Missing		8955	7720	
3155	14,529	5365	Round Top Wheat Field Peach Orchard Emmitts'b'g Road E. Cemetery Hill	575 4133 1285 2645 401	832 2822 1047 1978 450	
				9039	7129	
			Culp's Hill Cemetery Ridge Cav. Right Flank Cav. Left Flank	1155 2332 285 388	2000 5320 182	
				4160	7502	
				22,154	22,351	
				Killed and wounded	Missing	
			Federals Confederates	16,870 16,334	5241 6087	

The Federal losses are taken from the official report. The Confederate losses reported are shown in the first column. The report, however, is incomplete, and does not show the total losses. That these were much greater than the sum of the numbers reported is self-evident and is shown from the individual reports, from a comparison of the returns of May 30th and July 31st and from the number of prisoners. From this number Col. T. L. Livermore (T. L. L., 103) estimates the losses as 3903 killed, 18,735 wounded, and 5245 missing. In the second column the figures reported are modified to conform more nearly to the return of July 31st. Vanderslice has made a careful estimate of the losses of each brigade in each engagement on each day. A summary of his work is shown in the last table.

See T. L. L., 102, 103; 43 R., 187; 44 R., 346, 365, 476, 325, 375, 609; 45 R., 1065; Alexander, 444-446; Vanderslice, 52-67, 96-112, 142-163.

have hardly ever been attained by such numbers, even when stimulated by the fury of fanaticism, rather than by patriotic zeal.

The Army of the Potomac proved that its disasters at Chancellorsville were due to its leader, and not to its troops; but it also proved that the great commander who had so often defeated it was not invincible. As a military genius, Meade could not bear comparison with *Lee*; but his success in this campaign and battle was largely due to his superior direction. After taking command, Meade's first effort was, while covering Baltimore and Washington, to reach *Lee's* army before it could cross the Susquehanna, and exact contributions from Harrisburg and the rest of Pennsylvania. He had prepared to take up a defensive line at Pipe Creek, when opportunity offered to concentrate at Gettysburg, and induce *Lee* to attack him in a position of his own choosing. Explaining his general plan, he left much to Reynolds's judgment in carrying it out. Through Barlow's imprudence and Howard's bad management, the first day's fight was lost; but a position was taken which Warren and Hancock approved; and which Meade then occupied in force, in the hopes that *Lee* would attack.

Lee had at first proposed to assemble his troops at Cashtown; but the fight had begun at Gettysburg before he arrived. He was not willing to push too far until *Longstreet* came up, but prepared to attack the next day. *Longstreet* saw the danger, and wanted *Lee* to take a position to force Meade to attack. *Lee* insisted, and ordered *Longstreet* to attack, and turn Meade's left. *Ewell* wanted to make an attack of his own on Meade's right. *Lee* was persuaded to let him try. He knew very well

Summary of
July 1st.

Summary,
July 2d.

that his plan required that *Longstreet* should be strong at the point of attack, and that this could not be, unless the other parts of the Confederate line were weak. Rather than offend a subordinate, he authorized a plan he knew to be rash; and trusted that his enemy's inaction or mistake would favor him as they had so often favored him before. *Longstreet*, forced to yield to this plan, which he believed to be suicidal, was somewhat slow and awkward in carrying it out. Sickles, who like *Ewell* had his own views of how a battle should be fought, advanced his corps so far that it was exposed to the full force of *Longstreet's* attack, and so favored *Lee's* plan that against a weaker man than Meade it might have succeeded. Meade saw Sickles's danger, and thought it was too late to withdraw, for *Longstreet* had already begun to advance. He then took a central position where he could watch all parts of the field, and parried all *Lee's* blows like a skilful fencer. In the Wheat Field and Peach Orchard, both sides displayed prodigies of valor with only moderate skill or discretion. The line on the Emmitsburg road fell majestically back contesting every inch, and supported by suicidal charges of its supports. Sickles's advanced line was driven back with fearful slaughter to the position which Meade had first selected and which was then defended by the troops he had brought from all parts of the field. If Sickles had not advanced, he might have fortified his line; his supports would have reached him sooner than they did; and Meade would have had a shorter line to defend; for having a larger force than *Lee*, and fighting on ground of his own choosing, there is no sound reason to doubt that he would have repelled the attack. *Ewell's* little fights were too late; but if they had been earlier,

they might have accomplished no more. The troops engaged in the first day's battle were too badly shattered to fight to advantage on the second.

In the battle of the 1st and 2d Meade lost more men than *Lee*; but this was through the faults of his subordinates rather than his own. He held a position, however, which *Lee* could not take, and must attack or fall back with loss of prestige. This *Lee* was not willing to do. He preferred to strike a blow that would bring the war to a speedy end. Having gained some ground on each flank of Meade's position, he then proposed to strike at a point where Meade would not expect him. On the 2d, a few of *Wright's* men had crossed the Federal line near the Bloody Angle, and had been killed. Of course, their comrades held that if they had been supported, the Federal defence would have collapsed. *Lee* proposed on the third day to mass a large part of his army at this point; then, turning to the left, to attack the Federal line on its left and rear while *Ewell* should push his advantage on the right and *Stuart* with his cavalry should cut off the Federal retreat. *Longstreet*, who was to lead this attack, could not dissuade him. *Lee* says, "He [*Longstreet*] now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of *Hood* and *McLaws*. He was, therefore, reinforced by *Heth's* division and two brigades of *Pender's*." Even *Lee's* warmest supporters admit that without *Hood* and *McLaws* the attempt was hopeless; but some maintain that if they had cooperated, it would have succeeded. Even *Fitz Lee*, who defends his uncle's conduct of this battle, says¹:

¹ *Lee's Lee*, 289.

A consummate master of war such as Lee was would not drive *en masse* a column of fourteen thousand men across an open terrace thirteen or fourteen hundred yards, nearly every foot of it under a concentrated and converging fire of artillery, to attack an army, on fortified heights, of one hundred thousand, less its two days' losses, and give his entering wedge no support! Why, if every man in that assault had been bullet proof, and if the whole of those fourteen thousand splendid troops had arrived unharmed on Cemetery Ridge, what could have been accomplished? Not being able to kill them, there would have been time for the Federals to have seized, tied and taken them off in wagons, before their supports could have reached them. Amid the fire and smoke of this false move these troops did not know "some one had blundered," but had a right to feel that the movement had been well considered, and ordered because it had elements of success.

If Lee had realized all this at the time, it is hard to understand how he could have permitted the column to advance when he should have known that *Hood* and *McLaws* were not in supporting distance. The language of his own report appears to show that he had yielded to *Longstreet's* desire to defend his flank and rear with these divisions; and that it was in consequence of this that he had reinforced him by the troops from *Hill's* corps.¹ If, however, they had joined the column, or attacked at any other point, Meade could have opposed them with the V, VI, and other corps, or launched these

Comment.

¹ The report says (44 R., 320): "General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore,

corps upon the right flank of the assaulting column as *Longstreet* had feared. *Lee's* plan could only succeed if the officer in command of the Federal troops were so paralysed—as *Hooker* had been—that he could not take the proper measures to meet it.

Fitz Lee says¹:

Lee was bitterly disappointed at the day's results. . . . He was playing for big stakes and a decisive victory which would bring in its train peace to his people and success to his cause. . . .² "This had been a sad day to us," said *Lee*, "but we cannot always expect to win victories."

It was a sad day for the South, for at that time it was within a stone's throw of peace. Fate was against *Lee*; the high-water mark of Southern independence had been reached, and from that hour it began to ebb from the mountains of Pennsylvania until lost in the hills of Appomattox.

"It is all my fault," *Lee* exclaimed, and proceeded in person to rally his shattered troops. . . . With that wonderful magnanimity which *Lee* so fully possessed he took all the responsibility on his own broad shoulders.

Gettysburg was the last act of a drama which began at Chancellorsville or some time before. *Lee's* repeated

Lee. successes appear to have led him to believe

that he could take great risks in dealing with the Army of the Potomac. He has been unduly praised for his success in his former campaigns, and perhaps unduly censured for his failure in this. The principles of the art of war, and the rules for its conduct, are based upon probabilities; they may perhaps be violated once or twice with impunity, but there is no surer way to fail in the end than to violate them

reinforced by *Heth's* divisions and two brigades of *Pender's*, to the command of which General *Trimble* was assigned."

¹ *Lee's Lee*, 297.

² *Lee's Lee*, 298.

frequently. *Lee* probably understood those principles as well as any man in either army, and perhaps better; but in balancing the benefits of success against the evils of disaster, he was apt to be swayed by his natural combativeness, his sanguine disposition, his consciousness of his own strength, his tender regard for the feelings of others, and his faith in the justice of his cause. Those of *Lee's* friends who regard him as infallible, and believe that his every act was prompted by his unerring sagacity, do him great injustice. Few commanders, after such a career in dealing with incompetent adversaries, could fail to take a more sanguine view of his prospects of success than he could justify by cool calculation. To suppose that, if not affected by such influences, *Lee* would approve of such a manoeuvre as the charge of *Pickett*, *Pettigrew*, and *Trimble*, would be to remove him from the pedestal on which his military genius has placed him. His reputation does not depend upon such arguments. In his former campaigns, he had shown his superiority to every commander who had opposed him; and in those to come he was to show it in a manner even more creditable to his reputation as the greatest captain of his age.

Meade was a man of great refinement, but not of as profound an intellect as *Lee*, not a soldier by instinct, and not original in devising brilliant plans; but his clear understanding enabled him Meade. to discriminate between the plans of others; the opinions of some of the corps commanders, he valued as his own; he had a high respect for Warren's military genius, and especially for his quick perception. While he showed excellent judgment in the conduct of this campaign, yet in some instances he might doubtless

have done better. On the second day, Buford's division should not have been withdrawn from its position on the left until replaced by other cavalry; but should have remained to keep Meade informed of the movements on *Lee's* right. Meade did not intend to leave this post unoccupied; but whether he or Pleasanton was responsible for Buford's orders it is hard to determine. When Meade found that Sickles's line was too far advanced, it might have been wiser to give definite orders for its withdrawal. On this point, the opinions of experts are divided. Meade surely never authorized Caldwell to advance beyond the line he was sent to support. On the night of the 2d, and morning of the 3d, and again after the great charge, Meade did not take advantage of his opportunity to throw Sykes's and Sedgwick's corps on *Longstreet's* exposed right flank. Such an advance, if properly supported, on the evening of the 3d, would have rolled up the right of *Lee's* army, and the cavalry, if properly handled, would have completed the rout and cut off the retreat. On the 4th the problem was harder; but Meade might at least have taken up a position that would prevent *Lee's* escape without serious loss. *Lee's* artillery ammunition was exhausted, his loss in killed and wounded was greater than Meade had imagined, and the morale of his army was seriously impaired. The principles of grand tactics authorized and favored such a counterstroke, which would probably have ended the war in a short time; but much is to be said in favor of the conservative course that Meade adopted; and upon this question opinions are, perhaps, equally divided.

In the dread silence which followed the result of the great charge, it was hard for the men of the Army of

the Potomac to realize that some fearful ordeal was not awaiting them. The memory of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville was fresh in their minds; the great captain had at times been checked before, but never defeated in so great a battle. It was no ordinary task to direct the movements of the Army of the Potomac, so capable, so intelligent, and so long-suffering under incompetent leaders. A false move on Meade's part, or the mistake of a single commander, might perhaps turn his victory into defeat; to attack and be repulsed as McClellan was at the Antietam would destroy the prestige and perhaps the power of the Army of the Potomac. If *Lee* had been victorious and had shattered Meade's army at Gettysburg, he would have had Baltimore and Philadelphia at his mercy, and it is hard to say what might have been the result. The opening of the Mississippi might have been superfluous. Louis Napoleon was preparing to extend the boundaries of Mexico to its banks. Foreign powers might interfere. The peace party at the North might declare the war a failure. It might end for a time. But it is not in the nature of the American people to submit to a defeat. Every man, woman, and child of the loyal population would prepare for another effort. A popular government, an aristocracy, and an empire could not long live side by side on this continent. The sacrifices at Gettysburg would not have been forgotten.


By holding his position, restraining his natural desire to strike back, and forcing *Lee* to attack again, or to retreat after so severe a repulse, Meade insured the safety of the North and the opening of the Mississippi. To accomplish so great a task within a few days from the time he was placed in command, was the work of no ordinary talent; and Meade is well worthy of

the praise he has received for turning the tide of the Rebellion.

The battle of Gettysburg crowned the list of victories from one side of the continent to the other which on the 4th of July of 1863, rejoiced the hearts of the loyal citizens of the North. It was encouraging to learn that Rosecrans had outflanked *Bragg*, and driven him out of Central Tennessee; that Grant, by his persistent pushing, had at last found the line of least resistance of the defences of Vicksburg, and had cleared the way for the navy to advance and hold the Mississippi; that Banks was holding Port Hudson firmly in his grasp, and was about to remove the only remaining obstacle to the free navigation of the great river; and that Confederate attacks on points of minor importance had been repulsed.

Of the three great objective points for the Federal army, Vicksburg was already gained, Chattanooga was in sight, and Richmond, by far the most important, was only defended by the shattered remnants of *Lee's* forces. But the ultimate objective of the Federal army was the Confederate; in this respect, tactically, the battle of Champion's Hill and the fruitless assaults on Vicksburg and Port Hudson were not to be compared with the great victory that repulsed *Lee's* repeated assaults, shattered his army, and drove him back to the Rappahannock. Grant had captured or dispersed the army of *Pemberton*; but it was a common byword that the Rebellion's lease of life was borne on the saddle-bow of *Lee's* charger. By a vigorous advance of Meade's army, reinforced, as it might and should be, from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore, from the Ohio Railroad, the Peninsula, and, if required,

from all other fields of operations, there appeared to be good military reasons to believe that Richmond might now be taken, and the fratricidal war might now be brought to a speedy close.





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
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
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